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ABSTRACT 
When the first Nixon Administration took office, all the 
main conditions that make foreign policy innovation likely were 
present in an acute form: a combination of external and domestic 
crises coupled with widespread political self-doubt and unrest. 
There were essentially two alternatives for the new Administration: 
First, to implement a 'holding operation' that would preserve the 
key features of the conservative-realist definition of the US 
national interest, but would also include tactical adjustments to 
a changed environment that demanded - at least temporarily -a more 
differentiated policy of global containment. The second option open 
to the Nixon-Kissinger team was to set in motion a process of re- 
definition of the prevailing notions of national interest and 
security, and of the objectives of US foreign policy, questioning 
the basic (conservative-realist) ideological presuppositions that 
had guided this policy until the Vietnam debacle, and also the role 
played by the 'liberal' ideological discourse as a legitimating 
device disconnected from US actions - particularly in the Third 
World. 
The central thesis of the study is that substantial ideolo- 
gical innovation - not merely a change in tactics - was feasible 
and also necessary at the time in order to avoid a repetition of 
costly mistakes, to relate the US to emerging forces in world 
politics, and to restore an equilibrium between the ethical values 
that give cohesion to a free society and its actions abroad. 
Kissinger brought to office a conceptual framework that allowed 
him to impose significant coherence upon US foreign policy, but 
which also made it extremely difficult for him and Nixon to intro- 
duce the ideological innovations called for by the Vietnam 
experience. 
In this study four themes intertwine: (1) a consideration of 
the nature and functions of ideology in politics; (2) a charac- 
terization of US foreign policy ideology; (3) a discussion of the 
problem of innovation in the field of foreign policy; (4) an 
analysis of Kissinger's political thought and the Nixon-Kissinger 
foreign policy strategy. The conclusion is reached that under 
Nixon and Kissinger the conservative-realist aspect of US foreign 
policy ideology reached a higher point of political maturity and 
sophistication, without in any fundamental sense deviating from 
the assumptions about US aims and security interests that took 
America into Vietnam. 
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'Not ideas, but material and ideal interests 
directly govern man's conduct. Yet very 
frequently the "world images" which have 
been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has 
been pushed by the dynamic of interests. ' 
Max Weber 
(From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
edited by H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967, pp 64-5) 
'In any society the dominant groups are the 
ones with the most to hide about the way 
society works. Very often therefore truthful 
analyses are bound to have a critical ring, 
to seem like postures rather than objective 
statements... For all students of human 
society sympathy with the victims of historical 
processes and skepticism about the victors' 
claims provide essential safeguards against 
being taken in by the dominant mythology. A 
scholar who tries to be objective needs these 
feelings as part of his working equipment. ' 
Barrington Moore 
(Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democrac 
Allen Lane, London, 1967, p 523 
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INTRODUCTION 
Three kinds of factors can create the possibility for 
innovation in the realm of foreign policy-making. In the first 
place, external factors, that is to say, changes in the inter- 
national context which may stimulate new directions in a country's 
answers to the challenges posed by its external environment. 
Secondly, domestic factors, having to do with internal develop- 
ments and their repercussions on the State's external dealings 
and ambitions. And finally, ideological factors, that is, the 
way in which the perceptions and convictions of decision-makers 
affect the nature of a country's foreign policy responses. These 
are of course part of the domestic scene, but they should be 
considered separately for two reasons: on the one hand, no matter 
how acute international and domestic crises can be, they will 
translate themselves into an innovative foreign policy only 
through the prism of decisions made by those who are at a parti- 
cular moment in charge of the State's destinies. On the other 
hand, even in conditions of relative stability in external and 
domestic affairs, a nation's leaders can - within certain limits - 
impose changes in the direction foreign policy is taking, and 
this can only be the result of new beliefs and ideas expressing 
themselves as decisions. The purpose of such changes can be 
either an attempt to mould reality according to one's wishes and 
interests, or to forestall in good time certain developments 
which could probably affect those interests in a negative way. 
To be sure, the manner in which these factors interact, 
and their relative importance in specific circumstances, crucially 
depend upon the nature of each particular State. For a small power, 
with limited material and human resources and multiple depen- 
dencies on its external environment, the possibilities for in- 
novation in 'normal' times are usually few. Paradoxically, the 
scope for creativity seems to be greater in periods of crisis, 
but in fact this is the time when choices are more severely 
constrained, and the alternatives less numerous. Change does take 
place, but because it must, not because it was decided that it 
should be so. For a superpower the situation is different. Except 
in extreme cases, when national survival may be at stake, crises 
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have a less demanding character, and the scope for creativity 
never ceases to be relatively broad. The intellectual challenge 
is therefore much greater than in the case of small states, for 
even though a particular crisis can be overcome with only 
secondary adjustments to the existing foreign policy paradigm, 
the problem remains whether this will avoid a repetition of 
similar and perhaps more severe challenges in the future, or 
whether there might not be a more efficient, less wasteful and 
less risky way of protecting certain interests and gaining certain 
objectives in the world arena. To put it differently, for a 
superpower which enjoys a privileged position in the world, it 
may be relevant to ask whether costly mistakes can be avoided 
and how, whether the ideology that guides its foreign policy is 
compatible with the values of its political system, and whether 
an altered perception of its interests and goals might not best 
serve its long-term prospects of surviving without betraying its 
f'iýnrlamani-al TTa1ii _ 
In the decade between 1965 and 1975 the United States 
found itself in the position of having to ask certain basic 
questions about its foreign policy. The impact of the Vietnam 
experience upon America's external relations and domestic politics 
was profound. A new era of strategic 'parity' with the USSR came 
into being; the limitations of military force as an instrument 
to contain revolutionary nationalism in the Third World were 
cruelly exposed; President Johnson's 'Great Society' could not 
get off the ground under the combined pressures of economic 
crisis, social protest and political unrest. But above all Vietnam 
originated a deep ideological crisis which shattered the American 
people's and leadership's self-images, and put into question the 
most basic beliefs on which their foreign policy rested. This 
crisis affected, on the one hand, the liberal ideology which had 
served as the legitimating instrument of US foreign policy both 
domestically and internationally; and, on the other hand, the 
fundamental conservative-realist ideology that had till then 
played the decisive role in the formulation and implementation 
of that policy. The Vietnam experience not only openly exposed 
the contradiction between the legitimating 'liberal' principles 
and the operational 'realist' assumptions, but also showed the 
limitations and dangers of a version of 'realism' that led to 
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humiliation abroad and endangered the democratic substratum of 
American domestic politics. 
Thus in the late sixties and early seventies, when the 
first Nixon Administration held office, all the main conditions 
that make foreign policy innovation likely were present in an 
acute form: a combination of external and domestic crises coupled 
with widespread self-doubt and cultural unease. But for ideological 
innovation to take place something else was needed: the commitment 
of the new US leaders to a thoroughgoing revision of the ideo- 
logical premises of US foreign policy; not merely the adoption 
of new tactics in the diplomatic and military fields but a trans- 
formation of the perceptions and beliefs which had made Vietnam 
possible. It is a key contention of this study that the con- 
servative-realist ideology is founded upon a certain conception 
of politics, and that only by questioning this view of politics 
and its implications could a reformulation of American notions of 
security, national interests, and the ends of foreign policy 
take place. 
The novelty of some of the key Nixon-Kissinger diplo- 
matic moves has tended to obscure the essential continuity of 
the ideological premises of their foreign policy. The conceptual 
design, implementation and results of their strategy showed two 
things: first, that the Vietnam crisis mainly affected one aspect 
of the American leadership group's foreign policy ideology - the 
legitimatirg'liberal' aspect; secondly, that a process of foreign 
policy innovation without ideological change is inherently flawed, 
and rather than transforming old policies it tends to reinforce 
them. In fact, under Nixon and Kissinger, the conservative- 
realist basis of American foreign policy ideology reached a 
higher point of political maturity and sophistication, without 
in any fundamental sense deviating from the presuppositions about 
US purposes and security interests that took America into Vietnam. 
The importance of the 'Kissinger period' lies precisely in 
Kissinger's attempt to conduct foreign policy from a higher level 
of ideological self-understanding within a conservative-realist 
framework. In his, and Nixon's hands, the defence of the inter- 
national status quo became an extremely complex operation, 
demanding a high degree of tactical subtlety, without, however, 
transforming the ideological basis of a conservative foreign 
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policy design. 
In this study four themes intertwine: first, a con- 
sideration of the nature and functions of ideology in politics; 
secondly, a characterization of US foreign policy ideology; 
thirdly, a discussion of the problem of innovation in the field 
of foreign policy; and finally, an analysis of Henry Kissinger's 
political thought and the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy strategy. 
My main concern is then ideological critique rather than policy 
analysis itself; this is why I have chosen three aspects of the 
Kissinger-Nixon foreign policy that seem to me particularly 
relevant for the stated themes of this work: relations with the 
USSR and China, the response toward Third World nationalism and 
revolution, and strategic nuclear policy. Other spheres of policy, 
such as alliance relations and international economic affairs, 
are thus not given any detailed consideration. I intend to show 
the connection between an ideology which dominates American 
thinking about international affairs - which I call 'conservative- 
realism' - and the foreign policies of the Nixon Administration. 
This will involve an analysis of both political 'realism' and 
conservatism, and a discussion of the function of liberalism in 
the American discourse on foreign policy. I have chosen the 
'Kissinger period' as the subject-matter of my study because it 
throws into sharp relief the dilemmas between ideological con- 
servatism and the pressures for innovation in the field of 
foreign policy. Kissinger brought to office a conceptual frame- 
work that allowed him to impose an unusual degree of coherence 
upon US foreign policy strategy, but which also made it impossible 
for him and Nixon to introduce the ideological innovations called 
for by the Vietnam experience. 
I must admit, as a Latin American, that my purposes 
are not purely theoretical; that by studying the US foreign 
policy ideology I intend to find a clearer answer to two questions: 
first, what have been the roots of the American behaviour towards 
Latin America in the past ?; and secondly, what can we expect 
from the US in the future ? This accounts for what may be seen 
as an overconcentration on examples drawn from the history of 
US-Latin American relations in some sections of this work. I 
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believe that by analyzing ideas, and not only material interests, 
one can gain a more adequate perception of reality, for - as a 
great believer in the power of ideas once put it - '... soon or 
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for 
good or evil. '1 
1. J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Macmillan, London, 1936,38 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE IDEOLOGICAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY 
The debate on the nature of ideology generally falls 
into two broad domains, namely ideology in knowledge and/or 
ideology in politics: 
With respect to the first area of inquiry the 
question is whether, and to what extent, man's 
knowledge is ideologically conditioned or 
distorted. With respect to the second area of 
inquiry the question is whether ideology is an 
so what essential feature of politics and if 
does it explain. In the first case 'ideology' 
is contrasted with 'truth', science and valid 
knowledge in general; whereas in the second 
case we are not concerned with the truth-value, 
but with the functional value, so to speak, of 
ideology. 1 
Mannheim, for example, argued that historical and political 
thought is determined by the socio-historical location of the 
thinker and the aspirations and ambitions of the group to which 
he belongs. Such thought is inherently value-laden, one-sided, 
'distorted', and therefore false; and he calls all systems of 
historical-social-political thought 'ideologies' precisely because 
they represent a one-sided, socially-determined perspective of 
political reality. 
2 
This leads to Mannheim's well-known 'paradox': 
if all such perspectives are 'ideologies', an objective and 
valid social science is impossible, and Mannheim's own reflections 
on the historical process are self-refuting - for his perspective 
can claim no more objective validity than can other perspectives. 
3 
Marx and Engels had argued that the class system 
structures a society's cultural system, and that in all societies 
human consciousness reflects concrete reality (although, they add, 
under the class system only as in a camera oscura, i. e. upside- 
1. G. Sartori, 'Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems', American 
Political Science Review, Vol 63,1969,398 
2. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London, 1966,49-96,237-80 
3. W. A. Mullins, 'Truth and Ideology: Reflections on Mannheim's 
Paradox, History and Theory, Vol XVIII, No 2,1979,142-3 
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down and hence 'falsely'). In Mannheim's sociology of knowledge 
the Marxian notion of ideology was extended to implicate thought 
in general and not only 'false consciousness', with the consequence 
that all cogitation is said to be decisively coloured by our 
existentially determined 'world-view'. 
1 
The difficulties with 
this genetic and relativistic view of knowledge have led to an 
application of the notion of ideology in politics which emphasizes 
its functional value, in contrast to its 'truth' content: 
to say that ideologies legitimate political 
practices is to say that they are defined not 
by form or content, but by their function in 
legitimating or delegitimating social practices. 
It is not the specific beliefs about race in 
Nazism or about God in religions, nor the truth 
or falsity of such beliefs which make them 
ideological but the practical use to which they 
are put. 2 
According to this perspective, therefore, the ways in which 
political theorists' ideas in fact function in the world should 
be the principal concern in the study of ideologies. Lenin, in 
a significant departure from Marx's usage, emphasized this 
dimension of ideology. His originality lay not so much in his 
analysis of the epistemological foundations of Marxism, nor in 
his use of Marxism as a legitimating tool (at least not until the 
revolution succeeded), but in his conception of ideology as a 
mobilizing belief system, thus implicating a meaning which is 
mainly voluntaristic and action-oriented, in contrast to Marx's 
(and Mannheim's) rather passive imagery of a 'prism' or 'lens' 
through which our perceptions of the world pass. 
3 
Lenin 'opera- 
tionalized' Marxism as a practical instrument for political action, 
as a specific response to a set of socio-historical conditions, 
and as a 'weapon' in the struggle for power. In the evolution of 
Marxism, 'Leninism' represented a step in the direction of making 
theory serve the purposes of practical politics. 
The confusion surrounding discussions about ideology 
in politics are to a large extent the result of the inability 
1. W. Carlsnaes, 'Can Perceptions be Ideological ?' Cooperation 
and Conflict, Vol XVI, No 3, Sep 1981,184 
2. I. Shapiro, 'Realism in the Study of the History of Ideas', 
History of Political Thought, Vol III, No 3, Nov 1982,571 
3. W. Carlsnaes, The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis, 
Greenwood, Westport, 1981, Ch 3 
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to distinguish between the different functions of political 
ideology: the explanatory function, the instrumental function - 
as a guide to action - and the legitimative function. The crucial 
point to bear in mind is that, even though ideology - unlike 
philosophy and science - denotes sets of ideas not primarily 
conceived for cognitive purposes, it is not unrelated to empiri- 
cally ascertainable facts, or, to use Seliger's words, there is 
a 'necessary relatedness of ideological argumentation to facts'. 
1 
The dogmatic core of the Marxian theory of ideology, namely the 
view that in virtue of its being conditioned by socio-economic 
relations the consciousness of men is 'false consciousness', 
and Mannheim's epistemological relativism both preclude the very 
possibility of ideologies being capable of providing factual and 
objective insights. This radical rejection of the explanatory 
power of ideologies went hand in hand - in Marx's and Mannheim's 
cases - with an acute awareness of the use of distortion as a 
tool of political domination and control. But no political belief 
system of any importance consists wholly of conscious or uncon- 
scious lies and deceptions, for, as Lane puts it, 'total incon- 
gruence between ideology and experience extinguishes a social 
movement'. 
2 
To be effective, ideologies must be fitted to the 
characteristics of their potential audiences: 
While the adaptation serves the purposes of 
making the audience adopt beliefs and atti- 
tudes which it might not have adopted other- 
wise, this objective can be achieved only if 
the ideas put before an audience correspond 
with a minimal number of attested and attestable 
facts. 3 
In short, political ideologies contain an explanation of events, 
and this function limits their possibility of distorting'reality' 
to an extent that is totally incongruous with what the ideology 
says about it; ideologies should therefore be interpreted not 
only as integrated sets of ideas and political beliefs but also 
to a certain extent as persuasive beliefs seeking to persuade 
and guide in areas where 'truth' is difficult to establish. 
Ideologies, however, are not only - or even mainly - 
1. M. Seliger, Ideology and Politics, Allen & Unwin, London, 
1976,121 
2. R. E. Lane, Political Ideology. Why the American Common Man 
Believes What He Does, The Free Press, New York, 1962,42 
3. Seliger, 159 
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concerned with the explanation of a given situation; the difference 
between political philosophy and ideology stems from the fact 
that political philosophies do not serve political action directly, 
or at any rate not nearly to the same degree as do ideologies. 
Their more pronounced detachment from immediate political action 
provides greater scope for normative autonomy and empirical 
objectivity; and though the difference of degree cannot always 
be precisely measured, it is nevertheless demonstrably real, as 
a comparison of such works as, for example, Marx's Das Kapital 
and his and Engels{) Communist Manifesto can easily show. To 
put it differently, ideology, as it were, transposes social and 
political philosophy into the 'key' appropriate for action and 
the mobilization of elite and popular support. 
I 
It is the attempt 
of ideologies to so construe political situations as to make it 
possible to act purposively within them that accounts both for 
their practical relevance and for the intensity with which, once 
accepted, they are commonly held. 
Ideologies act as guides to action, and this practical 
relevance includes the function of providing legitimacy to 
political action, that is to say, of justifying it in the light 
of a set of normative views on the nature, purposes and probable 
consequences of certain political practices and power relation- 
ships. The legitimative function is correlative to the exercise 
of political domination and authority: it provides a regime, or 
an elite, with supporting social conditions for effective policy. 
In this capacity, legitimation is needed both for domestic and 
foreign policy. It is precisely at this level - that of the 
legitimative function - that the deliberate or unconscious 
ideological distortion of reality usually becomes more accentu- 
ated, as dominant groups and established regimes try to present 
power relationships or specific policies in a better image than 
perhaps they deserve when considered from the vantage point of 
those who are either excluded from the power structure or 
affected by its policies. As Mannheim put it, the concept of 
1. Seliger, 115,120. Plamenatz makes this point thus: 'For 
beliefs to be ideological... they must be shared by a group 
of people, they must concern matters important to the group, 
and must be in some way functional in relation to it: they 
must serve to hold it together or to justify activities and 
attitudes characteristic of its members. '(J. Plamenatz, 
Ideology, Pall Mall, London, 1970,27) 
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ideology 
reflects the one discovery which emerged from 
political conflict, namely, that ruling groups 
can in their thinking become so intensely 
interest-bound to a situation that they are 
simply no longer able to see certain facts which 
would undermine their sense of domination. There 
is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight 
that in certain situations the collective un- 
conscious of certain groups obscures the real 
condition of society both to itself and to 
others and thereby stabilizes it. 1 
The wider the gap between what is proclaimed and what is actually 
done, between ideological principles and political reality, the 
more the effect of ideology - as an instrument of legitimation - 
will be to obscure rather than reveal the true facts about the 
nature of power relationships and the consequences of state 
policies. 
Initially, the avowed intention of Marxism was to 
unmask the distortions which covered the 'true face' of capitalist 
society. As the official ideology of the Soviet regime, however, 
Marxism is used as a legitimative tool to mask the control of 
the Party (which becomes 'the servant of the people') and the 
domination of other countries (in the name of 'proletarian inter- 
nationalism'). What was first an instrument for the unveiling of 
illusions became - impelled by the need to justify power relation- 
ships -a means to adorn domination with an aura of legitimacy 
in an attempt to stabilize the existing structure by sanctifying 
it in the eyes of the ruled. The explanatory function of ideo- 
logies can sow the seeds of revolution; 
2 
their legitimative 
function, on the other hand, is a tool of stability, not change. 
1. Mannheim, 36 
2. Burke, who harboured fewer illusions than most about the 
reality of social processes, clearly recognized both that 
ideologies are the 'cement' that tie societies together, and 
that they can act as 'solvents' of established structures. 
Thus he traced the roots of the revolution in France to the 
unveiling of illusions: 'But the age of chivalry is gone. 
That of sophisters, economists, and calculators, has suc- 
ceeded... All the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle 
and obedience liberal, which harmonized the different shades 
of life... are to be dissolved by this new conquering empire 
of light and reason. ' (E. Burke, Works, Vol II, London, 1897, 
348-9. Quoted in R. Eccleshall, 'English Conservatism as 
Ideology', Political Studies, Vol XXV, No 1,1977,66) 
(Emphasis mine 
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To be sure, not all political ideologies have the 
same degree of internal coherence or capacity to perform the 
three functions already mentioned that, for instance, Marxism 
has. In fact, Marxism is possibly the most 'developed' political 
ideology of our times. It rests on a considerable body of 
theoretical work; it has been successfully used for the practical 
tasks of revolution in several countries, and it functions as 
the legitimative doctrinal 'cement' of all communist regimes. 
Fascism and National-Socialism, on the other hand, were conceived 
by Mussolini and Hitler essentially as instruments for popular 
mobilization and the conquest of power; the theoretical 'under- 
standing' of reality was from the beginning subordinated to the 
demands of power. The Fascist mixture of populism, racism and 
nationalism, however, proved remarkably successful - in the 
right conditions - in generating long-term support from great 
numbers of people in both Italy and Germany. Fascism and National- 
Socialism, like Marxism, did what a political ideology does: they 
posited and justified a distinct conception of society, laying 
down the ways and means of establishing and preserving it through 
a specific political system. 
On the basis of our discussion so far, an ideology can 
be defined, following Seliger, as a belief system 'designed to 
serve on a relatively permanent basis a group of people to justify 
... the legitimacy of the... prescriptions which are to ensure con- 
certed action for the preservation, reform, destruction or re- 
construction of a given order'. 
1 According to this basic de- 
finition of ideology, politics is inseparable from it, since all 
political action is in one way or another aimed at one of these 
objectives; also, this definition brings out the way in which 
something worth calling 'ideology' is common to all political 
belief systems. 
1. Seliger, 120 
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IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
The role of ideology as a factor affecting the per- 
ceptions of foreign policy decision-makers has been extensively 
analyzed and used for different theoretical aims. It has been 
argued that 
Ideologies not only establish foreign policy 
goals, evaluative criteria, and justifications 
for actions, but have important effects in 
perceptual processes as well... [An ideology] 
establishes the intellectual framework through 
which policy makers observe reality. All 
messages and cues from the external environ- 
ment are given meaning, or interpreted, within 
the categories, predictions, and definitions 
provided by doctrines comprising the ideology. 1 
According to this view, ideologies act as 'screens' or 'prisms' 
through which elite perceptions of the political environment are 
'filtered'. These images of the world constitute key inputs of 
a foreign policy system, for decision-makers act in accordance 
with their perceptions of reality, not in response to reality 
itself. 
2 
It is, of course, almost a truism to assert that foreign 
policy decisions generally cannot be adequately explained or 
predicted without reference to the thought processes, 'operational 
codes' or 'cognitive maps' of the individuals participating in 
the decisions. 3 This cognitive behavioural view of ideology, 
however, which sees it as essentially a cognitive phenomenon 
affecting our view of the world outside our minds, should be 
complemented by a conception defined in terms of purposive or 
intentional behaviour, that is to say, with reference to the 
concept of action. 
4 
Thus ideology should not merely be seen as 
a cognitive trait of the individual mind, but also as a specific 
1. K. J. Holsti, International Politics, Prentice-Hall, London, 
1974,366 
2. M. Brecher et al, 'A Framework for Research in Foreign Policy 
Behaviour', Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 13,1969,86; 
M. Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1974,6-7 
3. On the concepts of 'Operational Code' and 'Cognitive Map' see 
D. Heradstveit & 0. Narvesen, 'Psychological Constraints on 
Decision-Making. A Discussion of Cognitive Approaches: Opera- 
tional Code and Cognitive Map', Cooperation and Conflict, Vol 
XIII, 1978,77-92 
4. W. Carlsnaes, 'Can Perceptions be Ideological ?' 184 
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kind of intellectual-political product, a manifest system of 
purposive thought defined in terms of action-oriented goals. 
This notion of ideology, which emphasizes its explicit political 
function, is particularly important in the field of foreign 
policy, where the demands to legitimate domestically the external 
actions of the state frequently contribute to the intentional 
distortion of reality through ideological commitments. 
As Morgenthau has put it, the maker of foreign policy 
'cannot help being also an ideologue, that is, a falsifier of 
foreign policy', for 'the statesman who must try to make his 
foreign policies palatable to opinion at home and abroad is 
compelled to make them appear as something different than they 
actually are'. 
1 
Given this basic fact of international politics, 
it becomes crucially important to distinguish between what may 
usefully be called the 'official' foreign policy ideology of a 
state - which is mainly an instrument of legitimation - and its 
'fundamental' ideology - which explains reality 'for insiders', 
as distinct from domestic opinion at large, and serves as a guide 
to action. The first aspect of ideology can be defined as 'a 
system of normative and empirical beliefs about the international 
system and the role of one's country in that system, as declared 
in public by the official decision-makers of that country'; 
2 the 
'fundamental' dimension of ideology, on the other hand, is not 
concerned with justification or manipulation of public attitudes, 
but with the explanation of reality - as seen from a certain 
perspective - and the determination of the state's goals and 
methods of foreign policy in accordance with that political 
perspective. 
No study of the impact of ideology on foreign policy 
could get anywhere without first distinguishing between these 
two aspects of ideology. And even though this distinction might 
seem to be a perfectly straightforward tool of analysis in 
international politics, the fact - which is not difficult to 
1. H. J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962,5. K. W. Thompson also warned 
of the dangers of 'taking America at its word', thus running 
the risk of 'denouncing words that obscure realistic decisions 
or of confounding claims with intentions and results. ' See 
Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1960,127 
2. K. Brodin, 'Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy', 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol VII, 1972,104 
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corroborate - is that it is almost completely absent from all 
but a few of the most important analyses of United States' foreign 
policy. The problem has two sides: on the one hand, the majority 
of scholars and 'practitioners' who discuss American policies and 
ideology do not usually distinguish between what is said and what 
is done, or between what is publicly asserted and what is revealed 
by documentation not for public or mass consumption. On the other 
hand, what I call the 'fundamental' ideology of American foreign 
policy has received only scant and superficial attention even 
from 'radical' critics, who concentrate on pointing out the gap 
between the official pronouncements and the actual deeds of the 
US government, but who do not make the effort to assess the 
philosophical roots and implications of this ideology. 
1 
Even 
so-called 'realist' critics, such as Morgenthau and Kennan, have 
not always been able to go beyond the description of foreign 
policy, as it is enunciated and assumed by decision-makers and 
the public, to the analysis of its 'fundamental' ideological 
presuppositions and its practical implementation. Thus Morgenthau, 
in 1962, recognized that 
The United States has been particularly prone 
to deceiving itself about the true nature of 
its foreign policy. This special propensity 
to self-deception results from two factors: 
the mental picture the American mind has 
painted of the peculiar qualities of American 
foreign policy in contrast to the foreign 
policy pursued by other nations, and the 
actual character of American foreign policy, 
especially in the Western hemisphere. 1 
Only two years later, however, he was attacking those critics 
who question the commonly-held view among apologists of American 
power that the United States is not guided in its external 
relations by principles of self-interest but rather by abstract 
moral principles: the 'liberal' principles of freedom, self- 
determination, equality and democracy. The US, argued Morgenthau, 
has a 'transcendent purpose', namely 'the establishment of 
equality and freedom in America', and indeed throughout the world, 
1. possibly the most impressive of these 'radical' critics is 
Noam Chomsky, whose demolition work of the most characteristic 
self-delusions of US official foreign policy ideology has been 
expounded in a continuous stream of books and articles. See, 
for example, Towards a New Cold War, Sinclair Browne, London, 
1982 
2. Morgenthau, 5-6 
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since 'the arena within which the United States must defend 
and promote its purpose has become world-wide'. His basic 
assumption - at least in this essay - is that US foreign policy 
is one of benevolence - misplaced benevolence, sometimes. 
1 
Examples of the confusion between the 'official' and 
the 'fundamental' ideology of American foreign policy could be 
multiplied, and it is to say the least worrying to corroborate 
the - generally - low quality of the scholarly works covering 
this key area of US politics. Here are a few illustrative cases: 
The respected historian Norman Graebner, in his well-known study, 
Cold War Diplomacy: 1945-60, argues that the United States is 
not an 'aggressive, imperialist power', as is demonstrated by 
the many 'references to principle' in its 'diplomatic language'. 
The 'traditional American dilemma' lies in the delusion that, 
'given the energy and determination of its antagonists', never- 
theless 'the nation was always assured that it could anticipate 
the eventual collapse of its enemies and the creation of the 
illusive world of justice and freedom'. In his view, 'certainly 
all fundamental American relations with the USSR and mainland 
China after 1950 were anchored to that assumption'. But this 
'American idealism', this foreign policy guided by the'Wilsonian 
principles of peace and self-determination', the 'selfless search 
for order in world affairs' has not been able to'sustain the 
gratitude of a troubled world'. 
2 And, according to Michael 
1. See H. J. Morgenthau, The Purpose of American Politics, Universit: 
Press of America, Washington, 1982,33-4. This theme of the 
'benevolence' of American purposes is reiterated to the point 
of exhaustion in the scholarly literature on the subject. Thus, 
for instance, Kenneth Thompson, another of the so-called 
'realist' critics, wrote that '[the US] engaged in the world 
struggle [World War II] not selfishly or for political advantage 
but in order that conflict might cease once and for all and 
that the evil men who had been responsible might be destroyed. ', 
68. This, of course, is totally contradicted by the extensively 
documented US planning for the exercise of hegemonial power in 
the postwar period. See L. H. Shoup, 'Shaping the Postwar World', 
Insurgent Sociologist, Vol 5, No 3, Spring 1975; also, G. Kolko, 
The Politics of War, Random House, New York, 1968 
2. Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy: 1945-60, D. Van Nostrand, 
New York, 1962,7-11,128-32. Another interesting example of 
the inability to distinguish between 'diplomatic language' 
and the realities of foreign policy can be found in Dexter 
Perkins' book, Foreign Policy and the American Spirit, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1957,13 
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Donelan, a British scholar, the Cold War was caused by the Soviets' 
'crude rebuffs to American friendliness' and 'blatant affronts 
to Western opinion as a whole', which began a 'spirit of hostility 
which grew gradually into the East-West conflict'. It is not 
necessary to become a fully-fledged 'Cold War revisionist' to 
know that the story was more complicated than this; Donelan, 
however, went on to argue - in a book published in 1963, only 
one year after the Cuban missile crisis and after almost four 
years of unremitting US hostility to Castro's initially indepen- 
dent revolution - that the US 'has been a revolutionary power in 
its attempts to introduce democracy into international relations'. 
1 
The problem in Donelan's case is not that he forgets that 'However 
much Americans may like to speak of the role of the United States 
in world affairs in ideological terms, the basis of United States 
policy has been the pursuit of security and other conventional 
interests', 
2 
but that he unquestioningly accepts all the plati- 
tudes about 'Wilsonian idealism', the US as a 'reluctant' super- 
power', about the Monroe Doctrine being based on 'the principle 
of non-interference in the affairs of the other [Latin American] 
republics', and about power being 'an idea troublesome to the 
American conscience', connected as it is 'with the wars and 
tyrannies of the unregenerate outside world'. 
3 
The message is 
basically the same: the US is more 'moral' than other nations; 
the US goes to war solely to expand freedom and democracy, and 
the US only fights after being attacked, to defend itself and 
not for aggression against others. 
It would of course take me too far afield to discuss 
the history of American foreign relations before the Cold War 
era. For purposes of ideological clarification, however, it is 
important to consider the myth of an 'age of innocence' in 
American external affairs, when - as Robert Osgood argues - 'the 
American people were ignorant of the political and strategic 
grounds of their survival, because they were innocent of the 
real limits upon the efficacy of impulse and moral sentiment in 
international relations', an age when 'the omniscience and 
1. M. Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign Policy, Chapman & 
Hall, London, 1963,61 
2. ibId 
3. _, 13,25 
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saintliness of America's international outlook were not tested 
by the harsh imperatives of survival', and Americans 'drifted 
about aimlessly, without chart and compass, upon the strange 
currents of international politics'. 
1 
This extremely common and 
superficial view, according to which US foreign policy 'is mired 
with illusion', and produces not calculated and deliberate 
policies, but moral impulses that reflect little of the reality 
of international life, 
2 
has never in fact corresponded with 
reality, not even during the heyday of Wilsonian 'utopianism'. 
What has remained constant in American foreign policy, however, 
is a verbal strategy that disclaims any selfish interest on the 
part of the United States in its external relations and that 
presents interventionist policies as the produce of 'moral 
purposes'. As President Wilson put it in a 1914 speech about US 
pressures upon Mexican President Huerta - pressures which culmi- 
nated in a military invasion on April 22 of that year: 
The situation [in Mexico] is intolerable, and 
requires the strong guiding hand of the great 
Nation of this continent that, by every appeal 
of right and justice, and the love for order, 
and the hope for peace and prosperity, must 
assist these... people back into the paths of 
quiet and prosperity. We have an object lesson 
to give to the rest of the world... that this 
nation rises superior to considerations of 
added power and scorns an opportunity for 
territorial aggrandizement ... with no other 
idea than the idea and the ideal of helping 
them compose their differences, starting them 
on the road to continued peace... and leaving 
them to work out their own destiny, but watching 
them narrowly and insisting that they shall take 
help when help is needed. 
It was important, he commented - in a phrase reminiscent of 
Nixon's and Kissinger's later views on Allende's accession to 
power in Chile - 'to teach the South American Republics to elect 
good men. '3 The proposition that the US was not interested in 
1. R. E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign 
Relations, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1969, 
430-1 
2. E. Stillman & W. Pfaff, Power and Impotence: the Failure of 
America's Foreign Policy, Random House, New York, 1966,15, 
3. Quoted by E. Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy 
of Taft and Wilson with Mexico: U10-1917, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass, 1970,138-9 (emphasis added 
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'territorial aggrandizement' must have sounded ironic to the 
Mexicans, who had already lost great tracts of land to the US 
in what are now the states of California and Texas. This was not 
the first, nor would it be the last time that the US government 
would intervene in the affairs of other societies driven by 
'moral impulses', 'drifting aimlessly, without chart and compass'. 
One would expect outright propagandists and apologists 
to argue - as former Ambassador Charles Bohlen, for instance, has 
done - that 'one of the difficulties of explaining [American 
foreign policy] ... is that our policy is not rooted in any national 
material interest of the United States, as most foreign policies 
of other countries in the past have been'; 
I 
but the situation 
appears in a different light when even scholars of the intellectual 
stature of Stanley Hoffmann try to explain the ideological nature 
of US foreign policy with the use of pseudo-psychological 
categories such as 'the Wilsonian syndrome', which leads American 
foreign policy-makers to 'an oscillation from quietism to activism' 
to a permanent search for the 'golden mean', and the 'tension' 
in the 'American style' between 'the instinct of violence' and 
'the drive for harmony'. 
2 
The process that leads scholars to 
confuse ideological pronouncements - intended for legitimation 
purposes - with the realities of foreign policy, and to lose 
sight of the gap between the 'official' and the 'fundamental' 
aspects of foreign policy ideology is not necessarily a product 
of intellectual dishonesty. In most cases, it is partly the 
result of self-deception, of the difficulty of asking about one's 
own society unpleasant questions whose answers might be too pain- 
ful to admit. There is also the tendency, quite common among US 
scholars, to attribute to one's own government - if it is 
domestically 'satisfactory' - motivations guided by the highest 
ideals, to refer to the 'moral concern' that is 'a typical 
1. C. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Forei 
W. W. Norton, New York, 1969,957 
Policy, 
2. S. Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American 
Foreign Policy, MacGraw Hill, New York, 1968,91,181,191. 
For another, less valuable, example in this line of 'expla- 
nation', see R. Dalleck, The American Style of Foreign Policy. 
Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs, Knopf, New York, 1983, 
xii-xiii, 2 0-1,266-7 
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expression of the American spirit'. 
1 
I am persuaded, however, 
that in the American case the process of ideological self- 
deception of scholars, their inability to disentangle rhetoric 
from reality, is also the result of the overwhelming predominance 
in the literature on US foreign policy of works which unquestion- 
ingly accept the 'official' ideological version of the nature 
and impact of America's foreign involvement. 2 
A fascinating example of this difficulty in differ- 
entiating between 'official' and 'fundamental' ideology is pro- 
vided by Richard Falk, considered to be a critic of American 
policies, and it deserves extensive quotation. In a discussion 
on Vietnam and American intervention he had this to say on the 
problem of ideological 'deception': 
Both the debate on the 'lessons of Vietnam' 
and my analysis of it proceed on the assump- 
tion that there is a good faith connection 
between the persuasiveness of alternative 
lines of public justification and the course 
of governmental policy. Unfortunately... I 
have become increasingly skeptical about 
this connection. In my judgement, the ex- 
ternal debate may even function as a mysti- 
fication, obscuring the real basis of 
national policy; that is, the explication 
of a rationale may serve to confuse and 
distract, rather than to enlighten public 
opinion. 
He asks why it is that the real basis of policy must remain 
obscure and therefore excluded... from explicit mention', and 
1. See J. Chace, 'How Moral Can We Get ? ', New York Times 
Magazine, May 22,1977. And in a study on the 'verbal 
strategies' of the US and the USSR, when trying to justify 
their respective interventions in Latin America or Eastern 
Europe, Franck and Weisband carefully emphasize that 'We 
do not assert that what we did in relation to our small 
neighbours [Guatemala in 1954, Cuba between 1901 and 1961, 
and the Dominican Republic in 1965] is as bad as what the 
Russians did in relation to theirs', though they do not even 
try to explain why. See T. M. Franck & E. Weisband, World 
Politics. Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1971, viii 
2. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, especially in 
the 'revisionist' literature on the origins of the Cold War; 
these mainly historical works, however, do not deal directly 
with the subject of this study; their purpose, rather, is to 
'set the record straight' as far as certain key post-war 
events are concerned. See W. Appleman Williams, The Tragedy 
of American Diplomacy, Dell, New York, 1978; J. & G. Kolko, 
The Limits of Power, Harper & Row, New York, 19'72 
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says that, even though 'this is a complicated question', it 
would appear that 'policy-makers are implementing a set of 
policies that contradict popularly held attitudes about why 
America uses military power in foreign affairs'. After this 
tortuous detour through what for Falk - an honest and creative 
scholar - appeared as an intellectual 'revelation', he arrived 
at the conclusion that 'the outcome of the debate [on the lessons' 
of Vietnam] will depend on considerations other than degree of 
evidence and persuasiveness', for 'the policy debate in a puppet 
show of sorts'. 
I 
It would be a mistake to assume that, because it is 
a democratic society, the needs for ideological legitimation of 
state action in the United States are less pressing than in a 
totalitarian society such as the Soviet Union. The contrast be- 
tween the predominant American self-image - the product of a 
political culture which exalts the moral worthiness of 'the 
first new nation', a land 'of limitless opportunity', 'the Rome 
and Athens of the Western world'2 - and the actual behaviour of 
the US government abroad has been and still is very striking. 
The gap between the view, constantly reiterated by American 
decision-makers and scholars, that US foreign policy is charac- 
terized by its 'pacific spirit'3 and the policies of successive 
American administrations is so wide, that it creates enormous 
legitimation demands, in particular in a democratic society where 
the possibility of dissent is still open. Tucker's view that 
1. R. Falk, A Global Approach to National Polic , Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1975,59-61 (emphasis mine) 
2. These last are Morgenthau's words. See Purpose of American 
Politics, 5. On the 'ordinary US citizen's self-image' see 
Lane, 1 5-61,321-80,439-77 
3. Perkins, 13 
4. See the catalogue, compiled by B. Blechman and others, of 
the US government's systematic use of force as an instrument 
of policy, Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political 
Instrument, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1978. 
On the basis of the evidence analyzed by the authors of this 
book - who list more than 200 incidents in which the US govern- 
ment has used force as a basic component of policy [in the 
post-war period] - it is difficult not to agree with Chomsky's 
characterization of the US as 'the world's most violent power' 
(Chomsky, 111). The authors conclude that 'there is little 




'America has behaved very much as other great nations have be- 
haved', and that 'if there is a quality unique to American 
diplomacy it consists in the greater than usual disparity be- 
tween ideals professed and behaviour', 
I 
contains the explanation 
for the paradox of a profoundly conservative foreign policy that 
is commonly characterized - both by defenders and critics - as 
'liberal'. 
1. R. W. Tucker, The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy, 
Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971,148 
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LIBERALISM, VIETNAM, AND IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION 
Political legitimacy has been defined as 'a function 
of a system's ability to persuade members of its own appropriate- 
ness. The flow is from leaders to followers. Leaders lay down 
rules, promulgate policies and disseminate symbols which tell 
followers how and what they should do and feel. 'A The acquisition 
and maintenance of legitimacy can be considered a fundamental 
requirement of any political regime, for 'The state is not force 
alone. It depends upon the credulity of man quite as much as 
upon his docility. Its aim is not merely to make him obey, but 
also to make him want to obey. '2 The process of ideological 
legitimation is continuous and extends to any political system 
beyond purely coercive management. The advantages are easy to 
appreciate, for legitimacy is more 'cost-effective' than force, 
and, unlike force, it generates more solid and essentially long- 
term support. 
3 
The ultimate end of the legitimation process 
is to protect political authority, by investing state policies 
with a normative component. It is therefore crucial for both 
authoritarian and democratic states, despite their differences 
in methods and varieties in the use of force. While both 
guidance and demands arise domestically in each political system, 
the range of acts supported by legitimation must also account 
for the state's external activities: 
Legitimation consequently makes it necessary 
to construct, present, and defend... a pre- 
vailing image of the international situation. 
The structure of that image is bound closely 
to the foreign policy function, Nevertheless, 
1. J. Shaar, 'Legitimacy in the Modern State', in P. Green & 
S. Levinson (eds), Power and Community, Pantheon, New York, 
1970,285 
2. H. L. Mencken, Minority Report, Knopf, New York, 1956,217-8 
3. See B. Trout, 'Rhetoric Revisited. Political Legitimation and 
the Cold War', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 19, No 3, 
September 1975,252-3. It was Hobbes who first emphasized 
that the identity of the political is in large measure a 
product of beliefs, almost - in Wolin's words - 'an act of 
faith'. This is what Hobbes meant by the 'artificial' 
character of the political order and why he insisted that in 
every political system 'the people' really ruled, or, as Hume 
put it, 'It is... on opinion only that government is founded. ' See 
Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, Little, Brown Co., 
Boston, 1960,289) 
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while acting in reference to the inter- 
national situation, the foreign policy 
organization must simultaneously maintain a 
legitimative framework compatible with 
domestic affairs. Legitimative content in 
foreign policy is then an essential ingredient. 
l 
With the changes in the power relationships brought 
about by World War II, and in the uncertain international con- 
ditions prevailing at the time, both the US and the USSR had to 
deal with complex legitimation demands in the face of new 
challenges. The situation was particularly difficult for the US. 
Prior to that conflict, the US had not been an 'isolated' but a 
'satisfied' power; it had intervened forcefully abroad (especially 
in the Western hemisphere) whenever its perceived interests 
dictated it, but it had not yet developed the global role that 
the defeat of Germany and Japan, and the consequent emergence 
of Soviet power, now thrust upon it. From then on American 
policy-makers would seek security through global involvement in 
defence of a privileged political, economic and military position, 
and of an international status quo under assault by the forces 
of social revolution, decolonization and Third World nationalism. 
In other words, the US, which had traditionally tried to project 
the image of a 'liberal' and 'democratic' nation whose foreign 
policy did not partake of the egoism of ordinary diplomacy, now 
became the world's most important conservative power. As stated 
with absolute clarity in a 'Top Secret' document of February 24 
1948, the crucial fact determining American foreign policy in 
the post-war period was that 'We [the US] have about 50% of the 
world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population... Our real task 
in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships 
which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity 
without possible detriment to our national security. 
2 
This situation created unprecedented legitimation 
demands for the American political system, especially with 
regard to foreign policy, and was the root-cause of the permanent 
1. Trout, 261 
2. T. H. Etzold & J. L. Gaddis (eds), Containment: Documents on 
American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1978,226-7 emphasis mine). As Brodie has 
put it, until World War II the US enjoyed a 'surplus of 
security'; its relative 'isolationism' was the result of a 
conscious political choice, not the product of 'political 
innocence'. B. Brodie, War and Politics, The Macmillan Co., 
New York, 1973,118 
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tension between the 'liberal' political message and the con- 
servative strategy of the US government abroad. This divergence 
also gave rise to profound theoretical confusions which still 
persist, due to the seeming inability of a majority of American 
(and other western) authors to understand the nature of the 
process of ideological legitimation. 
1 
The Cold War highlighted 
the need for ideological legitimacy both for the Soviet and 
American regimes. A policy of global involvement required strong 
political support at home, which was gained through 'an inter- 
pretive framework based upon an ideological view of international 
affairs - the global assault of the "totalitarian" forces against 
the forces of "freedom" - calculated to command immediately the 
maximum public support. '2 The theme 'Communism versus Democracy' 
became the basic component of 'official' US foreign policy 
ideology, playing a key role which now emphasized more than 
ever the 'liberal' character of American intentions, purposes, 
and methods. 
The confusion produced by the inability to distinguish 
1. An interesting exception is provided by Franck & Weisband, who 
argue that, as the Soviets 'were able to quote [the US govern- 
ment verbatim to justify their actions [in Czechoslovakia in 
196811y this should cause a 're-examination of our rhetoric' 
(not of US interventionist policies in Latin America ; what is 
needed, in other words, 'is not a radical shift in actual con- 
duct but a [new] formulation by each state of its verbal 
behaviour... ', 9,159 (emphasis mine) 
2. R. M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthy- 
ism, Knopf, New York, 1972,9. It should be emphasized that 
the demands of the legitimation process can lead to political 
commitments that then become a hindrance to, rather than a tool 
of, politics; in this kind of situation, as Kissinger points 
out, 'the symbolic aspect of foreign policy begins to over- 
shadow the substantive component'. 
(See H. A. Kissinger, American 
Foreign Policy, Third Edition, Norton, New York, 1977,97). 
The rhetorical radicalism of the Cold War confrontation, for 
example, has tended to obscure the fact that both American and 
Soviet leaders were privately not so firmly convinced about 
the real dangers of open warfare between their two countries, 
and were possibly more prepared than they dared to admit publicly 
to reach some sort of accommodation. See Trout, 265-7. On the 
American side's position, Etzold & Gaddis, 52,61y 64,69-70, 
96,179,189. These documents, it should be pointed out, totally 
contradict Graebner's assertion - repeatedly stated in American 
studies on the 'origins of the Cold War' - that 'The central 
fact in the country's response to the Soviet challenge was the 
absence of any clearly defined body of objectives that had some 
relationship to American capability or even genuine intention. ', 
9 
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between different functions of ideology has been enormous. On 
the one hand, apologists of the aims and methods of US foreign 
policy argue that the patterns exhibited by the US in its foreign 
relations are an expression of the 'liberal political faith' and 
can be characterized as 'liberal interventionism': 'calculated 
to safeguard or promote the goals and values integral to the 
American way of life, as embraced specifically by the mission of 
projecting democracy abroad and uplifting the condition of the 
human race'. 
1 
On the other hand, a significant number of critics 
of US policies also tend to call themselves 'liberals' and they 
accept the conventional views about the uniqueness of American 
ideals and intellectual premises about world politics, based on 
a reverence for 'abstract' and 'selfless' moral principles and 
a belief that international society can be successfully founded 
upon moral and legal norms. They point out, however, that with 
the onset of the Cold War the US became an unwilling but in- 
evitable contestant in an ideological struggle, and lost com- 
pletely the ability to define and redefine interests and to 
differentiate between them. 
2 
American idealism entered into a 
'messianic phase'; the US was 'beguiled' into an expansionist 
cause 'which reached its disastrous climax in Vietnam'. 
3 
In other 
words, these critics, who include so-called 'realists' such as 
Niebuhr and Morgenthau in some of their works, accept without 
question the view that US global interventionism is the product 
of 'good intentions' that have become corrupted in their appli- 
cation because they are divorced from a sober appraisal of poli- 
tical realities, and that there has been an almost complete lack 
of selfish national interest in the implementation of American 
foreign policy. It is therefore not surprising, given the basic 
accord of apologists and critics alike on the fundamentally 
'benevolent' nature of US foreign policy, that both sides fre- 
quently draw the conclusion that the US's post-war expansion in 
1. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr, Policy-Makers and Critics. Conflicting 
Theories of American Foreign Policy, Praeger, New York, 1976, 
36 
2. See S. Kirby, 'National Interest versus Ideology in American 
Diplomacy', in R. Benewick, R. N. Benki and B. Parekh (eds), 
Knowledge and Belief in Politics. The Problem of Ideology, 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1973,231- 
3. A. Schlesinger, Jr, The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American 
Democracy 1941-1966, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1967,41,3 
-30- 
general, and the Vietnam crisis in particular, have been the 
result of the primacy of the 'liberal' ideological commitment 
in formulating and implementing US foreign policy. 
1 
No wonder, 
then, that - as far as the field of scholarly analysis of US 
foreign policy is concerned - 'everybody'- as Horowitz puts it - 
'is a liberal', and the interesting question is 'how the triumph 
of liberalism took place so thoroughly'. 
2 
The answer, of course, lies in the logic of the ideo- 
logical legitimation needs of an interventionist and militarized 
foreign policy in a democratic society. 
3 
Thus, when Kirby, for 
example, writes that the disparity between the rhetoric and the 
reality of US foreign policy is 'most odd', for 'an urge for 
domination and aggrandizement is fulfilled only by its pro- 
clamation and not by its denial', and that 'one would have 
expected from successive [American] administrations enthusiasm 
1. See Stillman & Pfaff, 171,177; Schlesinger, 72 
2. I. L. Horowitz, Ideology and Utopia in the United States, 1956- 
1976, Oxford University Press, New York, 1977,139. The theore- 
tical confusion created by the systematic efforts by policy- 
makers and scholars to characterize US foreign policy as 
'liberal' has led to convoluted attempts to establish totally 
arbitrary differences between, on the one hand, 'idealistic 
interventionist liberalism', and, on the other hand, a 'con- 
servative liberalism', without much care for the effects of 
such superficiality on the study of political theories. See 
E. Weisland, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Para- 
digm of Lockean Liberalism, SAGE Professional Papers in Inter- 
national Studies, SAGE Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973, Vol 
2, No 16,50. The difficulty that Weisland is trying to over- 
come is, of course, the disparity between the claim of the 
'liberals' of being nearly always in favour of change vis-a-vis 
the status quo and the conservative reality of US foreign policy 
3. It is not my purpose to analyze the relationship between the 
liberal ideology and American domestic politics. It may be 
useful, however, to reproduce here the following words by C. W. 
Mills, 'Liberalism, as a set of ideals, is still viable, and 
even compelling to Western men. That is one reason why it has 
become a common denominator of American political rhetoric; 
but there is another reason. The ideals of liberalism have 
been divorced from any realities of modern social structure 
that might serve as the means of their realization... The detach- 
ment of liberalism from the facts of a going society make it 
an excellent mask for those who do not, cannot, or will not do 
what would have to be done to realize its ideals. ' 'Liberal 
Values in the Modern World', in Power Politics and People: The 
Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (edited by I. L. Horowitz), 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1963,189 (emphasis mine 
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rather than the disquiet and embarrassment that has greeted 
the... "discovery" of an American Empire', 
I 
he compounds the 
theoretical mistake of failing to understand the legitimative 
function of ideology with the historical error of not seeing 
that imperial domination has traditionally been presented by 
its ideologists under the guise of a 'liberating' force, acting 
in the interests of civilization, 'liberal' freedoms or socialist 
equality. 
As T pointed out earlier, it is only by getting through 
the ideological smoke screen of 'liberalism' - used as a legiti- 
mative tool - that any sense can be made of the 'fundamental' - 
as opposed to the 'official' - ideological underpinnings of 
American foreign policy and of their conservative-realist nature, 
that I will analyze in due course. Also, this is the only way 
to explain the true nature of the ideological crisis brought 
about by the disastrous American intervention in Vietnam. 
Vietnam created a crisis of self-confidence within the 
ranks of the American ruling elite, and also a crisis of 
'legitimacy' at the level of popular support for the political 
system. These crises were interconnected, but should not be 
confused, and the former was probably more acute and significant 
than the latter. On the one hand, Vietnam dealt a severe blow 
to the image of American 'benevolence' and foreign policy 
'liberalism'; the perception that 'this country [the US] is a 
chosen people, uniquely righteous and wise, with a moral mission 
to all mankind'2 could no longer be preserved intact after the 
shocks to American pride in South East Asia. On the other hand, 
the Vietnamese experience shattered the image of American omni- 
potence, the overwhelming belief that if US power gras applied 
to a crisis and managed correctly it would always prevail. This 
second dimension of the war's impact on US society had traumatic 
effects upon the self-confidence of those who belonged to what 
Nixon, in a 1971 interview, called 'the establishment': 'the 
people who after World War II supported the Greek-Turkish aid 
program, the Marshall plan, NATO. But today... are terribly dis- 
3 
illusioned about Vietnam' . The war, in Kissinger's words, 
1. Kirby, 239-40 
2. Schlesinger, 87-8 
3. The New York Times, March 10 1971,14 
-32- 
'profoundly demoralized' US leadership groups. 
1 Already by 1968 
it had become evident to large segments of the US ruling circles 
that the cost of subduing the Vietnamese was too great, and that 
the enterprise should be reduced in scale or liquidated. The old 
foreign policy 'consensus', epitomized by the bipartisan support 
to the strategy of containment, had been shaken to its foundations 
- though by no means destroyed. 
The American public, however, even though increasingly 
confused by the inconclusiveness, cost, and domestic political 
effects of the war on US society, did not totally break ranks 
with its leaders. 
2 A 1968 survey illustrated the error of 
thinking that a majority of the US public had turned its back 
on the war or adopted an anti-interventionist stance: 
[Among] those who viewed the war as a 
mistake almost as many favored escalation 
as were for withdrawal. All told... a five 
to three majority regretted the original 
intervention, but at the same time those 
calling for a 'stronger stand even if it 
means invading North Vietnam' outnumbered 
those advocating complete withdrawal by 
1. H. A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
and Michael Joseph, London, 1982,84 
2. See J. E. Mueller, 'Trends in Popular Support for the Wars 
of Korea and Vietnam', The American Political Science 
Review, Vol 65, No 2, June 1971,364Y 371. Mueller shows 
that there is a misconception about the unpopularity of 
the Vietnam war in the United States: the opposition to 
the war in South East Asia, particularly after 1968, 
became extremely vocal (certainly more vocal than over 
the Korean war), but it was not as extensive as commonly 
believed. The reaction in 'leadership groups', however, 
was more extreme. See O. R. Holsti and J. N. Rosenau, 
'Vietnam, Consensus and the Belief Systems of American 
Leaders', World Politics, Vol 32, No 1, October 1979,1-56 
On the basis of data provided by a questionnaire sent to 
2,282 'leaders', the authors emphatically confirmed the 
hypothesis that 'the post-World War II consensus on US 
foreign policy [was] shattered' by the Vietnam experience 
among American ruling circles. 
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about as large a margin. ' 
Without doubt, the impact of the war on American society and 
its political system was profound, but it did not produce - as 
Chomsky has correctly argued -a 'collapse' of the 'doctrinal 
system that had served to gain popular support for the crusade 
against independent development'2 Rather, the 'official' foreign 
policy ideology entered into a phase of 'legitimation crisis' 
which alarmed the leadership, confused a majority of the public, 
and generated the concerted protest of important and vocal 
segments of society. 
In this situation, there were two alternatives open 
to the US leadership: either to try to restore the partially 
lost credibility of the 'official' foreign policy ideology and 
prosecute the war to a 'successful' conclusion - running the 
political risk of increasing the ranks of the opposition - or to 
undertake a thorough reassessment of the premises that had led 
the US into Vietnam, and evaluate all the possible 'lessons' of 
the conflict, with a view to reorientating the 'fundamental' 
ideology of American foreign policy. There were, in other words, 
two options for US leaders as far as the ideological dimension 
of foreign policy was concerned: either to initiate a process 
of re-examination, self-criticism, and innovation, or to limit 
the damage done by Vietnam through the manipulation of public 
opinion and by adopting a more flexible diplomatic posture 
leading to a tactical readjustment in the perceptions of the way 
US interests - as traditionally conceived - could best be served. 
1. See P. E. Converse and H. Schuman, 'Silent Majorities and the 
Vietnam War', Scientific American, June 1970,20. The Pentagon 
Papers analyst reported (in early 1968) that 'growing elements 
of the American public had begun to believe the cost [of the 
war] had already reached unacceptable levels and would strongly 
protest a large increase in that cost. ' See The Pentagon Papers 
(Senator Gravel's edition), Beacon Press, Boston, 1972, Vol IV, 
603. If the analyst was correct, then the American public was 
at one with the Executive in that its main concern was the 
cost to the US of continued aggression in South East Asia. 
As Tucker emphasized, 'There is no evidence... that for the 
public at large the growing implausibility of the rationale 
given for the war was the decisive factor in prompting the 
conviction of a majority that American involvement in the war 
had been a mistake. ' R. W. Tucker, A New Isolationism: Threat 
or Promise ?, Universe Books, New York, 1972,101 
2. Chomsky, 74 
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The reconstruction of ideological legitimation was not 
an easy task, but it was begun in official and academic circles 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This was done by interpreting 
the war as a 'quagmire', the result of 'unintended mistakes', or 
of 'blundering efforts to do good', rather than as the product 
of the conscious application of principles of hegemonial planning 
that formed the basis of the Cold War 'ideological consensus'. 
For Kennan, for example, the war had been 'a long exercise in 
national inadvertence'. 
1 
George Ball argued that Vietnam was an 
American defeat, 'not because [the US's] initial purposes were 
unworthy or our intentions less than honorable', but because the 
American 'innocence in the art of extrication' pushed the US 
forward into 'the employment of excessively brutal means'. 
2 And 
Michael Howard, the respected British historian, discussing a 
collection of statements on the US war in Indochina by parti- 
cipants in the decision-making process, concluded that, as a 
result of the lack of evidence from 'the other side': 
We have to decide ourselves, on the basis of 
previous knowledge, or, more probably, pre- 
judice, what the Americans were dealing with 
in Vietnam. Were they... defending the right 
of a people freely to choose their own govern- 
ment without intimidation and subversion from 
outside ? Or were they... upholding a puppet 
government against a people rightly struggling 
to be free ? 
According to Howard, 'the issue remains unresolved', and 'the 
evidence is not available... for a definite verdict to be pro- 
nounced yet'. 
3 
Had these words been written in 1969, rather than, 
as they really were, in 1979, it would perhaps have been under- 
standable. That they should appear four years after the igno- 
minious collapse of the Saigon regime and eight years after the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers surpasses belief. And Howard 
also repeated the mandatory words on US idealism: once defeated, 
'the Americans came home, leaving behind a society destroyed at 
least as much by their generosity and good intentions as by their 
1. G. Kennan, 'The Quest for Concept in American Foreign Policy', 
Harvard Today, Sep 1967,16 
2. G. W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World, Bodley Head, London, 
1976,83 
3. M. Howard, 'Many Reasons for Vietnam', Encounter, May 1979,20 
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bombs'. 1 In fact, however, the documentation contained in the 
Pentagon Papers makes it quite clear that the US political 
leadership undertook its attack upon the social basis of the 
Vietnamese revolution - the rural society of South Vietnam - 
with eyes open, that the various decisions which took America 
into Vietnam were made consciously, by the highest authority, 
on the basis of relatively accurate information about the chances 
for 'military' victory, and with due regard for existing political 
constraints: 'Debates revolved about how to do things better, 
and whether they could be done, not whether they were worth 
doing. '2 
As Gelb and Betts have argued, 
3 
in Vietnam the American 
decision-making system 'worked' in the sense that it operationa- 
lized an ideology that consistently favoured the expansion of 
the US's military involvement. There was, however, a basic manner 
in which 'the system' failed to work: it never succeeded in re- 
cognizing the contradiction between the US's aims and the reality 
of Vietnam. 
4 
The realization of this crucial fact could and 
should have led American leaders thoroughly to re-examine the 
ideological presuppositions that had led their country into its 
most traumatic postwar crisis. But this Nixon and Kissinger were 
not willing to do. The explanation for it lies to a large extent 
in the nature of the American 'fundamental' foreign policy 
ideology, embedded in the conceptual framework of US decision- 
makers. 
1. Howard, Encounter, May 1979,24. Basically, this was also the 
line taken by Senator W. Fulbright, who has argued that, inso- 
far as the US overextended its power and commitments abroad, 
in the main this process did not occur as a result of a deli- 
berate attempt by successive American governments to sub- 
ordinate other countries and regions, but that, for the most 
part, the process took place without conscious design, an 
unintentional and thoughtless product of the failure by 
officials to consider all the possible consequences of US 
actions. See his books, The Arrogance of Power, Random House, 
New York, 1966, and The Crippled Giant: American Foreign 
Policy and Its Domestic Consequences, Random House, New York, 
1972 
2. L. Gelb, 'Vietnam: The System Worked', Foreign Policy, Summer 
1971,170 
3. See L. H. Gelb with R. K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System 
Worked, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1979 
4. See D. E. Kaiser, 'Vietnam: Was the System the Solution ? ', 
International Security, Spring 1980, Vol 4, No 4,5 
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CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL REALISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
REALISTS AND 'REALISM' 
What is political realism ? The meaning of the term 
can be discussed with reference to two distinct - though not 
unrelated - contexts: first, 'realism' in the critical under- 
standing of the nature of politics and in the analysis - 
unprejudiced, dispassionate, and non-dogmatic - of political 
conflict; second, 'realism' as a philosophical posture on the 
problem of the relationship between ethics and politics. On the 
one hand, 'realism' must be seen as a disposition to try to 
understand political reality critically in all its complexity 
and ambiguity and not escape from it, either through wishful 
thinking, suppression of unpleasant facts, dogmatism or ideological 
rigidity. On the other hand, 'realism' consists of an awareness 
of the ineradicable presence of power and struggle in politics, 
of the tension between moral principles and the demands of 
political action; it implies the recognition that the assumption 
of infinite possibility, unlimited change, perfect freedom and 
justice in the realm of politics would simply mean that one's 
knowledge of reality is defective. 'Realism', in other words, 
implies a notion of self-limitation, of a basic discrepancy 
between what is intended and what is attained, of a sense of 
proportion that should permanently exert an influence on political 
thought and action. 
Historically, the debate on 'realism' in American 
foreign policy started in earnest in the 1930s when, according 
to an authoritative study of the 'realist' school, 'the in- 
creasingly overt manifestations of conflict in international 
society, the disintegration of all patterns of conduct and the 
emergence of new patterns began to impress sensitive minds with 
the importance of power in human relations'. 
1 
The implication, 
of course, is that before that period, and even for some time 
afterwards, the element of power had been absent from the 
American approach to foreign policy, that - in Niebuhr's words - 
1. Osgood, 381 
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the US was 'innocent' because its culture 'knows little of the 
use and abuse of power', 
' 
The impact, first of World War II, and 
then of the Cold War against Soviet supported communism, finally 
imposed upon US decision-makers a 'rediscovery of national self- 
interest' as a guiding principle of foreign policy and a partial 
abandonment of the 'idealistic illusions' they typically held on 
the nature of international politics. 
This account of the evolution of foreign policy ideology 
in the US is not only inaccurate and superficial, 
2 
but it also 
tends to pass over the considerable degree of theoretical con- 
fusion surrounding the place and function of 'realist' views in 
American foreign relations. On one side, authors with 'realist' 
aspirations argue that US foreign policy is 'pragmatic' and 
'nonideological', that Americans are 'empiricists'3, seeking 
'objectivity', sometimes - as Kissinger puts it - overemphasizing 
'realism'. 
4 
'The US' - writes Hoffmann - 'is not an ideological 
nation, and its policies are not ideological ones ... 1.5 On the 
other side, it is said that US foreign policy is characterized 
by the pervasive - and negative - influence of an idealistic 
ideology, which Kennan termed the 'legalistic-moralistic approach', 
and which he and others have considered a serious impediment to 
the American decision-makers' understanding of the world. 
6 
There 
are several problems here that must be distinguished and tackled 
independently: First, is there a difference between 'pragmatic' 
and 'ideological' politics, or, rather, can we meaningfully talk 
about politics being 'non-ideological' ? Secondly, what were the 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, Nisbet & Co., 
London, 1952,4,30. For Kissinger, however, the 'end of 
[American] innocence' came during the 1960s, as a result of 
Vietnam. See The White House Years, Weidenfeld & Nicolson and 
Michael Joseph, London, 1979,56 
2. See Thompson, 14-50. He argues that 'For more than a century, 
America has proved itself singularly inept in coming to terms 
with force' (206), even though it has used it at least as much 
as (and possibly even more than) any other power as an in- 
strument of foreign policy. 
3. Crabb, 258 
4. H. A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American 
Foreign Policy, Chatto & Windus, London, 1960,3452 357 
5. Hoffmann, 114 
6. See George Keenan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Secker & 
Warburg, London, 1952,95-103 
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most representative authors of the American 'realist' tradition 
fighting against ? And, did they adequately characterize it ? 
Thirdly, what was the analytical contribution of the 'realists', and 
how significant was it ? Finally, what role has 'political 
realism' played in American foreign policy ? And, is this the 
only valid version of 'realism' ? 
Both American domestic and foreign policies are 
frequently characterized as 'pragmatic' because they are held to 
reflect exclusively a contest for reaching compromises over well- 
defined interests, not over dogmatic 'principles'. Kissinger, for 
instance, has argued that American pragmatism 'is based on the 
conviction that the context of events produces a solution', 
whereas Marxist-Leninist ideology, which gives communist leaders 
'the key element of their self-proclaimed superiority over the 
outside world', is in itself to a significant extent 'responsible 
for international tensions'. 
I 
The presupposition of all this is 
that questions of 'interest' can be detached from 'ideology', 
but, as Seliger puts it, even if only compromises over narrowly 
defined 'material' interests were the core of the pluralistically 
organized game of politics, it would not follow that what prevails 
is a pragmatic non-ideological sense of compromise: 
It is not only rash to assume that clashes 
over material interests are by their nature 
less harsh and bitter than clashes over 
'principles': the very juxtaposition of such 
interests and principles is false. Principles 
pertain to values and to material interests. 
No important fight over interests has been 
led, and no aggregation, integration or com- 
promise between interests has ever been 
achieved, for any length of time,. without 
the eventual invoking of moral norms held 
to be generally applicable. 2 
Even if the 'American way of life' derived from purely pragmatic 
criteria, it would still be ideological inasmuch as it remains 
founded on values. The reference to 'higher' values is ineradi- 
cable from any system of political beliefs, no matter what their 
contents may be, and this allows us to classify all political 
belief systems as political ideologies insofar as the belief 
system can be said to guide political action. 
3 
1. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 29,35 
2. Saliger, 135 
3. ibid, 146 
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'Pragmatism' is sometimes contrasted with 'dogmatism' 
as an attitude less conducive to rigidity and more amenable to 
compromise; it is not, however, possible in principle to associate 
extremism, fanaticism or ideological rigidity with one kind of 
political belief system only. The conservatism that characterizes 
American foreign policy's 'fundamental ideology' plays as crucial 
a role in determining the 'operational codes' of US decision- 
makers as Communist ideology does in the case of Soviet leaders; 
1 
and there is no evidence to suggest that these 'codes' are less 
rigidly adhered to by Americans than by any others as far as the 
international contest in its variois manifestations is concerned. 
This typical worship of the role of 'pragmatism' in US foreign 
policy tends to ignore the hold of a particular ideology on 
American reasoning in regard to foreign relations, but, as 
Weisband correctly points out, beneath the 'how to do it' spirit 
of American 'pragmatism' exist belief-commitments that power- 
fully influence the decision-making process. That they are not 
easily recognized is 'a tribute... to the force of their general 
acceptance rather than proof of their minor influence', 
2 
The difficulties of the 'realists' in dealing with the 
role of ideology in foreign policy begin with their own narrow 
conception of what ideology is and the functions it plays. For 
Morgenthau, for example, ideology is national interest disguised 
in moral terminology. Even if decision-makers believe they are 
acting for the 'common good', the moral claims will still count 
as ideology as long as the basic motivation is still one of 
self-interest. If, as he holds, all foreign policies are basically 
self-interested, then all the moral claims of nations are, in his 
usage, 'ideological'. 
3 
What Morgenthau forgets, however, is that 
ideology plays a key role in defining what should be understood 
by 'national interest' in all circumstances. The American 'realists' 
have concerned themselves exclusively with the legitimative 
function of ideology, concentrating their attack upon the presumed 
1. See Chapter 3 of this study 
2. Weisband, 61 
3. H. J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, (Fourth Edition, 
A. Kopf, New York, 1968,68,83-94Y 315. See also J. E. Hane 
and C. B. Joynt, Ethics and International Relations, Macmillan, 
London, 1982,37 
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'moralism' and 'idealism' of US foreign policy, to the detriment 
of the other two crucial functions of ideology which actually 
guide the state's behaviour and mould the nation's policies. Not 
only have the political 'realists' misunderstood the scope of 
ideology's impact, but they have also underestimated the im- 
portance of ideological legitimation in foreign policy. In their 
concern to rid American foreign policy of its 'idealistic pre- 
sumptions' they did not differentiate between 'official' and 
'fundamental' ideology, and eventually confused the two, leading 
Morgenthau to proclaim that the 'legal and moral platitudes' 
spoken by US decision-makers are not really 'the tinsel in the 
show window making the merchandise on the counter attractive to 
the customer', but that these platitudes actually 'are the foreign 
policy of the United States'. 
1 
Taking the works of Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan as 
representative of the American 'realist' school, it is clear that 
what worried them was the problem of the relationship between 
self-interest and the norms beyond interest in inter-state 
relations. They developed their views as a criticism of what they 
thought was the inadequate understanding by US leaders and the 
public of the realities of international life, and the dangerous 
American tendency to worsen conflicts of interest by investing 
them with moral content, thus transforming them into 'moral 
crusades'. 
2 
For Kennan, the 'most serious fault' of US foreign 
policy formulation has lain in the belief that 'it should be 
possible to suppress the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of 
governments in the international field by the acceptance of 
some system of legal rules and restraints', and that 'it would 
be better to find some formal criteria of a juridical nature by 
which the permissible behaviour of states could be defined'. To 
the 'American mind', he argued, it is 'implausible that people 
1. Morgenthau, The Impasse of American Foreign Policy, 27 
2. For a detailed review of the writings of the 'realists', see 
R. C. Good, 'The National Interest and Political Realism: 
Niebuhr's "Debate" with Morgenthau and Kennan'. Journal of 
politics, Vol 22,1960,597-619; R. W. Fox, 'Reinhold Niebuhr 
and the Emergence of the Liberal Realist Faith, 1930-1945', 
The Review of Politics, Vol 38,1976,244-65; A. J. Beitzinger, 
A History of American Political Thought, Dodd, Mead & Co., 
New York, 1972,551-77; and K. W. Thompson, 'Moral Reasoning 
in American Thought on War and Peace', The Review of Politics, 
Vol 39,1977,386-99 
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should have positive aspirations, and ones that they regard as 
legitimate, more important to them than the peacefulness and 
orderliness of international life. From this standpoint, it is 
not apparent why other peoples should not join us in accepting 
the rules of the game in international politics ... 'I This legali- 
stic approach together with the American moralism which denies 
'the persistence of self-interest, the clash of contending groups 
and forces, and the need for power as the minimum precondition 
of international agreement' have, according to the 'realists', 
'destroyed' America's understanding of its problems. 
2 
These paragraphs should suffice to show that the ideo- 
logical adversary the 'realists' attacked is no more than an 
incoherent collection of groundless illusions which have very 
little to do with the real, concrete behaviour of the US through- 
out the world. The truly amazing point is that the 'realists' 
have taken seriously the moralistic platitudes of American 
'liberal' ideology in foreign policy as the determining factor 
in US policy-making. 
3 
To be sure, this idealistic ideology has 
played a significant role in legitimating domestically US military 
interventionism and economic domination abroad, and it of course 
1. Kennan, 95-6 
2. See Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politic- 
236 
3. Sheldon Wolin has pointed out that much of what is now accepted 
as 'liberal' ideology is in fact no more than a 'vulgar cari- 
cature of liberalism'. Both Marxists and 'realists', he argues, 
have repeatedly characterized liberalism as 'optimistic to the 
point of naivete; arrogant in its conviction that human reason 
ought to stand as the sole authority for knowledge and action; 
bewitched by a vision of history as an escalator endlessly 
moving upward towards greater progress; and blasphemous in 
endowing the human mind and will with a godlike power of re- 
fashioning man and society in its entirety. ' In his view, this 
image of liberalism has 'little or no support in the writings 
of the liberals' [Locke, Hume, Adam Smith and others], and it 
seems plausible only because the critics have lumped together 
two distinct traditions of political thought: democratic 
radicalism (whose main representative is Rousseau) and libera- 
lism. Wolin specifically mentions some of Niebuhr's writings 
as 'typical of what may be called the vulgar conception of 
liberalism'; but liberalism, he says, is not what its critics 
make it out to be; it is, rather, a 'philosophy of sobriety, 
born in fear' and deeply conscious of the limitations of man's 
will. (See Politics and Vision, Ch IX, and pp 480-1). This, 
of course, is an important problem of political philosophy, 
but its detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this study. 
For my purposes, the 'vulgar conception of liberalism' can 
legitimately be considered an integral part of US foreign 
policy ideology. 
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imposes some constraints upon the decision-making process, but 
this is something that Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan forget in 
their preoccupation with dismantling some of the myths which 
shape the 'official' US foreign policy ideology. They do not 
see that, no matter whether US decision-makers actually believe 
in American 'liberalism', no serious scholar can judge a nation's 
foreign policy exclusively by what the state's leaders say about 
it, but by their actions and the documentation - usually only 
partly accessible - which records those actions, and also by the 
works of influential authors less worried about justification 
and more concerned with actual analysis and implementation. 
I 
The 
ideological context of US foreign policy, therefore, has never 
been circumscribed to the 'legalistic-moralist approach' on which 
the'realists' have concentrated their attention. As a result of 
this simplification of reality, their views have been addressed 
towards only one aspect of the problem of political realism: that 
of self-limitation, of a sense of limits and proportion in poli- 
tical action, but their analytical contribution has been, I 
believe, rather poor from a critical point of view. 
Indeed, one is hard put to find in the published 
writings of the 'realists' - and I do not include here Kennan's 
reports as a State Department officer - specific discussions of 
economic, political or strategic problems and of US responses, 
or of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign 
1. I refer specifically to the 'neo-Clausewitzian' strategists 
of the nuclear era, like, for example, Kahn, Wohlstetter, 
Schelling, Kauffmann, and Kissinger among others. It is quite 
surprising to note the fact that only very infrequently do 
analysts of US foreign policy make use of documentation, 
formerly classified, contained in such sources as, for example, 
the Pentagon Papers, the collection - already mentioned - 
published by Etzold and Gaddis, on the policy of containment, 
of the series of Memoranda of the War and Peace Studies Pro- 
ject of the 'Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)', discussed 
by L. Shoup and W. Minter in their important study, Imperial 
Brain Trust, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1977. This 
remarkable documentary record of the design and execution of 
US imperial planning should have put to rest the worries of 
the 'realists' about the 'idealistic illusions' of American 
foreign policy. Kennan himself, who occupied an important 
position in the policy-formulating hierarchy of the US State 
Department in the early post-war years, should have done better, 
as an analyst, than to confuse the statement of policy aims 
for propaganda purposes with policies defining - in the CFR's 
words - the 'true national interest' of the United States. See 
Shoup and Minter, 162 
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policy in the United States. They tend rather to provide a 
highly abstract sort of analysis with little or no documentation 
to support it. 
I 
As Chomsky, rightly in my view, points out, much 
of the writing on the 'national interest' serves to obscure the 
basic facts of politics. He quotes Morgenthau's dictum that the 
national interest underlying a rational foreign policy 'is not 
defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship of party but 
imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their 
rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy', citing as 
illustration, among others, the US 'containment' of China and 
the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine. Morgenthau also observes 
that 'the concentrations of private power which have actually 
governed America since the Civil War have withstood all attempts 
to control, let alone dissolve them [and] have preserved their 
hold upon the levers of political decision'. The obvious question 
to ask, as Chomsky does, is this: under such circumstances, can 
the US national interest, as actually articulated and pursued, 
be expected to be simply the application of 'rational' faculties 
to 'objective' data, or to be an expression of the ideological 
perceptions and beliefs of those 'concentrations of private 
power' which Morgenthau talks about ?2 In fact, Morgenthau's idea 
1. Niebuhr, of course, was a philosopher-theologian, basically 
concerned to remind Americans that 'we could bring calamity 
upon ourselves and the world by forgetting that even the most 
powerful nations and even the wisest planners of the future 
remain themselves creatures as well as creators of the 
historical process. Man cannot rise to a simple triumph over 
historical fate. ' (See The Irony of American History, 115). 
His views on the relationship between ethics and power, 
however, even though valuable in themselves, belong to a 
level of theoretical discourse quite separate from the 
characteristic 'conservative-realist' approach of US 
'fundamental' foreign policy ideology. Morgenthau, also, has 
found it difficult to see in the deviations from American 
'idealism' anything other than 'misplaced benevolence'. Even 
though he opposed the US intervention in Vietnam, he argued 
that the issue was 'neither intellectual nor political but 
moral', thereby closing the doors to an analysis of the 
'fundamental' ideology involved in the origins of the crisis. 
(See H. J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United 
States, Praeger, New York, 1969,150). Kennan's case is para- 
doxical in that his written production as a US State Depart- 
ment official is so much more acute and perceptive - clearly 
distinguishing 'fundamental' from 'official' ideology - than 
his published discussion on the 'legalistic-moralistic approach' 
(See, for instance, documents nos 3,7,8 and 25 in the 
collection published by Etzold and Gaddis. ) 
2. Chomsky, 92-3 
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that foreign policy is derived in the manner of physics, and 
the 'national interest' determined as an objective datum immune 
from ideology is groundless. 
What the 'realists' do not take into account - and this 
is a crucial difficulty in their approach to politics - is that 
all descriptions of 'reality', in all fields of human knowledge, 
embody various assumptions about what 'reality' is and how it 
works. Facts, in other words, are essentially facts-as-inter- 
preted; there is no 'bare' account of reality, no description 
of the'facts' neutral between competing explanatory theories. 
Thus it is not the opposition between fact and theory which is 
decisive, but the clash of opposing ideological conceptualizations, 
and this applies to the version of 'political realism' given by 
Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan. There is no doubt that Realpolitik 
seen as an explanation of the nature of politics as 'fundamentally 
determined by the struggle for power'1 - has existed, and still 
exists, on the scene as one of the most influential inter- 
pretations of political realism. This version of realism operates 
with a dichotomy of approaches to politics, which E. H. Carr 
called 'realism' and 'utopianism'. He argued that 'realism' arises 
whenever people become aware of the failures of schemes to bring 
about radical improvements in society or in the behaviour of 
states towards each other. 
2 
Thus Realpolitik is associated with 
disillusionment, it denotes a conservative outlook and policies. 
Carr's dichotomy - which was adopted by American 'realists' - is 
however too rigid and distorted. That 'politics is the art of 
the possible' is a sensible notion and a valid characterization 
of political realism, but how can 'the possible' be ascertained ?3 
'Reality' - as Stevenson remarked - 'is not what is. It consists 
of the many realities it can be made into'; 
4 
politics, in other 
1. J. H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 1951,24; on the notion of Real- 
politik, see also K. H. Metz, 'The Politics of Conflict: Hein- 
rich von Trietschke and the Idea of Realpolitik', History of 
Political Thought, Vol III, 2,1982,269-84+ 
2. See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939, Macmillan 
London, 1940,28. See also Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 
3-4 
3. See R. N. Berki, On Political Realism, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 
London, 1981,19-20 
4. W. Stevens, Opus Posthumous, Faber & Faber, London, 1959,166 
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words, involves both an element of imagination, the capacity to 
transcend reality and to impose a new perspective upon it, and 
a sense of limits - the courage to face up to events as they are 
and to accept the limits of man's power to shape the world 
accoding to his wishes. Political action is partly manipulative 
and partly architectonic; its aim is, on the one hand, political 
mastery, and on the other, political sculpture, that is, the 
attempt to mould political phenomena to accord with some vision 
of order, justice, liberty, and equality that lies beyond the 
political sphere as it is at a certain historical period. Even 
Machiavelli, considered by many as the political realist par 
excellence, did not mean by political realism mere technical 
efficiency. His 'science of politics' was intended as the basis 
for a new political ethic. Thus to know the shape of events was 
to be in a position to exercise prudence or foresight. To select 
the type of action appropriate to a given situation was to 
possess a discriminating intelligence which allowed for the 
weighing of several factors simultaneously as well as for pro- 
jecting possible consequences. 
1 
Traditionally, defenders of Realpolitik have given 
the notion of 'realism' a defensive, cynical and anti-theoretical 
appearance. Carr tried to argue that 'any sound political thought 
must be based on elements of both utopia and reality', 
2 but the 
fact is that the predominant version of 'realism' - to which Carr 
and others have made decisive contributions - is intrinsically 
conservative and anti-utopian. The American 'realists', on their 
part, in trying to curb the 'crusading zeal' of US foreign policy, 
not only did not correctly assess the legitimating function of 
'idealism', but also accentuated the stationary, backward-looking, 
pro-status quo and defensive nature of American 'fundamental' 
foreign policy ideology, depriving it of any significant political 
'vision'. As far as the first aspect of 'realism' is concerned - 
that of facing political reality critically, with a disposition 
to question one's own ideological presuppositions - it is clear 
that the 'realists' were not able to assess - or only did it 
superficially - from a critical perspective the non-declarative 
reality of US foreign policy and its sustaining 'fundamental' 
1. Wolin, 220-8 
2. Carr, 118 
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ideology. To be sure, they made an honest effort to introduce 
into the formulation of US foreign policy a certain sense of 
limits, of the tensions between political 'ideals' and the moral 
ambiguities of political conflict, but the morality they fashioned 
is essentially negative, empty and passive: 
It is negative in furnishing no principles 
whatever to guide the citizen towards re- 
sponsible judgement upon the foreign and 
military policy of governments... Their 
position is empty because... there is room 
for very wide disagreement about what is 
in the national interest, and now way of 
resolving such disagreement, 
and finally their political morality is passive because 'it con- 
tains no ideas about creative action' emanating from the US. 
I 
Their insights may have been valuable in educating certain sections 
of the American leadership groups and public opinion to recognize 
that 'politics contains problems not amenable to solution by the 
platitudes of Sunday School morality', 
2 but between the need to 
1. B. A. Paskins, 'Containment and the Nuclear Danger', in R. 
Harries (ed) What Hope in an Armed World ? Pickering & Inglish, 
Basingstoke, 1982 
2. ibid. Kerman attacked what he saw as the 'Moralism' involved in 
'carrying over into the affairs of states... the concepts of 
right and wrong, the assumption that state behavious is a fit 
subject for moral judgement' (American Diplomacy 1900-1950,100) 
It is not clear, however, whether the 'realists' want to argue 
that no moral evaluation is desirable in international politics. 
This inference would require the premise that all such evalu- 
ation in inevitably unrealistic, and the 'realists' do not 
attempt to prove it. In fact, Morgenthau introduces his own 
values in his advice to American diplomats. Thus 'he condemns 
those who consider international politics exclusively as a 
technique, without ethical significance, for the purpose of 
maintaining and gaining power, and who can accordingly, like the 
Athenians in the Peloponnesian War, use the elimination of 
populations as a legitimate strategy. But he himself has defined 
politics in general, and international politics in particular, 
as the seeking of power. Where is the force of the proscription 
on genocide supposed to come from ?... It is clear that Morgen- 
thau needs to bring in morality, as he does, if he is to offer 
the hope that diplomacy can limit the struggle for power. But 
it is equally clear that he cannot consistently bring it in and 
maintain a strict theory of psychological egoism for states and 
their leaders. ' (See Hare & Joynt, 36,40-1). Niebuhr, on his 
part, concluded that what is needed is an idealism that points 
beyond the national interest, and a realism that uncovers the 
pretence in every effort to transcend the national interest. 
(See 'The Perils of American Power', Messenger, XVI, May 22, 
1951,6). That the relationship between interests and moral 
principles must remain at best problematical had already been 
forcefully argued by Max Weber in his famous lecture 'Politics 
as a Vocation', in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited 
by H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1970 
120-2 
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debunk 'utopias' - which grew out of a 'realist' sense of history - 
and the need to go beyond politics as usual - which derived in 
Keenan and Morgenthau from their awareness of the significance 
of the nuclear bomb - there is a gap which the 'realists' have 
never filled. 
1 
1. S. Hoffmann, 'Notes on the Limits of "Realism"', Social Researcl 
vol 48, No 4, Winter 1981, 657 
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF 'REALISM' AND THEIR 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS : THE HOBBESIAN PERSPECTIVE 
In the preceding section I argued two things: First, 
'realism' in politics should not be exclusively considered as 
a view on the relationship between moral principles and the 
'necessities' of power; it must also be seen from an episte- 
mological perspective as a disposition of the political actor 
to understand 'reality' critically, and to avoid the twin dangers 
of dogmatism and self-delusion. Secondly, I tried to point out 
that the predominant version of 'realism' as Realpolitik is based 
on certain definable ideological preconceptions, and is not the 
only possible interpretation of what being 'realist' in politics 
means. In other words, as Hoffmann puts it, 'we are all realists 
now, but there are not two realists who agree either on their 
analysis of what is, or on what ought to be, or on how to get 
from here to there'. 
1 
The problem then is to determine to what 
extent are specific policies derivable from the fundamental 
principles of the ideology that those engaged in Realpolitik 
claim to serve. 
2 
The American Realists' version of 'realism' derives 
from a narrow notion of politics, which sees it essentially as 
a contest for power, security and survival, and does not take 
into account, or give a subordinate place to, the elements of 
cooperation and 'vision'. It conceives politics as a 'technique' 
governed by 'objective laws 
3, 
whose function it is to exercise 
over social phenomena the same kind of control that technology 
exercises over nature. Given that the 'realists' concentrate 
their attention upon the international environment, and within 
this on the power struggle, their notion of politics is closely 
connected with the phenomenon of war. This leads to two results: 
first, the idea of politics - particularly of foreign policy - 
becomes 'militarized', and, secondly, the notion of politics as 
a technique for domination influences the idea of war as a social 
phenomenon that can be controlled by technology, a phenomenon 
1. Hoffmann, 'Notes on the Limits of "Realism"', 659 
2. See Saliger, 186 
3. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4 
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that must be analyzed with the approach of the technician to 
secure its control, and in which the elements of chance and of 
human commitment are considered secondary. Finally, the American 
realist tradition - which includes the crucial contribution of 
the post-war 'neo-Clausewitzian' strategists - is essentially 
anti-utopian. Even though it is based on a conception of politics 
as technique, it does not accept a utopian approach to reality, 
that is, an approach that tries to conceptualize modes of change 
and improvement by operating critically and constructively. On 
the contrary, from the epistemological point of view, this version 
of 'realism' places absolute weight on 'empirical reality' as it 
positively is and persists over time. 
I 
In political terms this 
position tends to identify 'reality' with the status quo, and 
order with stability, adopting an intrinsically conservative 
bias. 
Political ideologies are in most cases dependent for 
their fundamental principles on the contents of political philo- 
sophies. As joined together in an ideology, however, fundamental 
principles assume a less objective form than their philosophical 
models, for ideologies have an immediate action-orientation. 
2 
The 'fundamental' ideology of American foreign policy - that of 
conservative-realism - derives from a Hobbesian-Clausewitzian 
conception of politics which plays a crucial - though not usually 
clearly perceived - role as the philosophical foundation on 
which this ideology rests. To be sure, the connection between 
the Hobbesian view of human nature and Clausewitz's instrumental 
notion of war, on the one hand, and Realpolitik on the other is 
quite obvious. 
3 
The problem, however, is: in precisely what sense 
does American foreign policy ideology reflect these philosophical 
underpinnings ? The study of two aspects of Hobbes's and 
Clausewitz's conception of politics are, I think, of great help 
for the adequate understanding of this ideology. I refer, first, 
to Hobbes's notion of politics as 'technique', and, secondly, to 
Clausewitz's views on the relationship between war and politics. 
In the Leviathan, Hobbes argued that: 
1. On the idea of Utopia, see B. Goodwin and K. Taylor, The 
politics of Utopia, Hutchinson, London, 1982,31,82 
2. Saliger, 120 
3. See, for example, A. Rapoport, Conflict in Man-made Environ- 
ment, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974,133- 
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Though nothing can be immortall, which 
mortals make; yet, if men had the use of 
reason they pretend to, their Common- 
wealths might be secured, at least, from 
perishing by internal diseases. For by 
the nature of their Institution, they are 
designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or 
as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it 
seife, which gives them life. Therefore 
when they come to be dissolved, not by 
external violence, but intestine disorder, 
the fault is not in men, as they are the 
Matter; but as they are the Makers, and 
orderers of them, 1 
This paragraph implicitly contains the main differences between 
Hobbes's conception of politics and the classical, Aristotelian 
notion to which he formulated an alterantive. First, the claim 
that politics can be scientifically grounded and that it aims 
at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct 
order of society. Second, the view that the application of 
knowledge, its translation into practice, is a technical problem. 
In this view, once one is in possession of knowledge about the 
conditions of the correct order of society, one can calculate 
precisely the rules, relationships and institutions needed to 
preserve the state. Aristotle had emphasized that politics should 
not be compared in its claim to knowledge with rigorous science, 
for its subject matter was the doctrine of the good life, of the 
'just' and the 'excellent', that is, the continuation of ethics, 
and in this context of a contingent praxis it lacked logical 
necessity. The capacity of politics was a 'prudent' understanding 
of the situation; it was directed toward the formation of 
'character', it proceeded pedagogically and not technically. 
Hobbes, on the other hand, tried to make politics serve to secure 
knowledge of the essential nature of justice itself, namely of 
the rules and compacts that sustain a Commonwealth of human beings. 
For Hobbes, mankind owed its greatest advances to technology, and 
in particular to the political technique which was responsible 
for the establishment of a safely based state. 
2 
1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Everyman's Library, Dent & Sons Ltd, 
London, 1914,170 
2. This section of the analysis owes a great debt to Jürgen 
Habermas's brilliant essay, 'The Classical Doctrine of Politics 
in Relation to Social Philosophy', in Theory and Practice, 
Heinemann, London, 1974,41-81 
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Hobbes's views were closely related to the ideal of 
knowledge operating in his time, as epitomized by Bacon in his 
'new science', which implied that we only know an object to the 
extent that we ourselves can produce it, and in order to do this 
it is necessary previously to be able to decompose it. Thus 
Hobbes argued in De Cive that: 
everything is best understood by its con- 
stitutive causes. For as in a watch, or some 
such small engine, the matter, figure, and 
motion of the wheels cannot be well known, 
except it be taken insunder and viewed in 
parts; so to make a more curious search into 
the rights of states and duties of subjects, 
it is necessary... not to take them insunder, 
but yet that they be so considered as if they 
were dissolved... 
There was, however, a factor of uncontrollability in the field 
of relations between states, for there is no specific scientific 
object of which states are the components and that can then be 
decomposed to make them elements in relationships dominated by 
political technology. Hobbes was nevertheless hopeful that his 
science of politics could lead mankind to 'enjoy such immortal 
peace, that unless it were for habitation, or supposition that 
the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants, there would 
hardly be left any pretence for war'. 
2 
Thus Hobbes established that human behaviour was 
therefore to be considered only as the material for science. The 
new social engineers of the correct order could from now on, in 
Habermas's words, 'disregard the categories of ethical social 
intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of con- 
ditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, 
will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. '3 In this way, 
Hobbes very neatly separated politics from morality, going in 
this respect even beyond Machiavelli, for whom the significant 
aspect of the moral qualities needed by the political actor lay 
in their public or exterior character: 
They represented a mask which [the political 
actor] must wear in his role as a public 
figure; they had no intrinsic value. Thus 
1. Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, Humanities Press, Harvester 
Press, New York and London, 1978,98-9 
2. ibid, 91 
3. Habermas, 43 
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while the new science was the product of 
the moral commitment of the theorist... it 
assumed a purely political morality in 
those who were to practise its dictates 
because politics itself held only a necessary 
and not an ultimate value. 1 
Machiavelli did not conceive politics as mere technical efficiency, 
and he preserved a space for uncertainty and the play of non- 
'rational' factors in human intercourse through the use of the 
notion of Fortuna. The classical and medieval traditions saw 
political knowledge as a set of prescriptive remedies aimed at 
the gradual elimination of evil from society; Machiavelli's 
'science', for its part, was based on the premise that evil could 
not be totally dissociated from the very nature 0-f political 
creativity, and that the new political knowledge had 'its 
ambivalence of light and shadow'. 
2 
Thus he preserved a space for 
prudence, and did not attempt to carry his 'new science' to the 
point of scientific precision needed by calculated technique. 
It was Hobbes who first tried to place political action 
on the more certain basis of the scientifically controlled 
technique characteristic of the mechanics of his time. On the 
basis of his scientific analysis of the relationships of life, 
the 'correct' order would be permanently established. As he put 
it in De Corpore: 
the cause of war is not that men are willing 
to have it; for the will has nothing for 
object but good, at least that which seemeth 
good... The cause... of civil war is, that men 
know not the causes neither of war nor of 
peace... But why have they not learned them, 
unless for this reason, that none hitherto 
have taught them in a clear and exact method ?3 
The notion of politics as technique is directly connected to the 
problem of the control of chance and the reduction of uncertainty 
in political life; this point, coupled with the conviction that 
there are 'objective laws' of politics, and, finally, the view 
that the ethical potentialities of political action are few or 
almost non-existent, constitute the philosophical pillars on 
which the 'realist' tradition of Western political thought is 
1. Wolin, 217 (emphasis mine) 
2. ibid, 208-9 
3. Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore, English Works, London, 1838, Vol I, 
pt I, Ch 1, quoted by Habermas, 72 
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grounded. 
The way in which these philosophical principles have 
been ideologically operationalized in different circumstances 
is, of course, a complex problem, that requires to be studied 
with due consideration to the peculiarities of each case. In the 
field of contemporary American foreign policy ideology, there 
are, I think, several crucial tendencies that can be linked to 
the tradition just discussed: First, the militarization of 
foreign policy and the attempt to solve political problems with 
a moral and social dimension to then - as, for example, wars of 
'national liberation' - through essentially technical means, 
such as the application of military force. Secondly, the fixation 
with technology in the design of strategy - and particularly 
nuclear strategy - which is, again, an attempt to reduce un- 
certainty through the application of technical means. And finally, 
the anti-utopian, conservative bent of US foreign policy ideology 
which expresses a pessimistic view of the 'architectonic' 
potential of politics and a conception of politics as 'adjustment 
to necessity', to certain inevitable 'objective laws'. 
In some of their works Niebuhr and Morgenthau have in 
fact denounced the 'technocratic approach' to problems of politics 
and history, which 'erroneously equates the mastery of nature with 
the mastery of historical destiny', thus accentuating 'a very old 
failing in human nature: the inclination of the wise, or the 
powerful, or the virtuous, to obscure or deny the human limi- 
tations in all human achievements or pretensions'. 
I This, however, 
is not easy to reconcile with their acceptance - particularly in 
Morgenthau's case - of 'objective laws' in politics. There is, 
1. Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, 127. And Morgenthau, 
in a 1944 book, also attacked the view that political be- 
haviour can be studied by simply transferring the methods 
used in natural science. The unpredictability of the political 
world served him to postulate a sociology of politics in which 
moral absolutes and radical solutions are challenged and dis- 
missed. (See Scientific Man versus Power Politics, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1944). Kennan, too, has insisted 
that 'if there is any great lesson we Americans need to learn 
with regard to the methodology of foreign policy, it is that 
we must be gardeners and not mechanics in our approach to 
world affairs. We must come to think of the development of 
international life as an organic and not a mechanical process. ' 
(See Realities of American Foreign Policy, Oxford University 
Press, London, 19547-9-37 
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in other words, a tension between, on the one hand, the admission 
of the 'dictates' of Realpolitik and, on the other, a concern 
with the limits of power. Is power a means, an objective, or a 
necessary goal for the political actor ? Is the maximization of 
national power a national objective in all cases ? The ambiguity 
of the response of the 'realists' to these questions is an 
indication of their ethical and - in Niebuhr's case - theological 
uneasiness with a notion of politics which irretrievably reduces 
it to a technique for domination. 
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CLAUSEWITZ AND THE SOCIAL ELEMENT IN WAR 
A fuller expression of the impact of the view of 
politics as technique - with important consequences for American 
foreign policy ideology - is to be found in the 'neo-Clausewitzian' 
conception of international relations which became predominant in 
the US after World War II. 
I 
It is informed by a fundamentally 
Hobbesian idea of politics and is characterized by five main 
aspects: first, the tendency to look for the determinants of the 
'national interest' in the external environment more than in the 
domestic milieu. Second, the tendency to confuse 'politics' and 
'strategy', and to militarize the instrumentalization of foreign 
policy. Third, the tendency to analyze war from a predominantly 
technological perspective. Fourth, the identification of inter- 
national 'order' with 'stability', and finally, the difficulty 
in grasping the significance of the social and moral elements 
in war. 
To be sure, not all these aspects are explicit in 
Clausewitz's work, but contemporary Clausewitzian scholars, I 
think, have not sufficiently appreciated the extent to which his 
philosophy of politics influenced his views on war, nor have they 
clearly ascertained in all its complexity the nature of his in- 
fluence on contemporary Western strategic thought. 
2 
In general, analysts of Clausewitz's work and influence 
tend to agree that, to quote Howard, Clausewitz 
presented the concept of 'absolute war' 
not as something culturally conditioned 
but as a Platonic ideal, to which most 
wars in reality were imperfect approxi- 
mations. It was 'ideal', that is, in the 
1. A significant number of books and articles have been written 
on the work of this school of strategic thought in the West, 
but little emphasis has been placed on its philosophical 
presuppositions. See, for example, Lawrence Freedman, The 
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, The Macmillan Press (for the 
IISS , London, 1982; Philip 
Green, Deadly Logic: The Theory 
of Nuclear Deterrence, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 
1966; R. Aron, Penser la Guerre: Clausew±tz, Vol II, 'L'Age 
Planetaire', Gallimard, Paris, 1976 
2. I refer, specifically, to the following studies: Peter Paret, 
Clausewitz and the State, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976; 
Raymond Aron, Penser la Guere: Clausewitz, Vol I, 'L'Age 
Europeenne', Gallimard, Paris, 1976; Michael Howard, Clausewitz, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983; and W. B. Gallie, 
Philosophers of Peace and War, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1978 
-56- 
sense not of being 'good', but of bein 
logical and [in the Aristotelian sensel 
'natural'. The intrinsic nature of war, 
that is, was total. 1 
This 'nature' or 'necessity' of war should not, however, be 
confused with 'normality' in the sociological sense - that which 
is common occurrence - nor with 'normality' in the sense implied 
by moralists - that which is desirable. Rather, as Aron explains, 
Clausewitz thought it 
a duty to maintain the absolute form of 
war as a universal reference point, as the 
original yardstick for the measurement of 
hopes and fears - the hopes of those with 
the means to absolute victory, the fears of 
those who must never forget the risk of 
assuming that the war may be limited - 
limitation which can only be made real with 
the agreement of the two antagonists. 2 
There were, in other words, two reasons that justified Clausewitz'. 
use of the concept of 'absolute war': First, a methodological 
reason which, as Gallie has pointed out, is probably Kantian in 
origin or at least in inspiration: given that war is distinguished 
from other forms of social action by the ways in which it employs 
violence, then its use of violence must initially be grasped in 
its extreme form. 
3 
Secondly, Clausewitz gave a practical reason 
for his use of the concept: even those statesmen and military 
commanders who want to avoid great exertions and decisive 
battles - that is, who want to limit war - must always remind 
themselves that the fulfilment of their wishes also depends on 
their adversaries. Even though, in real life, very few wars come 
near the 'absolute' form, yet the mere possibility of war 
approximating the 'absolute' form ought to be the predominant 
thought in every commander's mind, since it represents either 
total success or the most complete disaster that can befall him. 
4 
This interpretation, however, seems to me to miss the 
1. Howard, Clausewitz, 49 
2. R. Aron, 'Reason, Passion, and Power in the Thought of 
Clausewitz', Social Research, Vol 39, No 4, Winter 1972,605 
3. Gallie, 52 
4. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1976,581 
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most important implications of the concept of 'absolute war' in 
Clausewitz's thought, which have to do not only with methodology 
or strategy but with the conception of politics that underlies 
the whole structure of On War. The crucial questions are these: 
is war a 'force' with a 'potentially unlimited nature'I and a 
'basic temperament'2 that can be considered separately from 
politics ?; and, related to it, when do wars tend towards their 
'absolute form' and how can they - in such cases - be controlled ? 
On these points there is confusion and disagreement among 
Clausewitzian scholars. It is argued, on the one hand, that: 
War came about , Clausewitz insisted, be- 
cause of a political situation... Policy 
was the guiding intelligence, war only the 
instrument. But even this was a misleading 
analogy. War could not be considered as 
existing distinct from policy, however 
subordinate it might be to it. It was part 
of policy, a mode of it... 3 
But it is also asserted that: 
while policy should always predominate and 
employ war to serve its purpose, it remains 
distinct from war itself. It is a harness 
which directs and controls the force beyond 
it, not an intrinsic part of that force. 
Likewise, while war must respond to directives, 
it finds the harness an unnatural encumbrance. 
Left to itself it would break free and return 
to its native existence, that is, absolute 
expression. Therefore, while war is a force 
susceptible to control, it continues to seek 
out its tkieoretical extreme whenever permitted 
to do so. 
The difficulty, I think, stems from a deficient understanding of 
Clausewitz's views on politics and of his own theoretical problems 
in grasping the significance of the social element in war. 
It has been said that Clausewitz's remarks on politics 
are 'curiously abstract and meagre', 
5 
that 'the major omission in 
[his] work... is a study of politics complementary to the study of 
1. P. R. Moody, Jr, 'Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War', 
World Politics, Vol XXXI, No 3, April 1979,423 
2. B. R. Nardulli, 'Clausewitz and the Reorientation of Nuclear 
Strategy', The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 5, No 4. 
December 1982,497 
3. Howard, Clausewitz, 50 
4. Nardul li, 496 
5. Gallie, 61 
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the proper conduct of war'; 
1 
these views, in my opinion, do not 
deal adequately with the theoretical subtlety of Clausewitz's 
thought. One can agree with Paret that there is no 'theory of 
politics' in On War; 
2 the work, however, rests on a certain view 
of politics and embodies an ideological commitment to the 
stability of a certain kind of international order. Clausewitz 
saw politics exclusively as power politics, with no real interest 
in the element of 'vision' except as far as the problem of the 
balance of power was concerned. In On War he used the term 
'politics' both to refer to the objective world of concrete 
historical circumstances (an 'bbjective' concept) and also to 
refer to the decisions of the head of State or to the ends of 
one State with respect to others (a 'subjective' concept). From 
this distinction there arises a tension in his thought between 
the forces of uncontrolled violence and those of political reason. 
When Clausewitz argues that even the more violent wars, those 
which approximate the 'absolute' form, are 'political' because 
they are generated by politics, he uses the term in the first 
sense to refer to objective historical conditions. He held that 
war has a dual nature: the first type is that of wars of an- 
nihilation or wars for overthrow (of 'unlimited aims'), and the 
second type that of wars for concession, with limited aims. 
3 But 
when he discusses the relationship between war and politics he 
uses a 'subjective' concept of politics (political goals and 
intentions) which in fact excludes the first type of wars (of 
annihilation) as something that can legitimately be considered 
a rational instrument of policy. If political reason is the 
element which controls violence and leads it towards defined 
goals, the fact that some wars tend to approximate the extremes 
of violence means that, in those cases, political reason loses 
its hold on the irrational factors of war (the 'blind natural 
forces'). 
1. Charles Reynolds, 'Carl von Clausewitz and Strategic Theory', 
British Journal of International Studies, 4,1978,189 
2. Paret, 365 
3. See On War, Book I, Ch 1. Clausewitz, it should be emphasized, 
depicted war as a 'remarkable trinity' composed of 'primordial 
violence... of the play of chance and probability... and of its 
element of subordination as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone. ' 89 
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What, then, is the principal, if not unique, cause 
that tends to provoke war's escalation to extremes, to intensify 
hostilities to the point when they approach 'absolute war' ? 
There can be little doubt that, for Clausewitz, it is the parti- 
cipation of the people, the intrusion of the social element in war. 
He committed himself to fight against Imperial France - which 
unleashed over Europe the 'excesses' of revolutionary war - for 
the restoration of an international order in which war is used 
as a limited instrument for limited political ends. This ideo- 
logical commitment, not always explicit in his work, led Clausewitz 
in Book VIII of On War to interpret the Napoleonic wars as 
conflicts which approximated the 'absolute' form of war despite 
the fact that they were the product of objective political con- 
ditions: 'It is true', he wrote, 
that war itself has undergone significant 
changes in character and methods, changes 
that have brought it closer to its absolute 
form. But these changes did not come about 
because the French government freed itself, 
so to speak, from the harness of policy; 
they were caused by the new political con- 
ditions which the French Revolution created 
both in France and in Europe as a whole, 
conditions that set in motion new means and 
new forces, and have thus made possible a 
degree of energy in war that otherwise would 
have been inconceivable. 1 
In other words, Napoleon's wars, though generated by 'politics' 
(in an objective sense) drifted away from 'politics' (in a sub- 
jective sense) because their escalatory violence weakened the 
rational controls of political reason. Thus Clausewitz implicitly 
identified 'political reason' - the probability of political 
control in war - with limited wars: 
2 the ends of war should be 
limited because this is the only guarantee that it would not 
approximate its 'absolute' form and therefore cease to be a 
rational political instrument. 
Is it, however, correct to argue that the participation 
1. Clausewitz, 610 
2. Paret has also observed that Clausewitz 'in practical terms 
stood for limited ends in foreign affairs'. See 'Clausewitz 
and the 19th Century', in M. Howard (ed) The Theory and 
Practice of War, Praeger, New York, 1966,38). And Aron remarks 
that Clausewitz 'implicitly gives to statesmen the counsel of 
moderation'. ('Reason, Passion, and Power... ', 614 
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of the people in war necessarily pushes it towards its 'absolute' 
form, weakening or destroying political controls ? Historical 
evidence does not seem to bear this out. World War II, for 
instance, was a 'total' war, of enormous violence, but the 
political controls over its development were firm throughout. And 
the revolutionary wars of our time - in Vietnam, Angola, and 
Nicaragua, for example - even though they produce extreme mani- 
festations of violence and generalized popular participation, 
cannot with any accuracy be called 'acts of pure violence' - 
Clausewitz's definition of 'absolute' war; they are, in fact, 
essentially political events. The application of violence, even 
in extreme forms, can be a political act, and the involvement 
of people in war does not necessarily result in a weakening of 
'political reason': the meaning we give to this 'reason' is not 
an abstract entity but an ideological elaboration. Clausewitz 
thought that the social energies released by the French Revolution 
made war approach its 'absolute' form, but what really happened 
was that politics ceased to be the affair of elite groups and 
became a mass conflict, in which the whole society was involved. 
In these new conditions, it was not possible any more for govern- 
ments to separate foreign from domestic politics, or society 
from war. 
1 
Clausewitz's ideological commitment to the stability 
of an international system of sovereign states (in fact, a system 
of relatively equal 'great powers' in equilibrium) made it 
difficult for him to realize that Napoleon's wars were not 
'absolute', but simply politically different. 
Clausewitz's thought, therefore, is characterized by 
the tension between, on the one hand, his view of politics 
exclusively as power politics, and, on the other, his concern 
to make 'politics' a harness or moderator of war. His difficulties 
in grasping the meaning of new political conditionsprevailing 
in his time led him to think of 'people's war' as a blind force 
1. Clausewitz attributed Napoleon's success to his ability to 
mobilize the French people behind the war effort, and he 
concluded that the way to defeat France was to act like 
France: to fight a 'people's war'. But the conservative powers 
which he defended were caught in a dilemma: their rule was 
safest when most questions concerning authority - among them 
war - were not politicized. As Moody points out, in advocating 
people's war, Clausewitz was 'mindlessly carried away by the 
logic of war, rather than articulating a set of policies that 
would guide the war .', 
430 
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which could easily become 'something pointless and devoid of 
sense'. Clausewitz still believed that it was possible to control 
and limit war through the limitation of political objectives; 
but nowadays, with the invention of weapons of mass destruction, 
the neo-Clausewitzian strategists have again emphasized the 
'blind' dimensions of war as an elementary force, which can only 
be controlled - particularly at the nuclear level - through 
technological means. In the same way as Clausewitz saw 'people's 
war' as 'elemental fury', 
1 
almost beyond rational control, today's 
neo-Clausewitzians tend to see military technology as an almost 
autonomous 'thing in itself', that both creates the conditions 
for 'absolute war' and the possibility of limiting it. 
2 
The fact that - as Freedman and others have pointed 
out - contemporary strategy, and in particular Western strategy, 
has become 'infatuated with the microscopic analysis of military 
technology', 3 and increasingly less concerned with the particular 
arrangements of political relations on which the balance of 
terror rests, or with the analysis of the notions of 'politics' 
behind the technological drive, is not just 'casual' but the 
product of a progressive impoverishment of the idea of 'politics' 
in Western strategic thought. 
4 
'Politics' is taken to mean merely 
the manipulation of conflict, not the search for higher values 
such as justice or freedom; international politics is conceived 
1. Clausewitz, 593 
2. Moody, for instance, argues that 'Autonomous technology shapes 
the way we live, and, in particular, the way we fight wars. 
As the constraints on warfare become increasingly technical, 
warfare ceases to be an instrument of politics. ', 425. Howard 
also has argued that 'Absolute weapons, whether mass armies 
or nuclear explosives, require absolute war aims and absolute 
enemies. ' (See 'War as an Instrument of Politics', in H. Butter- 
field and M. Wight (eds) Diplomatic Investigations, Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1966,198) 
3. Freedman, 400 
4. An inquiry into the extent to which this situation has come 
about as a result of a crisis in Western political theory, 
is beyond the scope of this study. Reference can be made, 
however, to John Dunn's insightful book, Western Political 
Theory in the Face of the Future, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1979. A similar process of 'militarization' of 
the notion of politics occurred in the evolution of Marxism, 
from Marx and Engels, through Lenin, to Grasci and Mao Tse 
Tung. See A. Romero, 'Lenin and the Militarization of Marxism', 
ARGOS, Simon Bolivar University, Caracas, No 4,1983 
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solely as a quest for power, not as an activity which could be 
informed by a 'vision' of a just order; and 'peace' is thought 
of purely as 'stability'. Politics thus becomes 'technique', 
confined to urging an optimal course of action without considering 
the policy basis of choice, or the ends sought. In the process, 
the difference in nature between 'politics' and 'strategy' tends 
to break down. This is especially clear in the neo-Clausewitzian 
reorientation of nuclear strategy in the US, whose essential 
driving force is a technical one. Paradoxically, in the in- 
creasingly rarified atmosphere of nuclear war-planning, more and 
more limited military options are devised as ways of fighting 
nuclear war, and this in turn is supposed to increase policy 
options and help to reinstate political control over the conduct 
of war. 
1 
Technical instruments of mass destruction thus become 
means for the 'limitation' of war. 
Hobbes had presumed that the knowledge provided by 
his 'science of politics' obviated public discussion of it. The 
epistemological certainty of his method and the concrete results 
of his technique made it unnecessary to allow the participation 
of informed citizens in the maintenance of political order: after 
the 'contract', absolutism would guarantee peace. In Clausewitz, 
too, the participation of the people in war is interpreted as 
an irrational factor, leading war towards its 'absolute' form. 
He did not say whether or how this could be controlled, but it 
is quite clear that his contemporary disciples in the West - 
and in particular in the US, as shown in Vietnam and other ex- 
periences - are still baffled by the 'intrusion' of the social 
element in war, confronting it systematically with technological 
means. In sum, both Hobbes and Clausewitz, from different per- 
spectives and with different purposes, contributed to give the 
idea of politics the character of strategic technique, with 
significant consequences for present day 'political realism'. 
By emphasizing the relationship between war and politics, 
1. Nardulli, 503. See also Chapter 7 of this study. I must point 
out that, though the dominant trend of US strategic thought 
is characterized by its technological 'fixation', there are 
exceptions to this rule, such as, for instance, some of the 
contributiors made over more than three decades by Bernard 
Brodie, in particular, his perceptive analysis of the value- 
issues involved in the Vietnam War. See War and Politics, 
Chapters 4 and 5 
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Clausewitz made a crucial contribution to the development of 
strategic thought; but the absence of a discussion of the 
notion of 'politics' in his work left strategy under the spell 




CONSERVATISM AND INNOVATION 
THE CONSERVATIVE NATURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
Soon after the end of the Second World War the policy 
of 'containment' became the cornerstone of US foreign policy and 
the principal guideline for dealing with the challenge of Soviet 
power and Third World political upheavals. The security per- 
ceptions of US leaders and their chosen position as defenders 
of the international status quo - based on American economic and 
strategic supremacy - led successive administrations to apply 
the 'containment' policy with a universality that was not sensitive 
to social, political and geographical idiosyncracies, and to rely 
most heavily on military force for its implementation. 
This globalist version of containment became the dominant 
ideological 'paradigm' of US leaders in the formulation of foreign 
policy. A 'paradigm', according to Kuhn, is a set of rules of 
how to think about problems, a collection of shared assumptions, 
a common belief among decision-makers on the validity of certain 
perceptions about the external world. 
1 
Though applied by Kuhn, 
a philosopher of science, to the problem of how scientific pro- 
gress is made, the notion of 'ideological paradigm' is, I think, 
extremely useful in the study of political ideology, with parti- 
cular reference to the problems of resistance to change and 
ideological innovation. 
Kuhn showed that fields of science are characterized 
by an accepted body of concepts and perceptions that set the 
framework for research. These constitute the paradigm (e. g. the 
Ptolemaic or Newtonian systems) that sets limits on what ex- 
planations 'make sense' and help determine what phenomena are 
relevant and merit further research. From a sociological view- 
point, a paradigm provides a consensual basis which consolidates 
the loyalties and commitments of the members of the scientific 
community; this community, in turn, has as its task the solution 
of the puzzles set by the paradigm. The bulk of science aims at 
1. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962,10-11 
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problem-solving within the paradigm and 'does not aim at novelties 
of fact or theory... '1. Scientific progress then consists in 
fulfilling the expectations set by a paradigm: 
Normal scientific activity, the activity 
in which most scientists inevitably spend 
almost all their time, is predicated on 
the assumption that the scientific com- 
munity knows what the world is like. Much 
of the success of the enterprise derives 
from the community's willingness to defend 
that assumption, if necessary at consider- 
able cost. Normal science... often sup- 
presses fundamental novelties because 
they are necessarily subversive of its 
basic commitments. 2 
As long as the expectations generated by a dominant 
paradigm are mostly fulfilled, science proceeds 'normally'. When 
expectations are frustrated, however, when new facts are dis- 
covered that cannot be squared with the paradigm, the scientific 
community undergoes a crisis in belief. Kuhn introduces the 
concept of 'anomaly' to describe the findings of 'normal science' 
that cannot be reconciled with the reigning paradigm, despite 
efforts made at adjusting it. When 'anomalies' reach the stage 
of 'crisis', the authority-structure of the old paradigm is 
weakened and the resultant theoretical upheaval 'loosens the 
rules of normal puzzle-solving in ways that ultimately permit 
a new paradigm to emerge'; 
3 
at that point, a conceptual 
'revolution' takes place. 
Kuhn's version of how scientific knowledge advances 
has come under criticism from different angles, 
4 
but for the 
specific purposes of this study the basic elements of his model 
of conceptual change do provide a useful framework for the 
organization of my discussion of ideological innovation in 
American foreign policy. The crucial questions to ask are these: 
First, what was the nature of the containment 'paradigm' up to 
the Vietnam experience ? Secondly, what kind of 'anomalies' did 
1. Kuhn, 52 
2. Ibid, 5 
3. ibid, 80 
4. For a comprehensive discussion of the issues raised by Kuhn's 
work, see I. Latakos and A. Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1970 
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Vietnam introduce into the 'paradigm' ? Finally, what sort of 
ideological innovation did the Vietnam crisis produce and why ? 
Did it lead to a conceptual 'revolution' or to a merely tactical 
adjustment of the old paradigm ? The answers to these questions 
will involve a parallel discussion of the peculiarities of con- 
ceptual innovation in the field of political ideology. 
By 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, 
containment was - and had been for a number of years - the es- 
tablished orthodoxy or dominant paradigm of American foreign 
policy. It enjoyed broad and solid support throughout the US 
body politic, and there was general agreement that the policy 
had been largely successful, both in stopping communist expansion 
throughout the globe and in establishing American economic, 
strategic and political preeminence in the non-communist world. 
The aim of the containment paradigm - as even its name indicates - 
was essentially conservative: to preserve an international status 
quo based on US hegemony. 
I 
As I said earlier, analysts of the evolution of 
American political thought have consistently maintained that 
'The American political mind has been a liberal mind'. 
2 
It is 
commonly assumed in the scholarly literature that the powerful 
US postwar Right has in some sense been illegitimate, and that 
the true American consensus has always been fundamentally 
liberal. 3 This view, however, was highly questionable well before 
the rise to power of the Reagan administration made conservatism 
'fashionable'. Quite apart from the legitimating functions of 
the liberal ideology, the difficulties in identifying the speci- 
fically conservative nature of US foreign policy ideology are 
related to the persistent attempts of conservative thinkers to 
present conservatism as 'characteristically inarticulate, un- 
willing... to translate itself into formulae or maxims, loath to 
1. See Etzold and Gaddis, 226-7 
2. C. L. Rossiter, Conservatism in America, A. A. Knopf & Random 
House, New York, 1962,69 
3. For a thorough analysis of the American conservative tradition, 
see G. H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in 
America since 19 5, Basic Books, New York, 1976. Horowitz 
points out that conservatism is both 'one of the most un- 
popular words in the American vocabulary' and also 'one of 
the most persistent currents of thought'. I. L. Horowitz, 141 
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state its purpose or declare its views'. 
' 
The problem is com- 
pounded by the confusion surrounding the terms 'liberal' and 
'conservative' in the US, where - in the field of domestic 
politics - 'liberalism' is identified with the 'New Deal' policies 
of state intervention in the economy, and 'conservatism' with a 
free-market, individualist view-point. 
2 
Huntington has argued that conservatism is a 
'situational' ideology, that is to say an ideology which arises 
out of a distinct but recurrent type of historical situation in 
which a fundamental challenge is directed at existing political 
arrangements and in which the supporters of these arrangements 
employ conservatism in the defence of the status quo. In contrast 
to 'ideational ideologies' such as liberalism, communism and 
fascism, which approach existing institutions with an 'ought 
demand' that the institutions be reshaped to embody the values 
of the ideology, conservatism lacks a 'substantive ideal': 'No 
philosopher', he writes, 'has ever described a conservative 
utopia. '3 
To be sure, very frequently ideologies turn 'conserva- 
tive' once their defenders consider them sufficiently realized. 
A distinction should be made, however, between this conservative 
attitude - which may be characteristic, for instance, within the 
Soviet Politburo - and the different versions of conservatism 
that have developed in the West since the French Revolution. 
The better known among these rests on a belief in the imper- 
fection of human nature, an imperfection which is both intel- 
lectual and moral. The consequence of men's intellectual imper- 
fection is that they do not guide their political actions under 
the stimulus of large, abstract projects of reform, conceived 
by individual thinkers working in isolation from the 'practical 
realities' of political life. The consequence of man's moral 
imperfection is that men, acting on their own uncontrolled 
impulses, will on the whole act badly, however 'pure' their 
1. Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism, Macmillan, London, 
1980,20. For a more detailed account, by an American author, 
of the principles of conservatism, see W. R. Harbour, The 
Foundations of Conservative Thought, University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, 1982 
2. On this point , see F. A. Hayek, 'Why I am not a Conservative', 
in The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 
1960,397-411 
3. Samuel P. Huntington, 'Conservatism as an Ideology', American 
political Science Review, Vol 51,1957,457-8 
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professed intentions may be. 
1 
As the 'politics of imperfection', 
conservatism is, then, essentially anti-utopian, for utopianism 
is based on the conviction that optimistic, imaginative thought 
and action are capable of bringing about a change towards not 
only a new social existence, but a better one. This Burkean 
version of conservatism, though influential in shaping Kissinger's 
political thought, has had a relatively low impact upon the 
evolution of US foreign policy ideology. Thus it is the situational 
definition of conservatism which is most relevant in an effort 
to characterize the nature of the 'containment' paradigm. 
Conservatism is based on the defence of privilege and 
domination, at both the domestic and the international level; 
its pessimism and anti-utopianism are mechanisms for the pro- 
tection of existing political hierarchies and institutions. 
2 
Utopian thinking always has the double effect of throwing into 
sharp relief the imperfections of the present and providing a 
stand-point for criticism. In its reaction to utopia, conservative 
ideology adopts a rigid and dogmatic character; at the same time, 
however, conservatives can be very flexible at the tactical 
level, adopting new policies as the circumstances demand and 
as long as the fundamental values of social inequality and inter- 
national hegemony are preserved. Thus, for example, at various 
moments in English history, conservative spokesmen have 
romanticized a semi-feudal and 'organic' 
community, flirted with the values of the 
cash nexus in an apology for the entre- 
preneurial activity, and celebrated the 
bureaucratic impetus of a fully fledged 
technocracy3 
but throughout this process of policy-change there can be detected 
a dynamic continuity which is informed by a distinctive ideology 
1. A. Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection, Faber & Faber, London, 
1978,9-22. For a discussion of the varieties of conservative 
ideology, see N. Wintrop and D. W. Lovell, 'Varieties of Con- 
servative Theory', in N. Wintrop 
(ed) Liberal Democratic 
Theory and Its Critics, Croom Helm, London, 1983,133-89 
2. Seliger points out (92) that 'Both historical and contemporary 
data confirm that conservative politicians can be alienated 
from a given status quo and adopt a commitment to change a 
society in the image of its past'. It must, however, be said 
that the conservative commitment to change goes always in the 
direction of a defence of privilege and inequality. 
3. Eccleshall, 62 
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grounded on a pessimistic view of human nature, a defence of 
social inequality, and the protection of an unequal distribution 
of international power. 
Eugene Rostow has said - referring to foreign policy - 
that 'the American temperament resists the acknowledgement of 
error'. 
I 
This statement is typical of the particular impervious- 
ness to criticism characteristic of conservative ideology, for 
its function is to obscure the nature of unequal power relation- 
ships by presenting them as permanent and even desirable features 
of social and international existence. The 'containment' paradigm, 
until Vietnam, not only enjoyed widespread and entrenched support 
as a successful foreign policy strategy - which meant that it 
would take highly unsettling evidence to disrupt it - but also, 
because of its conservative-realist ideological foundations, 
presented great obstacles to criticism of any sort. The paradigm 
had the following main characteristics: 
(a) As a basic objective, the maintenance of US political 
strategic supremacy and economic 'disparity' as against 
the rest of the world; 
(b) A specific commitment to preserve US nuclear-strategic 
superiority over the USSR; 
(c) An emphasis on the use of military force as an instrument 
of policy; 
(d) A strong belief in the power of technology as a 'problem- 
solving' tool in the realm of national strategy; 
(e) A disposition to forge bonds with dictatorships in the 
Third World, and to combat social change; 
(f) A global character, based on an expanded notion of US 
'security'; 
(g) A strong 'legitimating' component, which described US 
foreign policy as a weapon in the defence of a 'free 
world'. 
2 
At the same time, the dominant traits of the US decision- 
makers' 'operational code' established the following: 
1. E. V. Rostow, Peace in the Balance: The Future of American 
Foreign Policy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1972,21-2 




(a) International politics is a 'game', the object of which 
is to avoid losing influence and, if possible, to gain 
more. In this game 'toughness' is a positive attribute; 
(b) The international system functions best as a threat system. 
The premium placed on 'toughness' dictates that negative 
reinforcements should be used more than positive inducements 
to influence behaviour; 
(c) Legal restraints should not be considered important deter- 
minants of foreign policy formulation; 
(d) The complex nature of international life makes it advisable 
to design policies for only a short span - rather than a long 
term - of history, always on the premise of self-interest and 
without illusions about the possibility of contributing to 
long-range structural changes in international society; 
(e) 'Liberal' principles and proposals are irresponsible as a 
guide to policy, but excellent for propaganda purposes. 
1 
The conservative nature of this ideological paradigm, 
and its pervasive acceptance, meant that only a crisis of very 
significant impact could lead to its substantial modification. 
Kuhn finds it difficult to advance a simple explanation as to why 
or when a particular anomaly provokes a crisis in theory. At one 
time, he writes, the existence of an anomaly will prove so com- 
pelling that it 'call[s] into question explicit and fundamental 
generalizations of the paradigm'. 
2 
There can be no doubt that 
Vietnam was a great shock to American society. It showed the 
limitations of US military power, exposed the myth of monolithic 
communism and of a Soviet-controlled threat throughout the Third 
World, and demonstrated the inability of an unimaginative foreign 
policy to deal with the complex challenges of a heterogeneous 
international system. But despite its profound repercussions 
upon the American people's self-image, and its effects on the 
traditional bi-partisan foreign policy consensus, the opposition 
generated by Vietnam was mainly directed at certain policies and 
political incumbents, or, in other words, at the performance of 
the system, not at the rationales or values underlying it. 
1. R. C. Johansen, The National Interest and the Human Interest. 
An Analysis of U. S. Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1980,371-86 
2. Kuhn, 82 
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Already in the late 60s there was generalized agreement that 
the Vietnam crisis made it imperative to introduce a series of 
tactical adjustments in US foreign policy - though the specific 
direction of these changes was yet to be determined. A more com- 
prehensive reassessment of fundamental ideological premises, 
however, leading eventually to a new 'paradigm' required a 
commitment to innovation that could only come from inside the 
US government, from a team of officials convinced that Vietnam 
represented more than a temporary setback, and that it should 
induce the US to respond creatively to the forces of Third World 
nationalism, to the aspirations for social and political change, 
and away from the militarization of foreign policy and the 
hegemonial ambitions of the first era of 'containment'. 
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THE PROBLEM OF INNOVATION 
'Crises' provide the occasion for 'revolutions' 
(paradigm-substitutions), but they do not these changes 
inevitable. In the late 1960s there were objective factors that 
created the possibility for a thorough rethinking of the basic 
premises of US foreign policy; the Vietnam experience could have 
made it clear to all concerned in the American leadership groups, 
first, that actions based on the prevailing 'containment' paradigm 
were producing intolerable consequences, and, secondly, that this 
paradigm was no longer able to explain reality adequately. The 
magnitude of the paradigm shift induced by this situation, however, 
was in the end a function of the willingness and ability of those 
supporting the fundamental tenets of the old paradigm to resist 
successfully the pressures for change. 
As Kuhn points out, both in manufacture and in science - 
and, one may add, in politics too - 'retooling' is 'an extravagancE 
to be reserved for the occasion that demands it'. 
1 
The 'retooling' 
of an ideological paradigm in politics is a complex process, and 
a distinction should be made between, on the one hand, tactical 
adjustments of the paradigm designed to cope with new circum- 
stances, but without redefining its conceptual presuppositions, 
and, on the other, ideological innovation leading to changes on 
all of three crucial areas simultaneously: (a) on the images of 
international reality held by key leaders and their conceptual 
framework for interpreting it; (b) on their vision of their 
country's purposes and motivations, and of the legitimacy and 
efficiency of alternative methods for implementing foreign policy; 
(c) finally, on concrete views about what the 'national interest' 
demands in specific key policy areas (as, for example, Vietnam, 
or the 'North-South' dialogue). Thus, whereas a process of 
tactical adjustment need not imply a reworking of fundamental 
ideological views, but a change in methods within the boundaries 
of the old paradigm, a process of ideological innovation requires 
a redefinition of objectives and of security requirements to- 
gether with a reinterpretation of 'reality' itself. 
Of course, the likelihood of a superpower undergoing 
a process of tactical adjustment, let alone of ideological 
1. Kurkin, 76 
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innovation, in foreign policy is less than it is for other, more 
vulnerable nations. Because of their greater capacity to respond 
to challenges, they can more easily absorb change without sub- 
stantially altering their foreign policy orientation. 
1 
Historical 
changes, however, can make tactical adjustment and/or ideological 
innovation necessary, for the alternative could be catastrophic, 
or involve intolerable costs. In much the same way that a 
scientific community seeks to adjust its paradigm to account for 
novelty, a political regime will seek to adapt its system to the 
new developments brought by change. To the degree that a society 
succeeds in adapting, its efforts might be likened to a form of 
puzzle-solving. 
2 
Rosenau defines 'adaptation' as follows: 
Any foreign policy behaviour undertaken 
by the government of any national society 
is conceived to be adaptive when it copes 
with or stimulates changes in the external 
environment of the society that contribute 
to keeping the essential structure of the 
society within acceptable limits. A be- 
haviour is regarded as maladaptive when it 
copes with or stimulates changes in the 
external environment that contribute to 
changes in the essential structures that 
are outside acceptable limits. 
By 'essential structures' he means the basic political, economic, 
and social life patterns of a national society; 'acceptable limits' 
he defines as 'those variations in the essential structures that 
do not prevent the society from maintaining its basic forms of 
life or from altering these forms through its own choices and 
procedures'. 
3 
Despite its highly abstract nature, this definition 
is helpful in that it indicates that the concept of 'adaptation' 
does not only include a better manipulation - seen in purely 
instrumental terms - of the external environment, but also the 
preservation of the essential structures of a society and its 
political system. In other words, an 'adaptive' process which 
leads a democratic political system to change into an authori- 
tarian one, would be an example not of successful 'adjustment' 
1. J. N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Ada tation, Frances 
Pinter Publishers Ltd., London, 1981,17 
2. Sheldon Wolin, 'Paradigms and Political Theories', in P. King 
and B. C. Parekh (eds) Politics and Ex erience, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1968,149 
3. Rosenau, 38 
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but of maladaptive transformation. Adversity makes innovation 
possible, even necessary, but not inevitable, for there is a 
decisive subjective element in estimating what constitutes 
adversity and whether innovation is compelling. How do these 
general thoughts bear upon the US intervention in Vietnam ? In 
what follows, I contend three main propositions: (a) That the 
dilemmas of American involvement in, and, later, extrication 
from Vietnam, could be fully resolved only by reshaping funda- 
mental aspects of the 'containment' paradigm, including notions 
about the nature of international politics, US objectives and 
the requirements of American security. 
1 (b) That mere tactical 
adjustment, as promoted by US decision-makers after Vietnam, was 
defective as an answer to the challenges of contemporary inter- 
national politics - in particular, the pervasiveness of nationa- 
lism resistant to control by the great powers, coupled with the 
inhibitions and dangers imposed by nuclear weapons - that erode 
conventional notions on the use of force to achieve political 
ends and demand original responses to ever more complex problems. 
(c) Finally, that by failing to innovate substantially the 
conservative-realist ideology of US foreign policy, choosing 
instead to make tactical adjustments to 'containment', the 
Kissinger-Nixon team led the American body politic into a path 
of maladaptive behaviour, that produced changes in the 'essential 
structures' of American politics beyond the 'acceptable limits' 
imposed by the democratic values of the US system of government. 
More specifically, I contend that the failure of the Nixon 
administration to respond creatively to the challenge of foreign 
policy innovation, stimulated behaviour that decisively con- 
tributed to the unfolding of the complex series of events that 
eventually destroyed the Nixon presidency. 
How, then, does innovation take place, and what are 
the obstacles to it ? It is commonly assumed by political 
scientists that the decision to change paradigms is analogous 
to a fact-finding proceeding, in which new 'facts' are reviewed 
on the basis of logic, evidence, and experiment, thus leading to 
1. On this point, I coincide with M. J. Brenner, to whose concept 
of what 'innovation' consists of I am also indebted: 'The 
Concept of Innovation and the Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy', 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol 17, No 3, September 1973, 
257-8 
/5 
the abandonment of the old theory and the adoption of a 'higher' 
form of explanation. 
1 
In Kuhn's description, however, a decision 
between paradigms appears more like an adversary proceeding, more 
competitive than deliberative. What is at issue are new cognitive 
standards and perceptions, not new 'facts'; a new paradigm 
embodies a new way of looking at phenomena rather than the dis- 
covery of hitherto inaccessible data. 
2 
As Jervis explains: 
The appeal of the old view is weakened by 
its inability to cope with some known facts, 
but much of the evidence for the new para- 
digm seems persuasive only after people see 
the world within the new framework. Although 
many observations that in retrospect are con- 
sidered sufficient to discredit the old 
theory are made when the old theory holds 
sway, they are misinterpreted until the new 
theory has established itself. 3 
The relevance of this analysis of scientific development for the 
study of ideological innovation is quite obvious: the crucial 
point is that it is not enough to suggest that a paradigm is 
discarded when it is falsified; no paradigm ever fits the 'facts' 
completely and every paradigm is open to serious objection. A 
paradigm maintains its hold over its practitioners not because 
it has resisted falsification but because there are psychological, 
bureaucratic and/or specifically ideological factors which work 
against innovation by resisting pressures for change. 
The contribution made by psychology to the study of 
political and strategic decision-making has been enormous; 
4 
most 
of the literature in the field, however - in particular cognitive 
dissonance theory - concerns itself mainly with 'coping', that 
is, the manner by which an individual seeks to manage his environ- 
ment so as to minimize discomfort and restore 'psychic stability's 
My purpose in this work, by contrast, is political, not psycho- 
analytical; it has to do with intellectual challenge and response. 
1. See, for example, D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis 
Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 19 5,22 
2. Kuhn, 144-6; Wolin, 'Paradigms and Political Theories', 137-8 
3. R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976,165 
4. Two basic works are: Leon Festinger, The Theory of Cognitive 
Dissonance, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1958; J. 
Brehm, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance, John Wiley, New 
York, 1962 
5. Brenner, 256 
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Also, pscyhological approaches usually have two specific draw- 
backs: First, their deterministic bias, 1 the tendency to argue 
that innovation did not take place because it was 'impossible' 
that it could. As a counter-argument, Kissinger's own comment 
is apt: 'Whatever one's view about the degree to which choices 
in international affairs are "objectively" determined, the 
decisions are made by individuals who will be above all conscious 
of the seeming multiplicity of options. '2 Secondly, and related 
to my previous point, another drawback of psychological approaches 
is their tendency to establish connections between the most 
seemingly disparate elements in a man's life, and to try to 
explain political decisions by their roots in the decision-makers' 
biography, arguing, for instance, that 'if we remember Kissinger's 
reluctance to leave Germany, his father's vacillation, Louis's 
[Kissinger's father] wait-and-see attitude, followed by the 
sudden reversal into flight, Kissinger's four years of intransi- 
gence in Vietnam is given added meaning'. 
3 
While not denying the 
validity such assertions may sometimes have, I still think it is 
important to consider decision-makers as actors able, in principle, 
to criticize their own most deeply-held assumptions, and to reach 
decisions on the basis of a critical assessment of alternatives. 
A good deal of significant work has also been done on 
how resistance to new ideas is rooted in the way bureaucracies 
work. As Brenner puts it: 'The bureaucracy's stake in avoiding 
the responsibility of innovation is two-fold: intellectual con- 
venience, and the protection of organizational interests. Change 
is a strain and is disruptive of institutional harmony. '4 Still, 
I do not think it would be adequate to reduce the problem of 
ideological innovation in American foreign policy during the 
period under study to one of competition among bureaucratic 
interests and political factions. The main obstacles to innovation, 
as I hope will become clear in the course of this work, did not 
derive from the actions of organizational interests in preventing 
1. For a critique of 'psychologism', see Karl Popper, The Poverty 
of Historicism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961,158-9 
2. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 27 
3. Dana Ward, 'Kissinger: A Psychohistory', History of Childhood 
Quarterly, Vol 2, No 3, Winter 1975,330 
4. Brenner, 271 
-77- 
certain ideas from prevailing, 
1 but from the unwillingness of 
top decision-makers to scrutinize critically the basic assumptions 
of the dominant paradigm. 
Ideological belief systems do indeed constitute an 
enduring method for maintaining cognitive balance and organi- 
zational stability; being relatively self-contained and resistant 
to falsification, they are not readily undermined. It seems un- 
wise, however, to presume that belief systems in an open society 
such as the US, with long-standing pluralistic traditions, are 
totally impervious to alteration, and I believe that attention 
should be focused not so much on individual pscyhological traits 
and bureaucratic arrangements, but on the pervasive influence 
on decision-makers of the conservative-realist ideological 
paradigm - despite all the protestations about the 'liberal' 
motivations of US foreign policy. 
Jervis has argued that choosing among competing beliefs 
about world politics does not involve all the complex problems 
that arise in choosing among scientific paradigms. Foreign policy 
analysts, he maintains, usually 'can utilize previously developed 
alternative images, whereas scientists must often create a new 
framework. Second, the competing images usually have more in 
common than do competing [scientific] paradigms. '2 I think, on 
the contrary, that the intensity of dogmatic commitment and 
the propensity to reject criticism can be even greater in the 
field of political ideologies than in that of scientific theories. 
Political ideologies are sets of beliefs or values that can be 
explained through the non-cognitive interests of social groups; 
ideological beliefs belong to the more general class of biased 
beliefs, and the distinction between interest and position ex- 
planations correspond to the more general distinction between 
distortion and illusion as forms of bias. 
3 As I tried to show 
1. As Machiavelli explained: 'The innovator makes enemies of all 
those who prospered under the old order, and only luke-warm 
support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the 
new. Their support is lukewarm partly from fear of their ad- 
versaries... and partly because men are generally incredulous, 
never really trusting new things unless they have tested them 
by experience. ' The Prince, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971, 
51 
2. Jervis, 161 
3. Jon Elster, 'Belief, Bias and Ideology', in M. Hollis and 
S. Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1982,123 
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earlier, these two phenomena, distortion and illusion, play a 
crucial role in fulfilling the legitimative requirements of 
ideology, particularly in cases - such as that of US foreign 
policy ideology - where the distance between what is said about 
intentions and what is done in actuality is frequently very pro- 
nounced. Thus, because of legitimation, policy-makers tend toward 
relatively fixed positions which are extended to include broad 
areas of policy. This, as Trout points out, creates an inertia 
with important consequences: 
If projected responses to specific con- 
ditions fall outside the scope of the 
available legitimative structure, then 
the political costs of reinterpreting or 
reconstructing it exceed the potential 
gains of projected response. In the case 
of foreign policy the domestic costs of 
restructuring the image of the inter- 
national situation may exceed foreign 
policy gains. 1 
But it should be emphasized that, despite this inertia, innovation 
can still take place, for it is a function both of the intensity 
of crises and of political leadership. 
In spite of all obstacles, and even in the case of a 
superpower, ideological innovation can and should take place in 
certain circumstances as the best way to ensure both adaptation 
to a changing external environment and the long-term survival 
of the values of society. As in the case of the natural sciences, 
the prelude to discovery and to all novel 'vision' in politics 
is not ignorance, but the recognition that something has gone 
wrong with existing knowledge and beliefs. To be sure, the pro- 
duction of knowledge is not a main function of political ideologies 
but neither is it irrelevant to their role of preserving interests 
and values. As 'realist' philosophers of science explain, it is 
possible to claim both that science produces cumulative knowledge 
about the world, and that there are no apodictic foundations to 
it. 
2 In other words, science progresses not by making knowledge 
1. Trout, 281 
2. R. Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 
1978. For a discussion of this and other approaches mentioned 
here, see W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981 
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more certain but by producing more knowledge; 
1 
similarly, in- 
novation in political ideology is only conceivable as a result 
of the production of knowledge, of the fact that we can learn 
from our mistakes. 
2 
Since political ideologies are unavoidably 
selective, partial, and influenced by interest and position, the 
only way they can be affected by crises is by criticizing them. 
Only in this way can it be shown how an ideology rests on 
dubious assumptions, or how its concepts are muddled, or how 
it does not account for certain facts, or how it draws illegiti- 
mate inferences, or is inconsistent, etc. 
3 
Any system of beliefs may be an unfalsifiable one, 
if that is how it is held. It is not, however, impossible to 
question the basic assumptions of a paradigm, for - as Popper 
argues in his attack upon 'The Myth of the Framework': 
I believe that at any moment we are 
prisoners caught in the framework of 
our theories; our expectations; our past 
experiences; our language. But we are 
prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we 
try, we can break out of our framework 
at any time. Admittedly we shall find 
ourselves again in a framework, but it 
will be a better and roomier one; and we 
can at any moment break out of it again. 
4 
Beliefs are irrationally held only if they are closed to correction 
by awareness of the world, 
5 
and human thought - particularly in 
the field of politics - can cease to be endemically unreasonable 
only if it responds to 'crises' by a process of criticism. 
6 
1. Shapiro, 565 
2. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1963, vii 
3. B. Parekh, 'Social and Political Thought and the Problem of 
Ideology', in Benewick and Parekh (eds), 81 
4. Karl Popper, 'Normal Science and Its Dangers', in Lakatos and 
Musgrave (eds), 56; A. Ryan, '"Normal" Science or*Political 
Ideology ?' in P. Laslet et al (eds) Philosophy, Politics and 
Society (Fourth Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1972,99 
5. See Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1974,25 
6. In the field of strategic studies, the vital function of 
criticism has been well appreciated by analysts of military 
and political intelligence and surprise attacks. Possibly 
the best work in the field is by Richard K. Betts, Surprise 
Attack, The Brookings Institution, Washington D. C., 1982 
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Now, Kuhn has argued that no paradigm is overthrown 
unless an alternative lies at hand. 
1 
So far as US foreign policy 
in the late 60s and early 70s was concerned, there were - apart 
from a dogmatic defence of the 'containment' paradigm - several 
ideological alternatives to the prevailing framework, falling 
broadly between two main groups: options which represented a 
tactical adjustment to 'containment', preserving its basic ideo- 
logical premises, and alternatives which proposed a more radical 
departure from the existing dominant belief system. Among the 
first group the most important alternatives were the neo-isola- 
tionist option, 
2 
'trilateralism', 3 and the Nixon-Kissinger 
'detente' strategy, which was, in essence, a partial modification 
of the methods of 'containment'. Despite the significant differ- 
ences between these approaches, they had one fundamental thing 
in common: the negative character of their proposals, their 
refusal to contemplate a more positive re-ordering of priorities 
for US foreign policy, and to formulate a creative, rather than 
a reactive, strategy, leading the US from being - particularly 
in the Third World - the main defender of the status quo, to 
that of a challenger of the state of affairs prevailing in the 
less developed areas of the world. 
In contrast, those alternative ideological paradigms 
that put forward innovative strategies to 'containment' were 
characterized not by their timidity in suggesting new options 
for American foreign policy, but by their excessive radicalism, 
which made them both unassimilable and unviable as practical 
propositions for the US public and leadership groups. The diffi- 
culty with the left-wing paradigm - forcefully articulated by 
Noam Chomsky (among others) in his numerous books and articles - 
1. Kuhn, 77,80,84+, 149. See also his book, The Essential 
Tension, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977,338 
2. See, for example, G. K. Kerman, The Cloud of Danger, Hutchinson, 
London, 1978,229-30; E. C. Ravenal, Never Again: Learning from 
America's Foreign Policy Failures, Temple University Press, 
Philadelphia, 1978,103,135; R. Rosecrance (ed), America as 
an Ordinary Country, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1976, 
2 
3. See M. Camps, The Management of Interdependence. A Preliminary 
View, Council on Foreign Relations Papers on International 
Affairs, New York, 197+; also, M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, 
and J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the 
Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, 
New York, 1975 
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was its presumption that a new direction in foreign policy had 
necessarily to be preceded by a far-reaching, revolutionary 
transformation of the American society, economic structures and 
political system. Given these premises, it is easy to understand 
why this 'paradigm' has remained the banner of a relatively un- 
influential minority. 
A second innovative strategy was developed by authors 
who work on the so-called 'World Order Models Project'. Their 
purpose is to eliminate war, economic and social injustices, and 
ecological disaster by the creation, on the basis of national 
self-determination, of a world polity, with a world assembly as 
its chief co-ordinating organ. 
1 
Before simply dismissing their 
views as utopian, it is fair to point out that the argument of 
the 'World Order' reformers is not that US leaders should base 
their policies on the erroneous assumption that a system of 
foreign policy co-ordination already exists. On the contrary, 
their point is that US policy-makers should stop basing American 
foreign policy on quite different but similarly faulty assumptions 
that rest on the premise that a more equitable global system is 
impossible to create, and that, even if such a system were possible 
steps towards its creation should be actively resisted. 
2 
There 
were, of course, certain aspects of foreign policy where reform 
did not depend exclusively on the US, and reciprocity was needed, 
i. e. relations with the USSR and China, arms control, and relations 
with allies, and one of the main weaknesses in 'World Order' 
supporters' arguments has been the lack of 'realism' (in the 
critical sense) in their appraisal of the nature of communist 
regimes. There were, however, several other key foreign policy 
aspects where the scope for innovation - given an adequate ideo- 
logical framework and the necessary political will to effect it - 
was significant; in particular, US policies towards political 
and social change in the Third World, international economic 
relations, the use of force as an instrument of policy, strategic 
nuclear doctrine, military and economic aid, cooperation on 
issues of general human concern such as environment protection, 
exploitation of sea-based resources, and many others where it 
1. See, for example, R. Falk, A Study of Future Worlds, The Free 
Press, New York, 1975,150-27 
2. Johansen, 388-9 
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was possible for US decision-makers to move away from the 
simplistic identification of 'order' with stability and from a 
view of 'order' as the management of the international status 
quo. 
For this shift to take place, however, a new political 
vision was required, a vision at the same time realistic and 
progressive. Its realism, in other words, should not be based on 
the dogmatism of Realpolitik but on the belief in the creative 
mission of politics as the search for both order and justice, 
and on a positive identification with the aspirations of the 
underprivileged sections of mankind. This vision could only come 
from a new team of appointed officials disposed toward the critical 
revision of the way things had been done previously and also toward 
a systematic approach to policy-formulation. In conditions of 
crisis, as Steinbrunner explains, 'Men with new perspectives and 
new modes of analysis are able to shift the basis of common 
understanding, and widespread consequences flow from that. '1 A 
lot therefore depended on the theoretical imagination and qualities 
of leadership of the men who took over the conduct of American 
foreign policy after the 1968 elections, at a moment when changes 
in the direction of that policy had come to be considered by 
important segments of the population as imperative for the political 
and social health of the American republic. 
1. J. Steinbrunner, The Cybernetic Theor: 
University Press, Princeton, 1974,3. 
'Any new interpretation of nature (or 
discovery or theory, emerges first in 
few individuals. ' The Structure of Sc 
143 
y of Decision, Princeton 
And, as Kuhn puts it, 
reality), whether a new 
the mind of one or a 
ientific Revolutions, 
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KISSINGER AND VISION 
As an intellectual who became a policy-maker, 
Kissinger's personality and the context in which he worked 
combined certain characteristics which, paradoxically, at the 
same time propelled him towards, and stopped him from, introducing 
substantial changes in the content and methods of US foreign 
policy. In the first place, Kissinger had a well-defined belief 
system; he held a coherent and plausible view of the world, which 
he had set out in detail before he entered office, and he acted 
on it. As he noted in his Memoirs, 'a period in high office 
consumes intellectual capital; it does not create it'; 
1 
and a key 
ingredient of this 'capital' was his conviction that the essential 
nature of political life depends on the fundamental character of 
the participants, which is expressed by the prevailing mode of 
political leadership. In his view, the political style of the 
'statesman' - which he carefully defined and wanted to adopt - 
should be characterized by 'creativity', by the search for 'true 
innovation' which 'is bound to run counter to prevailing standards' 
In the second place, however, and despite his concern for politi- 
cal 'vision' and innovation, Kissinger's belief system was rigidly 
conservative, thus imposing a host of limitations on his attempts 
to go beyond containment and formulate a more positive role for 
the US in the world. He had argued that 'our [the US's] conception 
of world order must have deeper purposes than stability', 
3 but 
was unable to define them. What makes the 'Kissinger Period' 
particularly interesting for a study of foreign policy innovation 
is, on one side, that he saw the need for change, and, on the 
other, that he tried to innovate on the basis of an ideology that 
could not but reinforce the US's role as hegemonial defender of 
the international status quo. More clearly and explicitly than 
his predecessors at the helm of US foreign policy, Kissinger was 
a 'conservative' who modelled his world view on the historical 
study of Metternich, Castlereagh, and Bismarck and their Realpolitik 
perspective, but whose conceptual framework was also influenced 
1. H. A. Kissinger, The White House Years, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
and Michael Joseph, London, 1979,27 
2. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 19 
3. ibid, 94 
.® 
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by Kant's philosophy and the German thinker's concern with 
'perpetual peace' - which made him aware of the significance of 
political 'vision'. Kissinger tried to adapt the basic tenets 
of conservative statesmanship to the conditions of contemporary 
international politics, and the underlying meaning of his major 
diplomatic initiatives and tactical moves can only be adequately 
grasped through this ideological prism. Finally, Kissinger worked 
under a President who - though not as intellectually sophisticated - 
was knowledgeable about foreign policy, was also convinced of the 
need for change, and decisively centralized foreign policy formu- 
lation in his - and his Advisor's - hands, thus making it easier 
for them to overcome bureaucratic resistance to their projects. 
In his publications as a scholar before entering office, 
Kissinger has argued that doctrinal creativity and intellectual 
innovation are crucial elements of a nation's design for survival. 
Since the late 1950s he had criticized some aspects of the 'con- 
tainment' policy, in particular its excessive concern with purely 
military solutions and its inability to offer an ideological 
alternative to the Communist challenge. 
1 
The need for 'vision' 
was a constant theme in his writings, together with his view that 
'Any society can reach a point in its development where it runs 
the risk of having exhausted all the possibilities for innovation 
inherent in its structure', and his conviction that the US had 
'failed to identify itself with the revolutionary period through 
which we are living', and had not had 'the vision or the willing- 
ness to carry through a sustained program to bring a sense of 
direction to a world in turmoil'. 
2 
He was aware of the dangers of 
dogmatism and intellectual sclerosis, and argued that the true 
function of leadership is to question dominant assumptions and 
orthodoxies, and to overcome the obstacles placed by vested bureau- 
cratic interests in the path of 'vision' .3 He repeatedly asserted, 
first, that foreign policy should not be conceived as 'manipulation' 
of a given reality but as creation, that 'History's great achieve- 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 62 
2. H. A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1960,98,303. See also The Troubled Partnership. A Re- 
appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance, McGraw Hill, New York, 19 5, 
251 
3. H. A. Kissinger, A World Restored, Gollancz, London, 1977,326-7 
(first published in 1957 
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ments spring from the actualization of principles, not from the 
clever evaluation of political conditions', 
I 
and, secondly, that 
leaders can and should try to impose their 'vision' upon reality. 
2 
Yet, despite all his insistence on the relevance of 
innovation and vision, his awareness of the obstacles to 
creativity, his perception of the need for change and the unpre- 
cedented influence that for eight tumultuous years he had over 
the conduct of US foreign policy, it is widely held by his and 
Nixon's) critics that they 'provided no vision of the future' 
3 
or that it 'remained cloudy in concept' ,4 was'opaque', 
5 
and offered 
'few clear guides to the future. 
6 
These commentators, however, 
seem to take it for granted that there was a 'vision' behind 
American foreign policy before the 'detente' period, but they do 
not say what it was; also, they do not articulate a coherent 
explanation of the reasons why Kissinger - in spite of viewing 
his task as that of 'evoking a vision of an inspiring future 
7 
never managed to do it. What these analysts forget is that the 
crisis of containment was in no small measure due to the absence 
from US foreign policy of a positive vision of world order and 
peace going beyond the geopolitical game, the balance of power 
1. Quoted in J. P. Sewell, 'Master Builder or Captain of the 
Dike ? Notes on the Leadership of Kissinger', International 
Journal, Vol 31, No 4,1976,648 
2. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 34+4 
3. A. Buchan, 'The Irony of Henry Kissinger', International 
Affairs, Vol 50, No 3, July 1974,379 
4+. S. Brown, The Crises of Power, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 1979,14+6 
5. A. L. George and R. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign 
Policy. Theory and Practice, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1974,611 
6. A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change, The 
Brookings Institution, Washington D. C., 1981,357. The same 
point has been made by Stanley Hoffmann, 'The Case of Dr 
Kissinger', The New York Review of Books, December 6 1979,22; 
Ralph Dahrendorf, 'The Man Who Balanced the World', The Sunday 
Times, December 16 1979; and Robert Tucker, 'The American 
Outlook: Change and Continuity', in R. Osgood et al, Retreat 
from Empire ?, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973, 
19 3 
7. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 182. See also, The White House 
Years, 65,781 
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and anti-communism, and also to the contradictions between pro- 
claimed US values and American repressive actions in the Third 
World. Kissinger tried - to a limited extent - to go beyond 
containment, but his 'vision' was deeply flawed; it was the pro- 
duct of a conservative-realist ideological paradigm that is 
anachronistic as an intellectual tool for understanding the 
complexities of contemporary international politics, and incapable 
of creatively dealing with its most pressing challenges. Rather 
than reformulating US interests and purposes in the world, 
Kissinger and Nixon actually updated containment by articulating 
a more developed and sophisticated - but still specifically con- 
servative - response to the ideological crisis of American foreign 
policy. The results achieved showed both the intrinsic limitations 
of the conservative-realist political ideology as a vehicle for 
'vision' and the insurmountable difficulties for building on that 
basis a notion of order more meaningful than stability and a 
'permanent structure of peace' that does not rest on domination. 
Thus, contrary to the view that 'the historically significant 
drama of the Kissinger years was the turn in US policy toward 
positively relating to, rather than pushing away, the new forces 
in world politics' in what follows I shall interpret the 
Kissinger-Nixon foreign policy as an attempt basically to restore 
the old order, rather than to build a new one. 
1. S. Brown, 153 
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CHAPTER ý+ 
THE DILEMMAS OF CONSERVATISM : KISSINGER'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 
THE IRONY OF POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF POWER 
In times of domestic and international upheaval, the 
most complex challenges face those who want to stop political 
and social change, and not those who want to bring it about. For 
a conservative statesman the dilemmas are clear: the radical 
struggle against change can easily lead to a loss of perspective 
concerning the meaning and direction of historical events. 
Alternatively, the attempt merely to manipulate and contain change, 
and to manoeuvre in order to reduce its impact, can be no more 
than an illusion, a futile gesture, a temporal and fragile re- 
prieve, or the useless response of an unimaginative will. 
In those periods when the political order is firm and 
there is no coherent alternative to it, the challenge for the 
conservative statesman consists in transcending the present, 
thinking towards the future and trying to foresee the transform- 
ations that may occur, with the ultimate purpose of creatively 
channelling change and avoiding the high costs of revolution: 
'it is the task of the conservative', wrote Kissinger in 1957, 
'not to defeat but to forestall revolution... a society which 
cannot prevent a revolution, the disintegration of whose values 
has been demonstrated by the fact of revolution, will not be able 
to defeat it by conservative means. '1 In an era of turmoil, on 
the other hand, the challenge for the conservative statesman is 
to try to understand the real causes of events, to make this 
knowledge serve his own ends, to accept that passivity can be 
self-defeating and to design an active response to changing 
circumstances. In both situations, therefore, the dilemma of 
conservative statesmanship should be seen as a struggle between 
the demand for political creativity and conservatism's pessimistic 
assumptions about the potentialities of politics. 
Kissinger's view of politics is essentially conservative. 
He undertook the research leading to his Doctoral thesis at 
Harvard because he was interested in the problem of how to preserve 
1. Kissinger, A World Restored, 207 
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and, if necessary, restore political order by containing or 
defeating the forces that challenge it. This conservatism is the 
thread that connects the different aspects of his political philo- 
sophy, specifically his views on the limits of politics and his 
concern with stability. His writings represent a vigorous attempt 
to ground an interpretation of contemporary international conflicts 
upon a solid philosophical perspective on the meaning of history 
and political action. This intellectual perspective distinguished 
Kissinger's writings - and his policy-making activities - from 
those of the majority of Western strategic thinkers of the post- 
war era, and also gave its peculiar character to Kissinger's 
ideological contribution to the formulation of American foreign 
policy: with him, the European conservative tradition became 
explicitly connected with the generic (situational) conservatism 
of US foreign policy ideology. His conservatism was based not 
on religious principles but on a certain reading of history; it 
profoundly coloured his whole approach to policy-making, and, 
paradoxically, explains both Kissinger's strengths and weaknesses 
as a statesman facing the complex challenges of contemporary 
international relations. 
The revitalization of conservatism in Western political 
thought took place as a result of the demonstration provided by 
the French Revolution of man's power to destroy an order that 
had previously been considered as 'natural' and 'immutable'. The 
triumph of revolutionary will gave practical relevance to the 
conception of the political world as 'malleable' and responsive 
to deliberate change capable of realizing man's most cherished 
utopias. Conservative political thought, on the contrary, is 
based on the idea of the 'irony of politics', on the view that 
the world is by no means as malleable as the revolutionaries tend 
to assume, and that dreams of happiness can easily turn into 
nightmares. In The Prince Machiavelli referred to the ironic 
element in politics, to that kind of alchemy in the political 
condition whereby good is transmuted into evil and evil into good. 
1 
As Weber put it: 'The final result of political action often, no, 
even regularly, stands in completely inadequate and often para- 
doxical relation to its original meaning. This is fundamental to 
2 
all history. ' Conservative thought sets out to show that pain 
1. Machiavelli, 92 
2. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 117 
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and suffering are not temporary elements in human affairs, that 
tragedy is possible, and that awareness of the irony of politics 
should impose limitations upon what the statesman can hope to 
achieve without destroying the stability of society and the 
international system. Conservatism is, then, a philosophy of 
imperfection, committed in theory to the idea of limits and the 
defence of a limited style of politics. 
1 
Kissinger repeatedly remarked that 'When one studies 
history, one realizes how many tragedies have been unleashed by 
men of good will. '2 History shows that in politics the best of 
intentions, once put into practice, can sometimes lead to chaos 
and tyranny: the cemetery of fallen ideals is one of the most 
congested in the ancient territory of political struggles. But 
how can a statesman be creative without ideals ? How can he 
transcend pure manipulation without an 'architectonic' vision ? 
Kissinger defined 'the most fundamental problem of politics' as 
'not the control of wickedness but the limitation of righteous- 
ness'. 
3 As a conservative, he was convinced that creativity does 
not always involve a vision of change, that it can also be 
embodied in a policy geared to the containment of change, the 
preservation of the established order, the setting up of dikes 
against alternatives which could easily degenerate into anarchy 
and increase the number of frustrated hopes. But how can pessimism 
give rise to creativity ? In a 1968 essay Kissinger remarked that 
'we are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest for a 
final destination. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not 
physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will 
depend ultimately on convictions that far transcend the physical 
balance of power. '4 What are, then, these convictions ? On what 
values does conservative 'creativity' rest ? 
Kissinger's thought is plagued by an insurmountable 
tension between, on the one hand, a pessimistic assessment of 
the potential of politics, an inability to find a purpose in 
1. Noel O'Sullivan, Conservatism, St Martin's Press, New York, 
1976,12 
2. Daniele Hunebelle, Dear Henry, Gallimard, Paris, 1971,27-8 
3. Kissinger, A World Restored, 206 
4. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 79-80 
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the historical process, and, on the other, a willingness to inter- 
vene creatively in the shaping of history and even to establish 
'peace'. Kissinger developed his views on politics and history 
in two works written in the early 1950s. In the first one - still 
unpublished - he used the philosophies of history of Spengler, 
Toynbee, and, most important, Kant, as vehicles to answer the 
following questions: how much control or mastery can the individual 
have over historical development ? What is the individual's role 
in shaping history in the desired direction ? What is the role 
of chance in human affairs ?1 Later on, in A World Restored he 
analyzed different modes of political leadership as symbolizing 
alternative responses to the problem of order. 
In his confrontation with Kant's philosophy, Kissinger's 
concern was to discuss the 'tension' between the German thinker's 
moral views and his faith in the inevitability of historical pro- 
gress. Kissinger's study of Kant's thought was in fact a way of 
getting to grips with the problem of the scope available for 
individual creativity in a world without absolute moral certainties 
possessing no transcending meaning, and having no final destination 
a world in which 'whatever meaning history has is derived from the 
convictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it'. 
2 
1. H. A. Kissinger, The Meaning of Histor : Reflections on Spengler, 
Toynbee and Kant Undergraduate Honors Dissertation), Harvard 
Archives, Cambridge, Mass, 1950. Kissinger rejected both 
Spengler's and Toynbee's views on history because these authors, 
each in his own way, committed the error of identifying ethics 
with natural necessity. For Kissinger, history must be a personal 
task, not a mechanistic process, and human freedom should not 
be reduced to a predetermined process. However, there are in 
Kissinger's writings traces of the influence upon his political 
thought of the philosophies of Spengler and Toynbee, and, some- 
times, even indirect references to their works, such as, for 
instance, Kissinger's view that 'The statesman must... be an 
educator: he must bridge the gap between a people's experience 
and his vision.... ' (A World Restored, 329), which recalls 
Spengler's point that 'the true statesman must also be, in a 
large sense of the word, an educator... ' (The Decline of the 
West, Allen & Unwin, London, 1961,366). Also, the impact of 
Toynbee's analysis of the decline of civilizations and the 
role of 'creative' minorities and individuals can be clearly 
perceived in several of Kissinger's texts. (For an interesting 
comparison, see A. Toynbee, A Study of Histor 
(Abridged 
Edition), Oxford University Press, London, 1962,217-40,147-74, 
444-55, and Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 302-4, and 
The Troubled Partnership, 248-51) 
2. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, 251 
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Kant had argued that man's obligation to act as he would all 
other men act - the universalization of the will or 'categorical 
imperative' - impels him to work for universal peace. He did not 
content himself with the notion of an inner spirituality with no 
implications for public life, as this would mean accepting that 
the ethical domain has no relevance for history. The categorical 
imperative cannot and does not command man to do something that 
is impossible; in other words, 'ought' implies 'can'. The 
realizability of the categorical imperative and the idea of 
human progress were the two pillars of Kant's 'rational faith', 
of his hope that mankind was progressing slowly but surely in the 
direction of universal peace: 
1 
'nature', he wrote in a 1795 essay, 
guarantees perpetual peace by the actual 
mechanism of human inclinations. And while 
the likelihood of its being attained is not 
sufficient to enable us to prophesy the 
future theoretically, it is enough for 
practical purposes. It makes it our duty to 
work our way towards this goal, which is 
more than an empty chimera. 
2 
This 'natural' progress toward civility, however, should not be 
confused with the moral development of the human spirit; 
3 
it 
merely gives us a basis for optimism, pointing the way to a 
'rational faith' in the possibility of peace. 
Kissinger was dissatisfied with Kant's handling of the 
tensions between, on one side, the idea that our moral duty for 
peace should enable us to form a conception of its historical 
attainability, and, on the other, the deterministic overtones of 
the philosopher's views on 'natural progress'. For Kissinger there 
could not be reconciliation between teleology and moral philosophy 
and this is what led him to reject Spengler's and Toynbee's 
philosophies of history): 'No compromise between these two 
positions is possible', he wrote, 'either ethical activity can 
be meaningful out of an apprehension of its principle, or it is 
reduced to a function of nature's mechanism. '4 If history and 
1. P. Dickson, Kissinger and the Meanin of History,, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1978,54-5 
2. I. Kant, 'Perpetual Peace', in Kant's Political Writings 
(edited by H. Reiss), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1971,114 
3. I. Kant, On History, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963,151 
4. Kissinger, The Meaning of History, 309-10 
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nature are synonymous, he argued, then man in his political role 
possesses no freedom and hence no responsibility for his acts. 
Kissinger went too far in his criticism of Kant, for 
despite his allegation that the German thinker attempted to base 
his moral philosophy on a philosophy of history, the truth is 
that Kant carefully preserved the independence of the ethical 
realm from subordination to natural causality. As he put it in 
a 1798 essay: 
The profit which will accrue to the human 
race as it works its way forward will not 
be an ever increasing quantity of morality 
in its attitudes. Instead, the legality of 
its attitudes will produce an increasing 
number of actions governed by duty, whatever 
the particular motive behind these actions 
may be... Such developments do not mean, 
however, that the basic moral capacity of 
mankind will increase in the slightest... 
For we must not expect too much of human 
beings in their progressive improvements, 
or else we shall merit the scorn of those 
politicians who would gladly treat man's 
hopes of progress as the fantasies of an 
nr rhAa i-'MH mi nrl - 
Kant's optimistic assessment of the possibilities of human pro- 
gress was of course not unconnected with the general ideological 
and political climate of the 'age of the enlightenment'. In the 
same manner, Kissinger's pessimism -a permanent component of 
conservatism - is probably to some extent related to his ex- 
periences of war, exile, and the direct effects of Nazism on 
his family's fortunes, 
2 
all of which possibly made it very diffi- 
cult for him to believe in the universal moral values that form 
the basis of Kant's faith in human progress. But their differences 
cannot be reduced merely to a question of psychological dis- 
positions; there is a deeper aspect which has to do with the 
conception of the relationship between ethics and politics. 
1. Kant's Political Writings, 187-8 (emphasis mine). In his 
analysis of Kant's views on history, Kissinger concentrated 
on certain passages of the philosopher's works which suggest 
a belief in a 'hidden plan of nature', without connecting 
them adequately with the complex structure of Kant's episte- 
mology. See ibid, 50,88-9,108. Also, for a concise statement 
of Kant's views on the 'unconditional' nature of the moral law, 
see his Critique of Judgement, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, 
98 
2. D. Ward, 289-92 
-93- 
Kant held that the categorical imperative impels man 
to work for peace. As he put it, 'It is a pleasant dream to hope 
that a political product of the sort we... have in mind' (i. e. a 
peaceful world order) 'will one day be brought to perfection, at 
however remote a date. But it is not merely conceivable that we 
can continually approach such a state; so long as it can be re- 
conciled with the moral law, it is also a duty... to do so. '1 
Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted to find an equilibrium be- 
tween the view that man can act as a free moral agent in history 
and his position that there are no eternal values or 'final ends'. 
If man cannot receive guidance from moral law as enunciated by 
Kant, then man must create his own meaning. In Kissinger's words: 
'The ultimate meaning of history - as of life - we can find only 
within ourselves. '2 But, on these premises, Kissinger was faced 
with the problem of which principles - beyond mere survival and 
the manipulation of power - should guide the statesr 'a actions, 
or, to put it differently, which values - different from the 
conquest of power as an end in itself - should be at the basis 
of political action, and which limits were going to be respected 
in the contest for power. 
Kissinger's solution to the problem of the relationship 
between ethical values and political creativity was to adopt 
Kant's notion of the 'unsocial sociability' of mankind, the view 
that order can emerge from the interplay of men's conflicting 
interests. This is so, according to Kissinger, because man's 
vulnerabilities establish limits upon the tendency towards 
infinite self-assertion. But he went beyond Hobbes's idea that 
desire for self-preservation induces moderation by arguing that 
the recognition of the limits of power is in itself a 'moral' 
act. 
3 Concern with the 'limits of power' was Kissinger's main 
reason for praising the efforts of Metternich, Castlereagh and 
Bismarck because, presumably, they recognized those 'limits' and 
tried whenever possible to use diplomacy rather than force to 
achieve thier objectives. The value he attached to 'moderation' 
also led him to attack Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I: Bonaparte 
1. Kant's Political Writings, 188 
2. Kissinger, The Meaning of History, 22-3 
3. ibid, 25-6,34+5-6. Also, H. A. Kissinger, 'Force and Diplomacy 
in the Nuclear Age', Foreign Affairs, 34, April 1956,349 
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because he believed his power to be infinite; Alexander because 
he represented a policy of 'absolute' moral claims. The 'man of 
will' (Napoleon) was destroyed by the 'man of proportion' 
(Metternich) because the French Emperor 'was incapable of the 
final insight: the recognition of limits'. 
1 
For Kissinger, historical experience, not a universal 
moral law, shows the need for a 'sense of proportion'; moral 
claims involve 'a quest for absolutes, a denial of nuance, a 
rejection of history'. 
2 
In his view, conservative statesmanship, 
with its pessimistic assessment of politics and of human possi- 
bilities is ethically superior to the moralism of 'prophets' 
(such as Tsar Alexander I), for 'the claims of the prophet are 
a counsel of perfection, and perfection implies uniformity. 
Utopias are not achieved except by a process of levelling and 
dislocation that must erode all patterns of obligation. '3 
Kissinger tried to base his doctrine of limits on 
Kant's moral philosophy, 
4 
but though his view that principles of 
self-restraint play a role in Kant's ethics is correct in a 
general sense, Kissinger's reasons to emphasize the need for 
self-limitation are not those of Kant. 
5 
The need for moderation 
arises in Kant's ethics because man's actions should be consistent 
in order to fulfil the injunction to universalize one's will in 
accordance with the 'categorical imperative'. Moderation, however, 
is not considered by Kant a moral virtue in itself. As he explained 
in a 1797 essay, 
Moderation in the affections and passions, 
self-control, and calm deliberation... are 
far from deserving to be called good without 
qualification... for without the principles 
of a good will, they may become extremely 
bad; and the coolness of a villain not only 
makes him far more dangerous, but also 
directly makes him more abominable in our 
eyes than he would have been without it. 
1. Kissinger, A World Restored, 77 
2. ibid, 316 
3. ibid 
4. Kissinger, The Meaning of History, 261 
5. Dickson, 96-7 
6. I. Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1949,11-2 
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Thus moderation and a 'sense of proportion' may sometimes produce 
the opposite of what the truly moral man wishes. 
The crucial problem for Kissinger was to preserve a 
margin for political creativity in a world 'without meaning'; 
for Kant, on the other hand, the central issue was to preserve 
a notion of moral behaviour and a rational faith in man's progress. 
Since it had not been shown that perfectibility was impossible, 
the German philosopher felt it a moral imperative to believe in 
the possibility and to act as if it were feasible, thus contri- 
buting to bringing about the desired end. 
1 
In this specific 
sense Kant might be characterized as a 'utopian', for the first 
prerequisite of utopian thinking is, necessarily, a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the current order of things, together with 
a belief in progress. Utopianism does not - contrary to Popper's 
argument - inevitably imply that 'rational political action must 
be based upon a more or less clear and detailed description or 
blueprint of our ideal state, and also upon a plan or blueprint 
of the historical path that leads towards this goal'. 
2 
What it 
does imply is an optimistic faith in the future, and the con- 
viction that imaginative thought and action are capable of 
bringing about a change towards not only a new social existence, 
but a better one: 
Man has the faculty of fantasy; he can 
imagine that which is not. The empiricist 
chooses not to use this faculty, confining 
himself to observations of what is (which 
all too often turn into justifications of 
the status quo), while the utopian employs 3 
it in constructing alternative possibilities... 
This 'empiricism' constitutes the epistemological foundation of 
the conservative-realist version of political realism, and 
determines its narrowness of vision. 
Kissinger's inability to share Kant's 'rational faith', 
together with his determination to avoid the pitfalls of a 
nihilistic philosophy of history, left him with the 'sense of 
1. F. E. Manuel and F. P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western 
World, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979,530 
2. Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 358 
3. Goodwin and Taylor, 99 
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proportion' - so valued in theory by conservative statesmen - as 
the highest principle of action and political creativity. His 
notion that 'if a state calculated correctly it would understand 
that there are inherent limits to its strength, and it would 
produce a rather moderate foreign policy'1 was based on a parti- 
cular interpretation of Bismarck's career. In essence, Kissinger 
argued that Bismarck possessed an 'agility of conception' and a 
'sense of proportion' that turned power into an 'instrument of 
self-restraint'. 
2 
This assessment of the Prussian Chancellor's 
performance is, however, highly questionable. To be sure, Bismarck 
was a master in the use of power, but one who consistently pre- 
vented his fellow-Germans from developing a political sense and 
a breed of politicians competent to preside over the machine 
that the industrialists and bankers had developed, systematically 
transforming Prussia in the process into a police state. To quote 
Crankshaw, 
the man who fought his King and the 
generals so stubbornly after Königgrätz, 
throwing everything he had in the interests 
of moderation, was the man who four years 
earlier had defied parliament and made a 
ruin of constitutional government; he was 
the man who plunged Germany into civil war 
on his own responsibility and against the 
urgings of his sovereign; and he was the 
man who showed no moderation whatso3ver 
after the defeat of France in 1871. 
The Prussian Chancellor not only subordinated morality to the 
supposed needs of the state, but also exalted the amoral concept 
of politics into a principle, trying in the process to force his 
countrymen to surrender to it, concentrating great power ex- 
clusively in his hands, and producing widespread demoralization 
in the governmental machinery, subjecting it to the arbitrariness 
of a single individual. 
Was Bismarck nevertheless a 'creative' statesman ? And 
what does Kissinger mean by political 'creativity' ? Kissinger 
attempted to formulate a definition by contrasting the trajectories 
of Metternich and Bismarck. In his view, Metternich's political 
1. H. A. Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, London, 1981,120 
2. H. A. Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary: Reflections on 
Bismarck', Daedalus, Vol 97, Summer 1968,880-924 
3. E. Crankshaw, Bismarck, Macmillan, London, 1981,243 
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philosophy expressed the essence of the conservative tradition, 
for the Austrian foreign minister, in attempting to suppress 
revolution, 'posed the conservative challenge as the need to 
transcend the assertion of the exclusive validity of the will 
and as the requirement to limit the claims of power'. 
I 
Metternich, 
however, lacked the attribute of 'creativity': 
So agile was Metternich's performance that 
it was forgotten that its basis was diplo- 
matic skill and that it left the fundamental 
problems unsolved, that it was manipulation 
and not creation. . . He understood the forces 
at work better than the majority of his con- 
temporaries, but his knowledge proved of 
little avail, because he used it almost ex- 
clusively to deflect their inexorable march, 
instead of placing it into his service for 
a task of construction. 2 
Bismarck, on the other hand, was a defiant and 'creative' con- 
servative who 'drew his inspiration from a vision of the future'. 
3 
Despite Metternich's success in restoring peace to Europe after 
the defeat of Napoleon, Kissinger held that the Austrian diplomat's 
policies lacked ultimate stature because he confused self-restraint 
with tranquility and made stability the only acceptable political 
objective. His conceptual 'system' answered the question of the 
cause of revolution, 'but it gave no indication of how to cope 
with it once it had occurred. It spoke abstractly of its readiness 
to reform but it never discussed what specific measures it would 
consider appropriate'. 
4 
Unlike Metternich, Bismarck viewed history 
not as a universe governed by eternal laws, but as an indetermi- 
nate process. From this perspective history is a struggle to 
accommodate change, and in that struggle a successful policy 
depends on a proper calculus of power: 
The insistence in identifying his will 
with the meaning of events would forever 
mark Bismarck's revolutionary quality. 
Neither the sense of reverence for tra- 
ditional forms of the conservatives nor 
the respect for the intellectual doctrines 
of the liberals was a part of Bismarck's 
nature. He could appeal to either if 
1. Kissinger, A World Restored, 206 
2. ibid, 322-3 
3. Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary', 910 
4. Kissinger, A World Restored, 204-5 
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necessary, but aloofly, appraisingly, and 
with a cool eye for their limits. 1 
In the process - Kissinger argued - Bismarck freed statesmen to 
think in terms of 'interests', not 'ideologies', and to advance 
them with the ruthlessness demanded by an international system 
composed of independent nation-states. 
Kissinger's account is ripe with paradoxes and contra- 
dictions. On one hand he argues that the distinctive feature of 
conservatism is the 'doctrine of limits', but on the other he 
attacks Metternich because his 'skilful sense of proportion was 
appropriate for a period whose structure was unchallenged and 
whose components were animated by a consciousness of their safety; 
but it was sterile in an era of constant flux'. Whenever Metternich 
operated within a fixed framework, his conduct of diplomacy was 
masterly; whenever he was forced to 'create his own objectives', 
there was about him 'an aura of futility'. 
2 
But the question 
remains: What should Metternich's objectives have been ? The 
conservative statesman's dilemma boils down to the insurmountable 
tensions implicit in the attempt to reconcile political creativity, 
which requires innovation and change, with a policy ultimately 
committed to the preservation of the status quo. Kissinger argued 
that conservatism must be at least as imaginative and intellectu- 
ally resourceful as its opposition, rather than bound to outmoded 
concepts or irrational convictions, 
3 but his own analysis of 
Metternich's performance reveals the extent to which conservatives 
are sytematically prepared to sacrifice whatever is necessary for 
the sake of stability - considered the primary aim of politics. 
The polyglot Austrian Empire, with its cumbersome bureaucracy 
and governmental practices was certainly anachronistic: 'Unable 
to adapt its domestic structure, unable to survive with it in a 
century of nationalism, Austria's most successful policies 
amounted to no more than a reprieve. . . not to a work of con- 
struction. '4 But what else could Metternich have done ? If the 
revolutionary spirit was so widespread in Europe, how else could 
it be combated except by a policy geared to the preservation of 
1. Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary', 894 
2. Kissinger, A World Restored, 323 
3. ibid, 195 
4. ibid, 281 
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traditional authority ? If the causes of revolution - as Metternich 
himself realized - were so deep-rooted, what possible remedy could 
exist ? 
The Austrian Minister insisted that the defence of 
existing institutions, whatever their defects, was in fact 
possible. If the demand for change was universal, it was all the 
more imperative to resist it in the name of stability. He believed 
that the overthrow of any part of the existing order would have 
great symbolic importance, and that it could threaten the whole 
edifice; therefore every part had to be protected. He did not 
accept reforms as an alternative, because he did not have a clear 
conception of where these would lead. In the final analysis, his 
policies embodied the fundamental purpose of conservatism: the 
maintenance of 'order' for the benefit of those who occupy a 
privileged position within it. 
Writing several years after publishing his analysis of 
Metternich's diplomacy, Kissinger recognized that 
societies have collapsed not because their 
leaders did not understand what the environ- 
ment demanded of them but because they 
understood only too well. The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire failed to survive because to adapt to 
the forces of liberalism and nationalism 
seemed to its rulers inconsistent with the 
reason for its existence. It could have parti- 
cipated in the evolutionary process only by 
giving up its distinctive qualities. 
Metternich's conservative ideology did not allow him to transform 
his diplomacy of 'containment' of change into an 'act of con- 
struction', however much he was aware of its limitations. His 
skill enabled Austria, for a while, to avoid the hard choice 
between reform and revolution, but it only postponed the hour of 
reckoning, leaving a myriad of basic problems unsolved. 
Kissinger's interpretation of Bismarckian policies is 
also paradoxical. On the one hand he attacked Napoleon and 
Alexander I because they were 'revolutionaries' who 'strove to 
identify the organization of Europe with their will'2 yet, on 
the other, he praised Bismarck for being a 'revolutionary' whose 
revolution 'appeared in the guise of conservatism'. 
3 
On one side 
1. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 301-2 (emphasis mine) 
2. Kissinger, A World Restored, 316 
3. Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary', 889 
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10 
Kissinger defended the view that the crucial problem of politics 
is to restrain the exercise of righteous power, that 'volition, 
however noble' must be 'limited by forces transcending the will', 
1 
and yet he found Bismarck's 'revolutionary qualities', his tendency 
to 'identify his will with the meaning of events' praiseworthy. 
True, Kissinger did not conclude that Bismarck's policies were an 
unmixed good: 'The manner in which Germany was unified deprived 
the international system of flexibility even though it was based 
on maxims that presupposed the infinite adaptability of the prin- 
cipal actors. '2 It was, in theory, feasible in those conditions 
to manage power with restraint, but the feat could only be accom- 
plished by statesmen of Bismarck's dexterity, and the Prussian 
Chancellor 'proved unable to transform the personal act of 
creation into institutions that can be maintained by an average 
standard of performance. '3 
What, then, was Bismarck's legacy ? Apart from the 
ruthless use of power that led eventually to Prussian domination 
of Germany under autocratic rule, and to the outbreak of a 
cataclysmic European war, what lessons in 'moderation' can he 
be taken to have given ? If the management of power provides its 
own justification, how can we differentiate between political 
'creativity' and mere 'manipulation' ? Kissinger did not formulate 
an answer to these questions, and the tensions in his political 
thought are the result of his inability to reconcile his con- 
servatism with a consistent set of positive values and purposes 
that can serve as a guide to action for the statesman. In the 
final analysis, both Metternich and Bismarck were left with the 
security of the 'balance of power' as an end in itself, but - as 
Kant has pointed out - 'a permanent universal peace by means of 
a so-called... balance of power is a pure illusion, like Swift's 
story of the house which the builder had constructed in such 
perfect harmony with all the laws of equilibrium that it collapsed 
as soon as a sparrow alighted on it. '4 Kant clearly felt that the 
state of war between nations and the 'balance of power' are 
morally distasteful conditions that should be changed on the 
1. Kissinger, A World Restored, 206 
2. Kissinger, 'The White Revolutionary', 920 
3. ibid, 890 
Li.. Kant's Political Writings, 92 
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basis of values such as justice, freedom, peace, and cosmo- 
politanism. Conservatives, on the other band, see the creation 
of order as an end in itself; their 'vision', therefore, does not 
go beyond the preservation of stability as an objective to which 
all others - including the respect for the limits of power - must 
be subordinated. As a thinker and practitioner in the political 
field, Kissinger urged an 'active recognition of limits', but 
the Cambodian operations of 1969-1971, the Christmas bombing of 
Vietnam, and the wiretapping of his associates - among other 
actions in which he played a key role - suggest that he did not 
act on his own advice. 
The power-politics approach to foreign policy-making 
has traditionally relied on an amoral conception of the behaviour 
of the state, but in his writings Kissinger attempted to 'import 
a moral solvent into this situation'. 
1 
This 'moral solvent' is 
the view of the primacy of order as the precondition of peace 
and security. It is commonly held that there exists an inherent 
conflict between order and justice, and in that context 'justice' 
has a moral content. But the implications of political and 
strategic instability on the international system gave Kissinger 
a different perspective. For him, the creation or restoration of 
order - seen as stability - became in themselves a moral im- 
perative. He argued that in a system of sovereign states with 
conflicting interests 'peace' cannot be considered the normal 
pattern of international relations but the product of stability. 
Peace is not a goal that can be reached directly, but the ex- 
pression of a certain context of power relationships. It is to 
the creation of this context, and not towards 'peace' as an 
abstract objective, that diplomacy must address itself. Stability, 
then, depends upon the degree of acceptance by different states 
of this power context, and this acceptance is what establishes 
its 'legitimacy'. 
2 
Contrary to Kissinger, however, I think 'order' should 
not be considered as some kind of abstract condition of the inter- 
1. Philip Windsor, 'Henry Kissinger's Scholarly Contribution', 
British Journal of International Studies, No 1, April 1975, 
28 
2. Kissinger, A World Restored, 1-3 
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national system, but as a specific set of power relationships 
existing at any given time. To quote King, 
The question cannot meaningfully be 
whether or not we want order per se, but 
what type or degree of order we want, 
and how far we are prepared to go to 
defend some particular arrangement, some 
particular set of relations, which we 
desire (and accordingly label 'order'). 1 
The demand for 'order' is always implicitly a demand for some 
specific kind of political or social system, and the crucial 
question from the point of view of ideological analysis is whether 
the particular form 'order' will assume at any given time will, 
or should, be regarded as just. 
The conservative call for 'order' usually consists of 
a justification of stability as an end in itself, a demand for 
the protection of the basic tenets of the existing order, a plea 
for the perpetuation of the status quo. It is, also, a demand for 
the suppression or elimination of some form of conflict. According 
to Kissinger, the challenges to 'order' come from two sources: 
first, the political challenge of revolutionary or dissatisfied 
states to the stability of the balance of power (a 'balance' 
built to serve the interests of the dominant powers within it); 
and, secondly, the social challenge of domestic forces opposed 
to the current state of things. In his view, 'the true con- 
servative is not at home in social struggle. He will attempt to 
avoid unbridgeable schism, because he knows that a stable social 
structure thrives not on triumphs but on reconciliations. '2 The 
conservatives' concern with stability has traditionally been an 
obstacle to their understanding of the impact of the social 
element in politics and war; that is, the effects of social 
inequalities in the origin of revolutions, and of the partici- 
pation of new social groups in the transformation of war. Con- 
servative political thought also finds it difficult to accommodate 
the demand for justice within the narrow limits of its commitment 
to stability. The conservative view that 'order is prior to 
justice' embodies the injunction that the existing order should 
be accepted together with its injustices, for fear that otherwise 
1. Preston King, The Ideology of Order. A Comparative Analysis 
of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974, 
278 
2. Kissinger, A World Restored, 193 
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there will be no order at all. An argument for order, however, 
can never be regarded as ethically superior to a demand for 
justice, for it is merely another way of saying - often covertly - 
that some particular order, at the international or domestic 
level, is 'just', 'peaceful', or 'secure'. 
I 
The dilemma for con- 
servative ideology is, then, that to treat the creation or 
restoration of order - conceived of as the preservation of 
stability - as a 'moral imperative' produces the risk of legiti- 
mating those very social and political systems that are a threat 
both to order and justice. 
Again, the quest for stability as a fundamental 
objective of the conservative statesman is not easy to reconcile 
with Kissinger's concern with political 'creativity'. The problem 
of how to prevent 'stability' from becoming hostage to the status 
quo cannot be overcome within the ideological boundaries of 
conservatism. 
1. King, 286 
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THE FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Ole Holsti has argued that 
it is not very fruitful to assume direct 
linkages between beliefs and foreign 
policy action... [and]... it is important 
to recognize the distinction between 
decisions and foreign policy actions. The 
bureaucratic politics literature has il- 
lustrated the many potential sources of 
slippage between executive decisions and 
the implementation of policy in the form 
of foreign policy actions. 1 
Alexander George has also cautioned against the implication that 
a decision-maker's belief system is 'a set of rules and recipes 
to be applied mechanically to the choice of action'. 
2 
In spite 
of these reservations, I believe that the cognitive approach to 
foreign-policy decision-making is both epistemologically sound 
and theoretically illuminating. To be sure, the scope of the 
'linkages' between ideological beliefs and foreign policy de- 
cisions is logically restricted to those issue-areas that permit 
decision-makers to exercise their personal influence. In this 
respect, the Kissinger-Nixon period in US foreign policy presents 
obvious advantages, as they were committed to dominate personally 
almost all aspects of American foreign policy, from the policy- 
formulation to the implementation phase. 
Kissinger's influence as a 'conceptualizer' on the basic 
design of US foreign policy was complementary to Nixon's perspec- 
tive of foreign affairs as a higher calling of the politician, 
the area of activity in which the politician can become a true 
'statesman'. 
3 Kissinger's conservatism was rooted in the study 
of nineteenth century European diplomatic history and in his 
philosophical convictions; Nixon's political ideology - as ex- 
pounded in his writings - was a crude version of the Realpolitik 
tradition of political realism, coupled with the customary ex- 
pressions by US politicians about the virtues of American 
1.0. Holsti, 'Foreign policy decision-makers viewed psychologi- 
cally'. Paper prepared for the American Political Science 
Association Meeting, San Francisco, California, 1975. Quoted 
in S. G. Walker, 'The Interface Between Beliefs and Behaviour', 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 21, No 1, March 1977,131 
2. A. George, 196-7 
3. On Nixon's views, see R. Evans and R. D. Novack, Nixon in the 
White House, Vintage Books, New York, 1972,11; also his book, 
six Crises, H. Allen, London, 1962, xvi 
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democracy and the benevolent effects of US power. His rise had 
been fuelled by a crude and even demagogic anticommunism which 
had led them automatically to defend the need for the US to 
maintain nuclear superiority over the USSR, and to support without 
question American interventionist policies in the Third World, 
particularly - though of course not exclusively - in Southeast 
Asia. 1 His strength as a leader lay in his tactical flexibility, 
in his willingness to adapt himself to new circumstances; his - 
and Kissinger's - main weakness was his inability to question the 
conservative implications of his 'realism', both domestically and 
internationally, which blocked ideological innovation, led to an 
ever-increasing cycle of centralization and secrecy, and to his 
eventual downfall. 
Both Kissinger and Nixon recognized that the economic, 
strategic and political impact of the Vietnam war on the US, 
2 
and the changes in the international situation, made it imperative 
to adjust, at least tactically, to the new conditions. They 
'realistically' accepted the need for a change of direction that 
- and this was a crucial point - would not imply a reassessment 
of their 'fundamental' ideology. Their response was characteri- 
1. On Nixon's notions of leadership, see R. Nixon, The Real War, 
Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1981,265-70; The Memoirs of 
Richard Nixon, Arrow Books, London, 1979,110. In a 1968 inter- 
view, shortly before assuming office, he reaffirmed his con- 
viction that 'it is only our [US] nuclear superiority that has 
preserved peace for our generation. Maintaining superiority is 
necessary in order to speak to the Soviet Union from a position 
of strength. ' (Quoted by W. B. Husband, 'Soviet Perceptions of 
US "Positions of Strength" Diplomacy in the 1970s, World Poli- 
tics, Vol 31, No 4. July 1979,500-1) Nixon would have had US 
troops in Vietnam as early as 1954, when the French were sur- 
rounded at Dien Bien Phu. He had traditionally been an extreme 
exponent of the 'domino theory', who thought the war in Vietnam 
was being fought primarily between the US and the People's 
Republic of China, and who argued that Chinese aggression could 
reach as far as Australia if South Vietnam fell. See his Speech 
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 16 1954. 
Also Speech of March 15 1965 (Congressional Record, US House of 
Representatives, September 2 19652 21928-30). and his article 
'Asia After Vietnam', Foreign Affairs, October 1967,111-25 
2. On the economic impact, see Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State, 
Fontana, London, 1971,61,256; on the strategic impact, US 
Department of Defense: Statement by Secretary of Defense C. M. 
Clifford on the 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for 
FY 1970-1974, January 15 1969; also H. B. Moulton, From Superi- 
ority to Parity: The US and the Strategic Arms Race, _1261-1971, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1973,284-5 
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stically conservative both at the domestic and the international 
levels: if the forces of change were rampant, it was the mission 
of the conservative to strengthen those of 'order'; if the hope 
for reform was widespread, it was all the more imperative to 
resist in the name of 'stability', 'authority', 'credibility' and 
the 'balance of forces'. 
1 
The central object of their foreign 
policy readjustment would be to reduce the scope of any devolution 
from the previously held American positions to the benefit of 
either major allies or adversaries, while reducing the costs of 
upholding what were seen as essential US interests. The inter- 
national status quo would be preserved, but the burdens would be 
redistributed. 
The perceived need for a tactical readjustment, however, 
led the Kissinger-Nixon team to introduce two important modifi- 
cations into the traditional Cold War strategy of containment: 
in the first place, the new foreign policy design would seek to 
retain the essential assets of US power and influence at a low 
cost and with the acquiescence, rather than militant opposition, 
of America's principal rivals. Having become antagonists of one 
another, the USSR and China became potential - if limited - partners 
of the US. The 'structure of peace' - the protection of the inter- 
national status quo - would then be based on the acceptance of the 
legitimate security interests of the great powers, and this 
necessarily implied that they should defer to each other's zones 
of hegemonial control over subordinate - i. e. 'Third World' - 
areas of the world. In the second place, in view of the tendencies 
towards super-power accommodation, 'interests' not 'ideological 
commitments' would now be the guiding criterion of US foreign 
policy, 
2 
and previous attempts to identify that policy with an 
'American liberal mission' would be abandoned. To be sure, when 
Nixon and Kissinger talked about a world of 'interests' not 
'ideologies', they referred to the legitimating aspect of ideology 
- 'liberalism' in the US and Marxism-Leninism 
in the USSR and 
China - both in the domestic and international arenas. 
The quest 
1. This was also Metternich's position in the face of upheaval. 
See Kissinger, A World Restored, 203-4 
2. See Richard Nixon, A New Strategy for Peace, USGPO, Washington 
DC, February 18 1970,5, and Shaping a Durable Peace, USGPO, 
Washington DC, May 3 1973,41-3 
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for stability should not be confused with 'crusading' attempts 
to reform the international order; detente meant the acceptance 
by the US of the USSR's super-power status, the 'admission' of 
China to a new system of global equilibrium, and the preservation 
of overall US hegemony in the international system. The US govern- 
ment would not try to encourage 'democracy' in the 'Third World', 
nor would she display disapproval of 'friendly' authoritarian 
regimes; the USSR and China, on their part, would be expected to 
stop promoting revolution in the name of Marxist principles. In 
sum, the Nixon Administration set itself the task of converting 
its version of 'political realism' into the common currency of 
superpower exchanges. The Administration's aim would be - in 
Kissinger's words - 'to educate the American public in the com- 
plexities of the world we would have to manage', and to teach 
them 'the requirements of equilibrium', 
1 
not to mobilize them 
behind a vision of change. 'Creativity', therefore, was implicitly 
defined as no more, and no less, than the balance of power. 
With these steps US foreign policy reached its 'maturity' 
as a conservative strategy for the preservation of the status quo. 
The Nixon-Kissinger 'stable structure of peace' can be seen as 
a new version of Kissinger's conservative 'legitimate order', 
that is, 'an international agreement about the nature of workable 
arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign 
policy'. This kind of 'order' does not make conflicts impossible, 
but it limits their scope: 'Wars may occur, but they will be 
fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace which 
follows will be justified as a better expression of the 'legitimate 
general consensus. '2 Kissinger's 'system' gave containment an 
instrumental role within a strategy of superpower accommodation, 
which did not allow for the existence of 'revolutionary' powers 
and required that the USSR and China converge with the US in 
securing a new 'legitimacy'. This was thought to be feasible - 
firstly because, after several decades of upheavals, the USSR 
had acquired a stake in stability, and secondly because this 
'commitment to stability' could be reinforced by a number of 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 981; The White House Years, 914 
2. Kissinger, A World Restored, 1-2 
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agreements whose total effect would be to limit Soviet freedom 
of action, but at the same time redound to the USSR's advantage 
in other respects. 
1 
In short, the purpose of the policy would 
be to encourage the embourgeoisement of Soviet foreign policy. 
2 
In the case of China, the need to concede primacy to security 
considerations over revolutionary aspirations and to partake of 
stability would be even more compelling. The concern for self- 
sufficiency and internal consolidation and the growing threat 
of Soviet power, created enough incentives for a rapprochement 
with the US, a reduction of Marxist ideological zeal, and a 
willingness to stop calls for a worldwide crusade against 
'imperialism'. 
To be sure, Kissinger did not lose sight of the con- 
siderable differences between the conditions existing in nine- 
teenth century Europe and the much more complex characteristics 
of the contemporary international system, 
3 but his - and Nixon's - 
interpretations of the structural nature of the challenges and 
the responses needed were not essentially different from Metter- 
nichs: the new foreign policy formula embodied a conservative 
ideology of domination that reflected indifference to the weak, 
the desire to insulate foreign policy from domestic politics, and 
to minimize the role of the social element in politics and war. 
The preference for 'interests' above 'ideologies' and for the 
separation of domestic structures from foreign policy was ex- 
clusively reserved to the domain of superpowers' relationships, 
and it did not extend to other components of the international 
system. But Nixon and Kissinger - like Metternich before them - 
could not overcome the dilemmas of conservatism: they sought an 
order of restraint, yet their ideology led them to conduct a 
policy of generalized intervention. They wanted the communist 
powers to separate their domestic ideology and practices 
from 
1. See R. Nixon, The Emer in Structure of Peace, USGPO, Washington 
DC, February 9 1972,16-25 
2. A. Hartley, American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era, Adelphi 
Paper No 110, IISS, London, Winter 1974-5,23 
3. Kissinger was frequently at pains to emphasize - despite all 
evidence to the contrary - that 'it simply isn't 
true that 
I was extremely influenced by Metternich'. See Kissinger, 
For the Record, 118; for his analysis of the peculiarities 
of contemporary international relations, see American Foreign 
Policy, 53-7 
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their external behaviour, yet their view that - as Kissinger put 
it - 'a domestic upheaval in any country can cause a major shift 
in international alignments', 
1 led them to justify a 'precaution- 
ary' policy against the 'social' menace, for example, in Chile, 
against Allende, in Central America, against the reformist ex- 
periments of the 1970s, and in Iran - in support of the Shah's 
'revolution from above'. 'Linkage' - the idea that the way in 
which the US responds to any local crisis ought to be related 
to, and determined by, its relation to the central East-West 
balance - was a recipe for indiscriminate interventionism and 
led inevitably to a doctrine of indivisible credibility. The aim 
of disengaging the US from the overexposure of the Cold War years 
could not be accomplished under these ideological premises. 
This basic ideological framework had, in sum, the 
following foreign policy implications: 
2 
(1) The aim of the new policy was the petrifaction of the inter- 
national status quo - though the method of achieveing this would 
require a high degree of diplomatic flexibility. The preservation 
of US interests and hegemony would now demand a more explicit 
recognition of the USSR's sphere of influence and of China's 
global stature, with the US as the dominant actor and central 
manager of stability. As far as the US's main allies - Western 
Europe and Japan - were concerned, Nixon and Kissinger argued 
that the time had come for 'a more balanced alliance with our 
friends', for 'more equal partnerships based on a more balanced 
contribution of both resources and plans'. 
3 As Hoffmann has pointed 
out, these were euphemisms for an economic offensive aimed at 
shoring up US hegemony by eliminating some of the advantages that 
the monetary system, and the post-19)+5 commercial arrangements, 
had given to Washington's allies: in the new era of foreign 
policy, US 'primacy' was 'to be maintained by a combination of 
greater subtlety and greater toughness, two ways of restoring 
flexibility'. 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 68 
2. To be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5-7 
3. R. Nixon, Shaping a Durable Peace, 30-9 
4. S. Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order, McGraw Hill, New York, 
1978,47. On the issue of alliance policy, see Hartley, 
American Foreign Policy in-the Nixon Era, 18-31 
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(2) The 'redistribution of burdens' necessarily demanded a 
militarization of foreign policy towards the 'Third World', in 
the attempt to strengthen 'client states' in areas where US 
military deployments were to be reduced. This, in turn, implied 
more open American support for repressive regimes in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, and the Middle East. 
(3) The concentration on the East-West balance of power and, in 
particular, its military aspects, to the detriment of North-South 
issues - which have a mainly social and economic dimension - gave 
the new foreign policy design an anachronistic character, de- 
priving it of the ability to formulate any significant response 
to North-South issues and leaving it unprepared to confront new 
problems, such as the energy crisis, which could not be easily 
constrained within the narrow limits of traditional conceptions 
of superpower hegemony. In fact, the Nixon-Kissinger ideological 
framework embodied a one-dimensional view of powerI as strategic- 
military power, which led them, on the one hand (as in Indochina) 
to overestimate the utility of force in the resolution of crises, 
and, on the other, to underestimate the significance and impact 
of social and economic transformations on the world scene. 
(4+) The attempt to combine American conventional military re- 
trenchment without US political disengagement, demanded an en- 
hancement of the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy, 
pushing strategic nuclear doctrine to a more explicit 'war-winning' 
position and away from the MAD-related premises of previous years. 
(5) Despite protestation to the contrary, the attempt to sustain 
the international status quo not only was not incompatible with 
a policy of non-intervention, but in fact pushed the Nixon- 
Kissinger duet to uphold a doctrine of global 'linkage' and 
generalized credibility that made interventionism in the Third 
World a key element of policy. 
(6) Finally, the downplaying of the legitimating role of 'liberal' 
foreign policy ideology within the US did not in fact lead Nixon 
and Kissinger to elaborate a new creative 'vision' for American 
policies abroad. They merely made explicit the conservative-realist 
assumptions of those policies. 
1. Windsor, 37 
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INNOVATION AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM 
The twin processes of centralization and secrecy in 
decision-making which characterized the Nixon-Kissinger manage- 
ment of foreign policy were rooted in their notions on the nature 
of leadership. Their impatience with 'bureaucratic politics', the 
'vagaries' of public opinion and the demands of 'consensus' 
politics reflected their tendency to identify 'creativity' with 
the inspired but lonely individual, and also their conviction 
that paralysis and rigidity were inherent in policy-making within 
the vast and complicated US government apparatus. Thus, in their 
view, centralization had to be imposed as a matter of urgency. 
Their significant innovations in the methods of foreign- 
policy formulation did not, however, imply equally fundamental 
changes in the substance of US policies. The core of the new 
foreign policy apparatus1 was a network of interagency committees, 
all chaired by Kissinger. These committees were used to force 
the foreign policy - national security agencies to produce a 
series of studies ('National Security Study Memoranda' or NSSMs) 
to be reported to the White House and provide a range of options 
on many issues. 
2 
After consultation and deliberation with 
Kissinger, sometimes following discussion at a Cabinet-level 
National Security Council meeting, Nixon would issue a 'National 
Security Decision Memorandum' (NSDM). 
In the period between February and June 1969 the White 
House sent out 61 NSSMs assigning reviews of particular policies 
to various departments and inter-agency groups. By April 1971 
the total had reached 126.3 The topics ranged from the relatively 
specific to overall reviews of the US strategic posture and its 
world-wide commitments. The ostensible intention was to enlist 
1. For a comprehensive description of the new NSC system under 
Kissinger, see US Congress, House of Representatives, Sub- 
committee on National Security and International Operations: 
The NSC: New Role and Structure, USGPO, Washington DC, 1969; 
H. A. Kissinger, The National Security Council, Comments to the 
Sub-committee on National Security and International Operations, 
USGPO, Washington DC, 1970; H. A. Kissinger, The White House 
Years, 38-48 
2. A complete list of topics covered is included in John P. 
Leacacos, 'Kissinger's Apparat', Foreign Policy, No 5, Winter, 
1971-72,3-27 
3. I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1972,133 
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the foreign policy bureaucracies in the discussion and critical 
analysis of the widest possible range of options for US policy. 
In theory, these studies could have become the basis of a thorough 
reappraisal of US foreign policy at various levels, leading to a 
reformulation of US interests and notions of national security in 
a non-conservative direction. In practice, however, despite the 
rigorous intellectual standards that were set for these studies, 
1 
they did not lead to ideological innovation in foreign policy, 
but exclusively - and not always - to tactical readjustments 
sometime reinforcing previously held US positions that contributed 
to increased political and military repression in the Third World, 
2 
to an escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, 
3 
or to the develop- 
ment of more 'flexible' war-making strategies in the nuclear 
field. 
4 
It is true that the studies in themselves could be ex- 
tremely open-minded in the range of hypothetical options they 
proposed, but Nixon and Kissinger took the decisions, and they 
defined American national interests according to the same con- 
servative ideological perceptions prevailing under previous 
administrations. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger eventually came to 
use the NSSM and the committee process to tie up the bureaucracy 
1. For a description of the purposes and requirements set for 
the NSSMs, see R. Nixon, A New Strategy for Peace, 12. 
Unfortunately only a handful of these studies are available 
for public scrutiny, though the substance of some is known 
through secondary sources. 
2. See NSSM-39 on Southern Africa, August 15 1969, published as 
The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa, by Spokesman Books, 
London, 1975. What appears obvious throughout this study is 
the complete lack of awareness or concern over the aspirations 
of the non-white people of southern Africa. The exploitative 
nature of the Apartheid system did not fall within the NSC's 
framework of analysis. See also NSDM-93 on policy towards the 
Allende regime in Chile, in Seymour Hersh, Kissinger: The Price 
of Power, Faber & Faber, London, 1983,294+-5 
3. NSSM-1 on Vietnam made it clear that the war in the South 
could not be won without continued US presence, at least in 
the air, no matter what improvement could be introduced in the 
fighting abilities of the South Vietnamese Army. The full text 
is printed in the Congressional Record, USGPO, May 10 1972, 
4975-5o66 
4. For an account of the contents of NSSM-3, entitled Military 
posture, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, 
Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1973,149, and Lynn E. Davis, 
Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American 
Doctrine, Adelphi Paper No 121, IISS, London, Winter 1975-6, 
3 
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on issues where their own minds were already made up, or where 
they wanted to delay the decision, by simply ordering more studies. 
Thus, ironically, the Nixon-Kissinger NSC system 
evolved into practically the opposite of the 'multiple advocacy' 
model designed during the initial phase of the Administration: 
the two chief officials not only made their own decisions based 
on their own analyses, but often kept the bureaucracy in the dark 
concerning those decisions, with sometimes very harmful effects 
on the working of government. 
1 
What the Nixon-Kissinger organi- 
zational innovations showed was that, though rationality and a 
formal commitment to policy reappraisal may be important steps 
in the direction of policy modification, they are not sufficient 
to assure that ideological innovation will take place. 
2 
The 
retention by the Nixon-Kissinger team of the fundamental ideological 
framework of their predecessors did not allow them to transform 
their successful control of - or disregard for - the bureaucracy 
into mechanisms geared to innovation in the substance of US 
policies. Moreover, their methods of centralization and secrecy 
ran counter to the American institutional traditions of intra- 
governmental pluralism and to public and Congressional sentiment. 
Although these methods facilitated a number of remarkable diplo- 
matic initiatives, 
3 they also contributed to the crises that 
eventually destroyed the Nixon Presidency in 1974. 
1. Two areas negatively affected by the Nixon-Kissinger centrali- 
zation policies were those of intelligence and arms control. 
In both fields Kissinger's own expectations became crucial for 
determining the framework for analysis, particularly of contro- 
versial issues such as SALT, and his rigid control of the esti- 
mating process through the NSC machinery eroded the critical 
independence of the intelligence agencies. See Lawrence Freedman 
US Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat, Macmillan, 
London, 1977,60; also Gerard C. Smith, Doubletalk: The Story 
of SALT, Doubleday, New York, 1980 
2. Brennen, 276 
3. According to Roger Morris, without Nixon's independence of 
action, 'his greatest achievements in the White House would 
probably have been impossible; with it, the tragedies of his 
presidency became more numerous'. Uncertain Greatness: Henry 




THE NEW 'LEGITIMATE' ORDER 
THE MEANING OF SUPERIORITY : THE US AND DETENTE 
It is undeniably true that in The Necessity for Choice, 
published in 1960, Kissinger had reproached those who saw 'in 
every change of [Soviet] tone a change of heart'. He also decried 
'the persistence with which it has been claimed that the economic 
needs of the Soviet Union would impose a more conciliatory policy 
on it', and disapproved of the fact that 'whatever aspect of the 
Soviet system they have considered, many in the West have sought 
to solve our policy dilemma by making the most favorable assump- 
tions about Soviet trends'. 
I 
In later years the adversaries of 
the detente process strongly criticized him for his presumed 
'new attitude' towards the USSR, arguing that it 'revealed how 
much his understanding of the Soviet system had changed since he 
took up residence in Washington'. 
2 
To be sure, the fundamental hostility that both Nixon 
and Kissinger had previously displayed towards the Soviet Union 
gave way, after 1969, to a different, much more complex and 
subtle posture. This was not, however, the product of a 'monu- 
mental piece of fatuous misjudgement', 
3 
but the result of a 
carefully crafted, highly sophisticated political response to 
new realities of the international system. The policy of detente 
was indeed basically flawed, but not for the reasons most of its 
critics or sceptics usually put forward. It was not conceived as 
1. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 191-203. And in Nuclear 
Weapons and Foreign Policy, published in 1957 (W. W. Norton, 
New York) Kissinger expressed his anxiety about 'peaceful 
coexistence', arguing that it meant for Soviet leaders nothing 
more than 'the most effective offensive tactic' and 'the best 
means to subvert the existing structure by means other than 
all out war' - all with the purpose of keeping 'provocation 
below the level which might produce a final showdown', (142-3, 
350) 
2. See, for example, Theodore Draper, 'Appeasement and Detente', 
in J. R. Schlesinger et al, Defending America, Basic Books Inc., 
New York, 1977,3-21 
3. L. Labedz, 'USA and the World Today: Kissinger and After', 
Survey, Vol 22, No 1, Winter, 1976,2 
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a consequence of a loss of the 'sense of reality'1 by its 
principal architects, nor can it meaningfully be explained 
simply as an 'artifice of statecraft... consciously managed into 
being by policymakers, often rather against the grain of political 
ideological expectations in their constituencies'. 
2 
For even though 
the impulse given to detente personally by Nixon and Kissinger 
was crucial, the policy was rooted in a number of facts that had 
transformed significantly the international landscape and on 
which US leaders could not possibly turn their backs. Thus the 
question why did Secretary of State Kissinger pursue a policy 
which Professor Kissinger had denounced in advance3 is easy to 
answer: he showed, once in office, a recognition of changing 
circumstances that did not lead him to alter his basic beliefs 
and objectives, but to adapt the tactics of US foreign policy to 
the new conditions in which it had to operate. 
In essence, detente was a policy for an age of US- 
Soviet strategic parity and Sino-Soviet schism. It played on the 
profound ambiguities of Soviet policy, torn between its unwilling- 
ness to tolerate an international status quo under US hegemony, 
and its attraction towards the possible rewards of 'equal security' 
and the American recognition of the USSR as an 'emerging super- 
power', with legitimate interests and areas of influence. The 
policy was a means for arresting the erosion of US power and 
the decline in the US's ability to conduct 'tough' global diplomacy, 
particularly in the Third World. Its failures reflected ideological 
misconceptions about the nature of contemporary social and poli- 
tical conflicts, not unwarranted 'conciliation' on the part of 
US leaders. As Kissinger explained: 
Until the early Fifties [the US] had an 
atomic monopoly enabling us to substitute 
strategic power for conventional infer- 
iority without fear of retaliation. Until 
1. This quotation is taken from one of the most forceful cases 
against detente, made in a statement prepared by a group of 
students of Soviet and international affairs, reprinted for 
the use of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate: Detente: 
An Evaluation, USGPO, Washington DC, 1974,24 
2. C. Bell, 'Detente and the American National Interest', in 
R. Rosecrance (ed), America as an Ordinary Country, 40 
3. See G. Warren Nutter, Kissinger's Grand Design, Foreign Affairs 
Study 27, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re- 
search, Washington DC, 1975,11 
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the Sixties we were in a position of such 
superiority that in a first strike we 
could probably have destroyed the Soviet 
retaliatory force, and the Soviets had no 
comparable capability. In any event the 
Soviets, calculating the worst-case scenario, 
would not risk it. Until the early Seventies, 
in fact, the worst-case scenario analysis of 
the Soviets was bound to be a significant 
restraint on adventurism. Therefore, our loss 
of strategic superiority was a strategic re- 
volution even if the Soviets did not achieve 
a superiority of their own. For that, to some 
extent, freed the Soviet capacity for regional 
intervention. 
The arrival of 'parity' implied 'a revolutionary change in the 
assumptions on which the West's security had been based in the 
entire post-war period', 
2 
and this was the case not only in the 
European context, but most importantly of all in the Third World. 
The 'revolutionary' impact of the US's loss of strategic 
superiority was twofold: on the one hand, it eroded - though it 
did not totally eliminate - previous Soviet inhibitions to project 
military power in turbulent Third World areas, and, on the other, 
it gave impetus to the struggles of anti-Western movements fighting 
against the military, political and economic dominance of the US 
and its main allies. 
3 
Detente was then the product of the con- 
straints induced by the new strategic environment and by the 
Vietnam experience on the US leaders' capacity to intervene 
militarily abroad. In my view, it is a serious misreading of the 
situation to argue that 'as it nursed its [Indochinese] wounds', 
the US 'became convinced of the folly of military intervention 
as a means of promoting great-power interests'. 
4 
Rather, what 
happened was that US leaders were temporarily unable to give to 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 1176 (emphasis mine). Also, 
W. Slocombe, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity, 
Adelphi Paper No 77, IISS, London, May 1971,5. The publicly 
announced Soviet military budget rose from 12.8 million roubles 
in 1965 to 13.4 in 1966, to 14+. 5 in 1967,16.7 in 1968,17.7 in 
1969, and 17.9 in 1970, an increase of 4+0% which does not in- 
clude hidden allocations to the Soviet military 
(T. W. Wolfe, 
Soviet Power and Europe 1945-1970, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, 1970,429) 
2. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 258 
3. In Indochina, the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and Latin 
America, for example 
4. L. Freedman, 'Requiem for Detente ? ', World Politics, February 
1980,41 
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the effective, practical use of military force the priority status 
as an instrument of policy that it had enjoyed throughout the 
post-war period. Nixon and Kissinger saw that in the prevailing 
conditions there was no support for high-risk, interventionist 
policies; their worry was that 'the assault on our foreign policy 
would collapse all our commitments', and a way had to be found 
to preserve vital interests by diplomacy instead of force. The 
policy of detente, which included a mixture of incentives and 
penalties, would be used to push the USSR gradually towards 
accepting the American conception of the status quo, aiming at 
'an end to the constant probing for openings and the testing of 
every equilibrium'. 
2 
This was the crucial weakness of the policy of detente 
as conceived by Nixon and Kissinger: their assumption that a 
'mellowing' of Soviet foreign policy would necessarily be re- 
flected in a more 'manageable' Third World - an illusion arising 
from the conservatives' difficulty in understanding the role of 
the social element in politics and the roots of contemporary 
revolutions. In the first place, the Soviet Union was not prepared 
to concede continued Western domination of the Third World - 
though the Kremlin leadership was ready to be cautious so as not 
to jeopardize the benefits of detente. In the second place, and 
more importantly, whilst Soviet military and political support 
is sometimes a very significant factor in Third World conflicts, 
it is not Moscow which generates or controls events in these 
areas: the legacy of colonialism, the struggle against dictator- 
ship and repression and for national liberation and democracy, 
the impact of economic underdevelopment and of social inequalities 
1. See interview with Kissinger by B. J. Wattenberg, 'Is there a 
Crisis of Spirit in the West ? ', Public Opinion, May-June 1978, 
6-21. And in The White House Years, Kissinger defined the US's 
problem in terms of strengthening security 'in an international 
system less dependent for stability on permanent American inter- 
vention' (765). In Years of Upheaval he clarified the point 
thus: 'The... transformation of the strategic balance should 
have forced a reappraisal of the strategy of relying on the 
threat of general nuclear war even to protect Europe and 
certainly other areas; and it should have led to major efforts 
to strengthen local and regional conventional forces. Unfor- 
tunately, in the early seventies the civil strife over Vietnam 
prevented a rethinking of old verities just when it became most 
urgent. ' 
(259) (emphasis mine) 
2. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1143 
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constitute some of the most relevant factors for explaining 
Third World upsurges. These realities, and not Soviet 'adventu- 
rism', are at the root of the American dilemma in the under- 
privileged areas of the globe, and these realities made a policy 
of 'linkage' unfeasible. As Kissinger articulated it: 
Events in different parts of the world, 
in our view, were related to each other; 
even more so, Soviet conduct in different 
parts of the world. We proceeded from the 
premise that to separate issues into dis- 
tinct compartments would encourage the 
Soviet leaders to believe that they could 
use cooperation in one area as a safety 
valve while striving for unilateral ad- 
vantages elsewhere. This was unacceptable. 
l 
But 'linkage' had two basic drawbacks. First, what US leaders 
described as Third World challenges to American security - such 
as, for instance, the Vietnamese revolution - were not of Moscow's 
making nor could they be controlled by the Kremlin: a policy of 
'punishing' Moscow in order to threaten Hanoi, though not super- 
fluous, was little productive. Secondly, for international or 
domestic reasons, the 'punishment' could not always be delivered. 
2 
In sum, in spite of their expressed wish to establish a less 
undifferentiated hierarchy of US interests, the doctrine of 
'linkage' pushed Nixon and Kissinger inexorably towards putting 
US global credibility at stake in every conflict. 
The Nixon-Kissinger attempt to construct a more pre- 
dictable world system of bipolar management was also plagued with 
ambiguities. On one hand they both realized that the late 1960s 
had marked, at least temporarily, the end of American predominance 
based on overwhelming nuclear and economic power, and were pre- 
pared to reorientate the central aim of US diplomacy from con- 
tainment through supremacy - by dictating the terms of 'stability' 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 129 
2. Nixon described one such incident in his Memoirs: 'When 
Kissinger raised the question [to Dobrynin of the Communist 
violations of the ceasefire in Cambodia [in 1973], the Soviet 
scornfully asked what we expected, now that we had no 
negotiating leverage because of the bombing cutoff imposed by 
Congress. Kissinger tried to be as menacing as he could, even 
though he knew Dobrynin was right. "There should be no illusion 
that we will forget who put us in this uncomfortable position", 
he [Kissinger] said. "In that case", Dobrynin replied, "you 
should go after Senator Fulbright, not us. "' The Memoirs of 
Richard Nixon, 888-9 
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to the USSR - to containment through 'equilibrium' - based on 
detente and 'equal security'. Kissinger was sometimes even pre- 
pared to consider the possibility that the new relaxation of 
tensions might indicate 'the beginning of a new phase in Soviet 
policy', 
1 
and to argue that, though internal change should not 
be made a condition for negotiations, it was itself a condition 
that might evolve from them: changes in Soviet society had 
already occurred, and more would come. 
2 
But on the other hand 
Nixon's and Kissinger's inability to elaborate an alternative 
view of US interests in the Third World, and to redefine the 
requirements of American security in terms other than through 
the continuous exercise of hegemony over those areas, together 
with their indecision as to the meaning of the new phase of Soviet 
'geopolitical expansion' did not allow them to break ideologically 
with the premises of containment based on American strategic 
superiority. Thus, Kissinger argued that detente was necessary 
because the Soviet Union had entered the phase of imperial ex- 
pansion, 
3 but that the US would 'not accept Soviet military 
expansion of any kind'. 
4 
The American leaders' ambivalence towards detente was 
closely connected with the problem of the political meaning and 
implications of strategic 'superiority'. The controversy about 
what is 'superiority' in strategic terms and what it represents 
is usually referred to cases where war has already been assumed 
to have broken out; and it is frequently pointed out that since 
both sides - given the size of their respective nuclear arsenals - 
can destroy each other many times over, superiority makes no sense 
5 
But this totally ignores the significance of political perceptions 
in the relationship between the superpowers and the importance 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1209 
2. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 172 
3. See The New York Times, 21 December 1975. Interview with Dr 
Kissinger 
4. The New York Times, 22 December 1975 
5. This is what Kissinger meant when he said in 1974, in answer 
to a question at a press conference: 'What in the name of God 
is strategic superiority ? What is the significance of it at 
this level of numbers ? What do you do with it ?' This state- 
ment, Kissinger now argues, reflected 'fatigue and exasperation, 
not analysis', and he 'regrets' having made it. See Kissinger, 
For the Record, 213 
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that American decision-makers have traditionally given to nuclear 
weapons as a political instrument in various kinds of crisis. 
From this perspective, the possession of a margin of superiority 
is seen as increasing US bargaining power and leverage by the 
use of threats of nuclear attack against local, non-nuclear, Third 
World countries, or against the power perceived as encouraging 
the challenges, namely the USSR. 
1 
In the Cold War years, up until the mid-1960s, the 
essential requirement of strategic stability in American eyes was 
a continuing degree of US superiority in all realms of strategic 
nuclear power over the USSR. By establishing an overwhelming 
advantage in missile power the US hoped to show its ability to 
maintain its commitments even at a time when it was becoming in- 
creasingly vulnerable to direct Soviet attacks. This placed Soviet 
leaders in a dilemma in the event of war: whether to retaliate 
against American cities and so risk the destruction of their 
country, or else to confess that their bluff had been called. 
2 
The Cuban crisis was the culmination of the US's efforts to achieve 
decisive strategic superiority; 
3 
but it also - and paradoxically - 
1. As Mandelbaum notes, short of 'victory' in a nuclear exchange, 
asymmetries in the nuclear arsenals the United States and the 
Soviet Union deploy 'can lead to significant consequences even 
when both sides possess the capacity for the assured destruction 
of the other'. (The Nuclear Revolution, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1981,124) This is because, in Luttwak's words, 
'The political utility and military effectiveness of a given 
structure of armed forces exist in different worlds: one, the 
world of appearances, impressions, and the culturally deter- 
mined value judgements of international politics; the other, 
the world of physical reality in actual warfare. ' (E. N. Luttwak, 
'The missing dimension of US defense policy: force, perception 
and power', in Donald C. Daniel (ed) International Perceptions 
of the Superpower Military Balance, Praeger, New York, 1978,28 
2. See Philip Windsor, Germany and the Management of Detente, 
Chatto & Windus (for the IISS , London, 1971,12,15- 
3. General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, has expressed doubts that American nuclear superiority 
played a role in the 1962 Cuban crisis, arguing that it was US 
conventional naval superiority in the Caribbean that proved 
decisive (International Herald Tribune, 13 October 1982). While 
not denying the role of US naval forces in the crisis and the 
alternatives they provided for a flexible use of power by 
American decision-makers, the Soviets perceived their humiliation 
as directly related to American nuclear preponderance - as shown 
by their accelerated, post-1962 development of the USSR nuclear 
arsenal. 
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instilled a greater degree of caution into the American leaders' 
attempt to impose their notion of strategic stability upon the 
Soviet Union. The Kremlin leaders' decision, after Cuba, to reach 
nuclear parity with the US, the massive American intervention in 
Indochina after 1965, and its impact upon the US defence budget 
changed the strategic context. What concerned US leaders about 
this strategic 'revolution'1 - particularly once it became clear 
that the intervention in Indochina had gone disastrously wrong - 
were the effects that the change in the nuclear balance would 
have on American willingness to take risks in local situations, 
and the new opportunities that 'parity' had opened up to the 
USSR to play a more active role in the Third World. 
2 
The erosion of US strategic superiority and of the US 
government's political ability to intervene militarily abroad 
made it imperative to implement a change of course in American 
foreign policy, which materialized in the process of detente. 
From their architects' point of view, detente represented a 
breathing space; 
3 it embodied the search for a political under- 
standing that would make purely strategic considerations less 
relevant, at the same time creating opportunities for 'taming' 
Soviet power. The American view of strategic stability based on 
US overall superiority and willingness to dictate - if necessary - 
the terms of the relationship to the Soviet Union was not abandoned 
as an objective, but it was - in Windsor's words - 'downgraded in 
its heuristic importance'. 
4 
Thus, in the American view, the success 
1. The extent to which these changes actually transformed the 
strategic environment, and the question whether the US now 
came to occupy a position of relative inferiority compared 
with the USSR, are matters of debate. But as Lawrence Freedman 
puts it, military power is 'in the eyes of the beholder', and 
it is a fact that in the early 1970s 'the impression grew [in 
the US] that the Soviet Union was seizing the strategic in- 
itiative'. (The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 368,346) 
2. Blechman and Kaplan have shown that on at least nineteen 
occasions since World War II the US has sought to use nuclear 
weapons as instruments of policy in crisis situations in 
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, where in 
two cases US bombers have been sent to reassure allies. (Force 
without War, 47-9). See also Fred Halliday, The Making of the 
Second Cold War, Verso, London, 1983,46-80 
3. Although he did not use these terms, the basic notion is imp- 
licit in Kissinger's explanations of the meaning of detente. 
See American Foreign Policy, 143-76,299-323 
4. Windsor, Germany and the Management of Detente, 21 
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or failure of detente would ultimately be measured both by the 
degree to which the USSR accepted 'restraint' as a guiding 
principle of foreign policy in a new status quo, and also by 
the satisfaction of US expectations about the 'manageability' of 
the Third World. To put it differently, the agreement or refusal 
by the rest of the world to behave in the manner which the 
American architects of the policy hoped would constitute the 
real test of detente. 
-123- 
A NEW CORRELATION OF FORCES : 
THE USSR, CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS QUO 
The Soviet move to detente was basically - though not 
exclusively - the result of a conviction of the inherent long- 
term strength of the Soviet system, and also of a perception of 
a gradual shift in the 'international correlation of forces' in 
favour of the USSR. According to Soviet writers, the concept 
'correlation of forces' differs fundamentally from the concept 
'balance of power'. While the balance of power can be the product 
of deliberate policy, the 'correlation of forces' represents 
'balance' determined by social and historical processes of which 
the policy of states is only a component. The 'correlation of 
forces' constitutes the basic structure upon which the interstate 
system rests; it can be affected to a certain extent by state 
policy, but, in general, state policies are shaped by the socio- 
economic, technological, military, and political variables that, 
together, constantly transform the 'correlation of forces'. 
1 
Since Soviet leaders felt that the main reason for the US 
acceptance of detente was a shift in the 'correlation of forces', 
particularly military forces, to the USSR's advantage, the 
Soviets naturally expected that further movements in this directior 
would encourage additional accommodation of Soviet interests. 
2 
Despite their newly-gained self-confidence, however, 
the fact is that the Soviet leaders' move to detente also re- 
flected a perception of weakness. As in the Americans' case, 
their attitude was ambivalent: on the one hand, there was a 
growing belief that the USSR was becoming stronger, and this, by 
implication, meant that Soviet policy would necessarily become 
more assertive and that conflicts with the main pillar of 
the 
status quo - the US - would be more 
likely. On the other, the 
Soviet leadership's consciousness that the USSR confronted a 
number of serious domestic and international problems pushed 
the Kremlin in the direction of cooperation rather than con- 
1. Vernon V. Aspaturian, 'Soviet Global Power and the Correlation 
of Forces', Problems of Communism, May-June 
1980,1-18 
2. On the Soviet view of Detente, see Walter Laqueur, 'Detente: 
Western and Soviet Interpretations', Survey, Vol 19, No 3, 
Summer 1973,74-87; L. S. Hulett, Decade of Detente: Shifting 
Definitions and Denouement, University Press of America, 
Washington DC, 1983 
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frontation. These realities of the Soviet system allowed Nixon 
and Kissinger to conceive a policy of 'incentives' that would 
inevitably have to be reciprocated by Soviet political and 
military 'restraint'. 
Kissinger was initially convinced that the Soviets 
needed a 'relaxation of tensions' at least as much as the US, 
and that a period of international tranquillity was bound to present 
more problems to the Soviet Union than to America, 'since its 
cohesion was in part maintained by the constant evocation of an 
external danger'. In his view, a 'long period of peace' would 
'unleash more centrifugal tendencies in the totalitarian states 
than in the industrial democracies'. 'Time', he concluded, 'was 
not necessarily onthe Soviet side. '1 It is clear from this assess- 
ment that Kissinger did not adequately appreciate - until events 
forced the realization upon him - the extent to which US domestic 
upheavals and strategic overextension, the impetus of Third World 
revolutionary struggles, and the growth of Soviet military power 
had opened up in the 1970s a period of international instability 
and Soviet geopolitical ascendancy that placed the US in a more 
exposed and vulnerable position than its main rival. Detente at 
the bilateral level could only be sustained on the basis of a 
new global balance of power, in which the USSR would ask to play 
a larger role. American leaders were then faced with only two 
options: either to accept willingly an expanded Soviet global 
role or to adopt a posture of generalized containment, handicapped 
by the reality of an increasingly unfavorable military equation. 
Of course, this dilemma was not yet commonly perceived 
in such clear-cut terms in the early 1970s, partly because Soviet 
policy was still undergoing a process of redefinition. Four 
factors played a dominant role in the Kremlin's decision to seek 
a rapprochement with the US. In the first place, a significant 
factor was Moscow's extraordinary anxiety about the People's 
Republic of China at the start of the decade, and their concern 
with the US approach to the PRC. Subsequently, as 
the limits of 
the Sino-US relationship became clearer Soviet fears receded, but 




second factor was the recognition that the difficulties 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 801 
2. ibid, 547-8,810-23 
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of the Soviet economy justified a much more vigorous effort to 
obtain Western credits and technology to overcome the bottlenecks 
of Soviet development in these areas. 
1 
Thirdly, the Kremlin 
leadership's interest in detente was fuelled by the arms control 
issue. While the quantitative momentum in the nuclear arms race 
was undoubtedly on the USSR's side, the American lead in such 
fields as ABM and MIRV technology was big enough to persuade the 
Soviet national security establishment of the need to make some 
concessions to prevent the US from exploiting its advantage. 
2 
Finally, the progress of Westpolitik, the Soviet normalization 
with West Germany, also contributed to facilitating an opening 
to the US. The climate of relaxation was improved by the unfolding 
of Soviet and East European political and economic relations with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which also made more feasible 
the European security conference, long sought after by the Kremlin. 
All these motives for a detente with the US notwith- 
standing, the USSR's accommodation with the West did not represent 
an acceptance of the status quo or of restrictions prohibiting 
Soviet international advances. The Soviets were indeed interested 
in the economic benefits of detente, but the political price they 
were prepared to pay for these was limited, and it certainly did 
not include the 'acquiescence' in the US's predominance in the 
international system. The Kremlin leadership perceived detente 
essentially as the product not of Soviet weakness but of Soviet 
strength; the most they were willing to consider in the name of 
detente was how to find less dangerous ways to modify - not to 
preserve - the international status quo. 
4 
As a Soviet analyst 
put it in 1973, 'The purpose of detente [is] to make the process 
of international change as painless as possible. '5 This objective, 
of course, was in total contradiction with the Nixon-Kissinger 
view of detente as a device to protect, rather than transform, the 
status quo. 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1142 
2. D. K. Simes, 'The Death of Detente ? ', International Security, 
Vol 5, No 1, Summer 1980,5 
3. H. Gelman, The Politburo's Management of Its American Problem, 
Rand Report No R2707-NA, Santa Monica, California, 1981,41. 
Also, W. G. Hyland, Soviet-American Relations: A New Cold War ? 
Rand Report No R2763-FF/RC, Santa Monica, California, May 1981, 
24 
4. Simes, 10 
5. A. Bovin, Pravda, November 20 1973 (quoted Simes, 11) 
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The problem was not that Nixon and Kissinger had blindly 
succumbed to 'wishful thinking'1 and 'delusions'2 about Soviet 
power. They had formulated a policy which, in the circumstances, 
offered at least the possibility of preserving the sinews of the 
American hegemonial position in the world through a complex 
transition period, and at most the promise of obtaining the co- 
operation of an 'emerging superpower' in the 'management of order'. 
The difficulties lay in the American leaders' unwillingness to 
reconcile themselves - even if reluctantly - to at least a limited 
expansion of the USSR's sphere of influence, above all in the 
Third World. The recognition that the impressive increases in 
Soviet strength had changed the strategic environment was not 
accompanied by the admission that this necessarily implied a more 
assertive political presence by the USSR in Third World conflicts. 
In theory, Nixon and Kissinger knew that a 'place' had to be found 
for the USSR's new ambitions; in practice, however, their aim was 
to 'freeze' the international status quo, enticing the Soviets 
into accepting this deal by the attractions of massive economic 
assistance. At a minimum, detente could induce the Soviets to be 
more cautious - out of fear of losing its benefits. At best, it 
could lead them to see some of the advantages of stability, in- 
cluding a formal recognition of their Eastern European sphere of 
influence. 3 
1. L. Labedz, 'The Politics of Survival', Survey, Spring 1980,43 
2. R. W. Tucker, 'America in Decline: the Foreign Policy of Maturity 
Foreign Affairs, Vol 58, No 3,1980,472 
3. This was the main thrust behind Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Kissinger's 
assistant at the State Department 's polemical remarks in March 
1976, when he argued that 'The Soviets have been inept. They 
have not been able to bring the attractions that past imperial 
powers have brought to their conquests... They have not brought 
the ideological, legal, cultural, architectural, organizational 
and other values and skills that characterized the British, 
French, and German adventures... The Soviets' inability to ac- 
quire loyalty in Eastern Europe is an unfortunate historical 
failure, because Eastern Europe is within their scope and area 
of natural interest... There is no way to prevent the emergence 
of the Soviet Union as a superpower. What we can do is affect 
the way in which that power is developed and used. Not only can 
we balance it in the traditional sense, but we can affect its 
usage - and that is what detente is all about... We seek to in- 
fluence the emergence of the Soviet imperial power by making the 
base more natural and organic so that it will not remain founded 
on sheer power alone. ' See US National Securit Doctrine Vis-a- 
vis Eastern Europe. The 'Sonnenfeldt Doctrine' Hearings before 
the US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International 
Security and Scientifc Affairs, April 12 1976, USGPO, Washington 
DC, 1976,41-4 
-127- 
The difficulties arising from conflicting US-Soviet 
perceptions of the meaning of detente were compounded by the 
Chinese analysis of the process. Despite Nixon's and Kissinger's 
awareness of the erosion of US geopolitical supremacy, they re- 
mained convinced that in the changed international context America 
was still operating from a base of great residual strength, that 
in the new 'triangular' balance it could play a dominant role, 
and that the Chinese leadership realized that its interests in 
a rapprochement with the US were more urgent and overwhelming 
than Washington's. 1 
Not surprisingly, the Chinese view of the origins and 
purposes of the 'opening' to the US was significantly different. 
The primary catalyst of the new Chinese foreign policy was a 
perception of American weakness rather than of Soviet strength. 
2 
During the period of the Cultural Revolution until 1968 Chinese 
foreign policy was grounded on the assumption that the US was 
determined to extend its economic and political hegemony by the 
application of military power for the foreseeable future. While 
the USSR was seen as a 'revisionist' power which betrayed 
'people's wars', it was not considered an 'imperialist' power 
in its own right. A series of events transformed this analysis 
and the turning point came in 1968 in the wake of the Vietnamese 
'Tet' offensive and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The 
US was seen as unable any longer to pursue the aggressive ex- 
pansionist policy which had characterized American international 
behaviour since World War II, particularly in the Third World 
where it was now on the defensive. 
The other crucial assumption of the new Chinese foreign 
policy was the reappraisal of the USSR as an 'imperialist' power 
in its own right which, at this particular stage of history, was 
advancing at a time when US imperialism was in serious decline. 
The new international situation made it imperative to exploit 
the contradictions between the two superpowers, and to do so by 
extending an opening to the US. As Chou En-lai put it in a 1971 
briefing: 'When the US got stuck in Vietnam, the Soviet revisionist 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 51 
2. G. O'Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy, Croom Helm, 
London, 1978,21 
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embraced the opportunity to extend vigorously their sphere of 
influence in Europe and the Middle East. The US imperialists 
cannot but improve their relations with China to combat the Soviet 
revisionists. 'I Chinese spokesmen described global politics in 
progressively less tranquil terms, but both the short-term and 
long-term consequences of this situation were deemed positive 
for the PRC. 
2 
In the short run, superpower competition in more 
vital and vulnerable spheres of interest than Asia would provide 
China with the breathing space required to restore an economy 
and polity shattered by years of turmoil. In the long run, both 
superpowers could be expected to throw away substantial parts of 
their resources in an increasing competition which neither could 
expect to win decisively. 
The Chinese leaders therefore wanted and needed an 
intensified competition between the US and the USSR as a key 
element of their foreign policy strategy, and they were convinced 
that in this confrontation China could not, and would not, play 
a decisive role. The US's strategic decline and the USSR's geo- 
political momentum made it necessary to adopt a more flexible 
attitude towards Washington and to warn American leaders where 
their true interests lay. Only the US had the power to stop 
Soviet advances, and it was essential that American leaders 
respond forcefully to the Soviet challenge. 
There were, then, significant differences between 
American and Chinese perceptions of the impact of China's new 
perspective on world affairs. First, for the Chinese leaders the 
US opening to China was an unequivocal sign of American weakness; 
less the prelude to a diplomatic 'revolution' than a hopeful 
indication that Washington had understood the nature of the Soviet 
threat and would firmly act against it. For Nixon and Kissinger, 
on the contrary, the rapprochement with China was seen as a master- 
stroke in the creation of a triangular relationship that would 
strengthen stability by involving the USSR in the 'management of 
order'. Secondly, US leaders' perceptions of the new strategic 
equation gave China an important role to play in the containment 
1. Quoted by M. B. Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, Croom 
Helm, London, 1978,228 
2. L. W. Pye, 'Dilemmas for America in China's Military Moderni- 
zation, International Security, Spring 
1979,3-17 
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of the USSR. The Chinese, however, were less sure about the 
imminence of Soviet threats to China, and considered their 
contribution to a global 'balance' as of a very limited character. 
1 
Thirdly, Nixon and Kissinger interpreted the new equilibrium as 
a mechanism which would help to control and reduce the level of 
confrontation with the USSR through a mixture of incentives and 
penalties and the skilful manipulation of triangular diplomacy. 
The Chinese, however, expected the US to adopt a much more 
belligerent attitude towards the Soviets. ? or their part, the 
Kremlin leaders, faced with the revived dangers of a two-front 
confrontation and of a coalescing of rivals on both its Eastern 
and Western frontiers, were more disposed to strengthen their 
links with the US; but the Soviets came to make a US willingness 
to isolate and weaken China a crucial test of detente -a test 
that the American could simply not accept. Finally, Nixon and 
Kissinger placed high hopes in the help the PRC could give them 
on the Vietnam issue, but the Chinese were not in fact able to 
deliver much on that account even if they wanted to, for their 
influence on Hanoi was limited. In sum, despite the changes in 
China's position brought about by the new foreign policy of the 
early 1970s, the Chinese did not accept the American conception 
of equilibrium based on detente and triangular diplomacy, nor 
were they prepared to let themselves be used as a pawn in the 
struggle between the superpowers. Rather, they envisaged a 
return to the Soviet-American Cold War, with China playing a 
secondary role and concentrating on its own internal development. 
Thus, the Nixon-Kissinger view of the new equilibrium 
and its political and strategic implications was based on an 
evaluation of the international correlation of forces, which was 
not shared by the US's main antagonists. In these conditions, the 
policy of detente could not but remain at the stage of a tactical 
reprieve, failing ultimately to contain the deterioration of the 
US-dominated international status quo. 
1. To be sure, Chinese writings conceded that some Soviet deploy- 
ments in Asia are directed against China, but they also con- 
tended that many of these forces remain primarily intended to 
threaten Japan and the US. In addition, Chinese discussions of 
the 'inevitability of war' refer almost exclusively to armed 
conflict not between the USSR and China but between 'imperialist' 
states or their surrogates, with the PRC playing a peripheral 
role, or being uninvolved in such conflagrations. See J. D. 
Pollack, 'Chinese Global Strategy and Soviet Power', Problems 
of Communism, Vol XXX, No 1, January-February 1981,54-5 
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THE FRAGILE EQUILIBRIUM 
The end of the era of American strategic supremacy 
happened to coincide not only with the end of Soviet strategic 
inferiority but, more importantly, also with the beginning of 
an era of Soviet geopolitical expansion and a renewed period of 
socio-political turmoil and revolutionary upheavals in the 
Third World. The relentless Soviet drive for strategic parity 
was bound to undermine the American quest for 'equilibrium' - on 
US terms - as the Kremlin's perception of the world 'correlation 
of forces' and of the dynamics of international instability 
differed fundamentally from that of the US leaders. In particular, 
the Kissinger-Nixon 'linkage' assumption that the USSR could, or 
would, help the US maintain stability in the Third World had no 
basis either in actual fact or in anything the Soviet leaders 
had committed themselves to for the sake of detente. 
1 
In the 
first place, the whole theory of Soviet-American cooperation to 
'manage' Third World crises depended upon the continued primacy 
of the superpowers, when in fact Kissinger himself had repeatedly 
argued - correctly, in my view - that this power and authority 
were gradually waning on both sides. 
2 
Secondly, the Soviet leaders 
made at all times no secret of their view that detente did not 
mean an end to Soviet-American competition in the Third World, 
only an agreement that such conflicts should not be allowed to 
escalate to dangerous levels. 
3 
The Nixon-Kissinger strategy of equlibrium sought an 
overarching bargain in which Soviet expansion would in practice 
1. Thus, the statement that 'the Soviet and Warsaw Pact approach 
to detente suffers from the most fundamental, intrinsic contra- 
dictions', for it is 'simply inconceivable to any reasonable 
mind to advocate reconciliation, accommodation and agreements 
in an adversary relationship, while at the same time presenting 
detente as a manifestation of a policy to shift power relations 
in favor of Socialism', only shows its author's profound mis- 
understanding of Marxist doctrine and its role in 'legitimation' 
See F. A. M. Alting von Geusau, 'Detente after Helsinki', The 
Year Book of World Affairs, Stevens & Sons, London, 1978,8-22 
2. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 59-90 
3. See, for example, V. Kortunov, 'The Leninist Policy of Peaceful 
Coexistence and Class Struggle', International Affairs (Moscow), 
May 1979,91 
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be contained by a number of political, economic, and military 
arrangements, reinforced by the political and strategic implications 
for Moscow of the US opening to Peking. The global emergence of 
the USSR in the late 60s and early 70s was, however, a double 
and paradoxical phenomenon. As Windsor explains, the Soviet Union's 
global presence is 'a demonstration of her strength, but also an 
indicator of her weakness'. 
1 
The 'bipolar' system of the 50s and 
60s was based on the power of one country, the US; and the emer- 
gence of the USSR as a global power in the early 70s - one whose 
military strength was actually a function of her weakness in 
other spheres - rather than confirming 'bipolarity' challenged it. 
Soviet strategic power, coupled with the USSR's structural weak- 
nesses was 'bound to present Soviet activity as subversive to 
any global understanding and potentially dangerous to the super- 
power relationship'. 
2 
This can only be taken to mean that 
'bipolarity' was an euphemism for US strategic superiority. To 
be sure, in the early 70s - with the US still involved in 
Vietnam and the USSR only starting to flex its muscles under the 
spell of 'parity' - the policy of detente made sense from the 
American point of view; it was not an 'unmitigated snare and 
delusion', 3 but an expedient of containment in changed circum- 
stances. However, the idea that the USSR could become a status 
quo power, co-responsible for 'world order' and security was 
much less realistic. The Soviet interest in a form of condominium - 
when it played a part in exchanges with US leaders - was always 
explicitly directed against China, and this could not be en- 
couraged by Nixon and Kissinger. 
4 
After all, their triangular 
diplomacy demanded that all attempts by Moscow to achieve hegemony 
over China be forcefully resisted. 
5 
The Chinese analysis of the 
correlation of forces in the period was more accurate, not because 
it reflected more precisely the 'true' nature of Soviet motives, 
but because it revealed the true extent of American weakness and 
openly exposed the nature of the challenge. In retrospect, it 
1. Philip Windsor, 'The Soviet Union in the International System 
of the 1980s', in Prospects of Soviet Power in the 1980s, Part 
II, Adelphi Paper No 152, IISS, London, Summer 1979,3 
2. ibid 
3. T. Draper, Present History, Random House, New York, 1983,202 
4. Kissinger, The White House Years, 547-8; J. Newhouse, 189 
5. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 53,277 
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seems quite obvious that the Soviets came to assume that the US 
was engaged in a unilateral withdrawal from the competition for 
geopolitical influence, and also that they underestimated the 
American willingness first to demand reciprocity, and then to 
restore their former primacy. US leaders, on their part, clearly 
overestimated the superpowers' ability to control the world 'from 
above' and did not for a while perceive the true extent of Soviet 
ambitions. Finally, both the US and the USSR overestimated the 
impact of China as a factor in the balance of power: the Soviets 
by their exaggerated fears of the threat posed by the Chinese on 
their eastern flank, and the Americans by their exaggerated 
expectations about the potential of the 'China card' as an 
instrument for manipulating the Soviets. 
'Stability' could only be sustained - if at all - by 
powers with parallel conceptions of 'order' or by a structure in 
which one power was effectively able to impose restraint on the 
others. Neither of these alternatives was feasible in the 1970s. 
But the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was not limited to the cooperative 
aspects of detente. The policy was essentially an attempt to 
preserve US power and influence at a difficult period, and to 
prepare the ground for a restoration of American supremacy. As 
Kissinger explained, 
the change in the strategic situation pro- 
duced by [the US's] limited vulnerability 
is more fundamental for the United States 
than even total vulnerability would be for 
the Soviet Union because our strategic 
doctrine has relied extraordinarily, perhaps 
exclusively, on our superior strategic power 
... Therefore, even an equivalence 
in destructive 
ower, even 'assured destruction' for both sides, 
was] a revolution in the strategic balance... 
1 
Thus the Strategic Arms Limitation process sought to halt the 
race in offensive delivery systems (ICBMs and SLBMs) at a time 
when the US enjoyed a great advantage in warheads, to give time 
for the deployment of new weapon systems not covered by the 
SALT-I Treaty, and also for the introduction of qualitative im- 
provements in strategic forces that would restore the US edge in 
the field of power-perceptions. In Kissinger's words, 
if there was an imbalance [in the 1970s] SALT 
did not create it; it reflected self-limiting 
1. Kissinger, For the Record, 239 
(emphasis mine 
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decisions made over a decade. SALT did 
provide a time-span in which they could be 
remedied. SALT I caused us to give up not 
a single offensive weapons program. The 
freeze [on offensive weapons] was essential, 
indeed, if we were ever going to catch up. 
And we followed SALT I with a substantial 
modernization of our strategic forces. 1 
The 'best' that could be accomplished in the early 1970s to 
maintain pressure over the USSR was to 'alter the older strategic 
doctrine [MAD] and shift targeting from civilian to military ob- 
jectives'. 
2 
This was the origin of the 'new' declaratory nuclear 
policy of 'limited nuclear options', which in fact represented 
a temporary political device rather than a substantial technical- 
military alteration of existing American nuclear plans. 
3 In short, 
detente would not guarantee 'parity', for the US was not prepared 
to consider 'strategic stability' a 'military asset'. 
From the beginning, critics of detente argued that the 
policy led inevitably to appeasement of the USSR, and that it 
did not imply radical changes in the Kremlin's strategy but 
simply a tactical readjustment to continue the Cold War by other 
means. 
5 
The crucial question, however, is not whether there was 
a complete Soviet break with the past, but whether the East-West 
rapprochement led to 'modifications of Moscow's foreign policy 
of such magnitude as to make the change meaningful for the other 
party in the relationship'. 
6 
Apologists of detente insist that 
this was so, that the policy gave the US nonmaterial butvery 
important things, like 'diplomatic leverage, a safer relationship 
in the central balance and better prospects of long-term stability 
in the world'. 
7 
But in fact the policy produced more tangible 
benefits for the US, not only because the Soviets recognised 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 257 (emphasis mine) 
2. Kissinger, For the Record, 199 
3. See Chapter 7 of this study 
4. Kissinger, For the Record, 237 
5. See E. J. Rozek, 'Henry Kissinger: The Switch-Doctor', Survey, 
Winter 1982,211-18; 'Whitewashing the White House', Survey, 
Spring 1980,32-40; T. Draper, 'Detente', Commentary, June 
1972 
6. Simes, 8 
7. Bell, 47; see also her book, The Diplomacy of Detente: the 
Kissinger Era, Martin Robertson, London 1977,245 
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a number of overlapping interests with the Americans in such 
relevant fields as strategic arms control, crisis management, 
and nuclear non-proliferation, but also - and more important - 
because the period of relaxation of tension with the USSR and 
China ran parallel with one of the most turbulent and traumatic 
years in the development of US domestic and foreign policies, 
when Nixon and Kissinger were implementing their complex and 
costly strategy for extrication from Indochina. 
1 It was not 
until the Angolan civil war in the autumn of 1975 - at a time 
when detente had already come under concerted domestic attack 
in the US - that the Soviets abandoned the caution which charac- 
terized their behaviour in the early 1970s in troubled Third 
World areas, including Vietnam, Chile, and the Middle East. 
2 
To be sure, the Soviet leadership did not 'defend' American 
interests in these and other trouble spots, but still, the 
Kremlin displayed a degree of restraint which to some extent 
contributed to opening a 'breathing space' and to the eventual 
restoration of US strategic power and hegemonial will. 
What the Soviets could not do, even if they had wanted 
to, was to freeze the status quo in the Third World, or - even 
less likely - to limit the damage to US interests resulting 
from the numerous mistakes by American policy-makers in their 
handling of Third World crises. A case in point was the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war - which was taken by many in the US as an 
example of flagrant Soviet violation of the 'spirit of detente'. 
Leaving aside the question of how far in advance the Soviets 
were informed of the Arab attack, and of whether the 'principles 
of detente' with the US (agreed at the 1972 Moscow summit) 
obliged them to violate their previous 'Friendship and Cooperation 
1. As Kissinger noted: 'For the statesman ... a foreign policy 
issue does not present itself as a theory but as a series of 
realities. And the realities of Nixon's first term were stark. 
We had to end a war in Indochina in the midst of a virulent 
domestic assault on all the sinews of a strong foreign policy 
... Detente was not 
the cause of these conditions but one of 
the necessities for mastering them. '(Years of Upheaval, 23 
(emphasis mine) 
2. See Chapter 6 of this study 
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Treaty' with Egypt, 
1 
the fact is that on several occasions 
before the outbreak of war the Soviets - including Brezhnev 
himself - warned US leaders that military hostilities were 
imminent unless there was progress toward a peaceful settlement. 
2 
The Nixon-Kissinger policy of total reliance on Israel's military 
superiority, however, and their lack of interest in Sadat's pre- 
1973 overtures made war the only remaining option for the Arabs. 
In Europe, where the superpowers' spheres of influence were neatly 
1. For the full text of these 'Basic Principles', see US Depart- 
ment of State, Bulletin, April 1973,485. The text states 
that both sides commit themselves to 'Do their utmost to 
avoid military confrontations', but it also makes it clear 
that nothing in the text was to contradict both parties' 
previous commitments. (See also, Kissinger, The White House 
Years, 1246-57). While questioning the Soviets' role in 
helping their 'friends' in the Third World, Nixon and Kissinger 
did not have inhibitions about doing the same for American 
allies, to the extent of signing (on their way back from the 
1972 Moscow summit) a secret agreement with Iran backing the 
Shah in his destabilization of Iraq (a state allied to the 
USSR). In the name of stability, the USSR was asked to desist 
from aiding its allies, but no such limitation was to be im- 
posed on the US. (see T. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, The 
Viking Press, New York, 1978,58 
2. During his stay with Nixon at San Clemente, California, in 
the summer of 1973 (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 286-300) 
Kissinger interpreted the 'Basic Principles' as implying that 
'the great nuclear powers cannot be pushed into a position 
that jeopardizes their basic survival without noting it', and 
that 'the attempt of traditional diplomacy to accumulate 
marginal advantages is bound to lead to disastrous consequences 
in the nuclear age'. (US Department of State, Bulletin, June 
26 1972,885). He returned to the theory of 'marginal advan- 
tages' in the 1973 Presidential foreign policy report to 
Congress (written by himself and his staff). There he argued 
that 'a certain balance of power is inherent in any inter- 
national system. . . But it is not the overriding concept of [US] foreign policy', because in the nuclear era 'the continual 
maneuvering for marginal advantages over others' was both 
'unrealistic and dangerous': 'It is unrealisitc because when 
both sides possess such enormous power, small additional 
increments cannot be translated into tangible advantage or 
even usable political strength. And it is dangerous because 
attempts to seek tactical gains might lead to confrontations 
which could be catastrophic. ' 
(R. Nixon, Shaping a Durable 
Peace, 78). This inevitably leads to the question: if the 
'tactical gains' were politically insignificant, why should 
they then be the prelude to 'catastrophic confrontations' ? 
The conceptual confusion of the 'marginal advantages' theory 
was another sign of Kissinger's lack of understanding of the 
dynamics of Third World conflicts, and also of his tendency 
to attribute international turmoil to Soviet machinations. 
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drawn, all the diplomatic and strategic activities connected 
to detente amounted basically to 'recognizing the status quo', 
1 
to a 'commitment to immobilism'2 for the perpetuation of the 
existing order. This same stability, however, could not be - and 
was not - maintained in the Third World. 
3 
In this area of super- 
power relations, there was no prospect for 'legitimacy'. 
1. Pierre Hassner, 'Detente: The Other Side', Survey, Spring 1973, 
9o 
2. Windsor, Germany and the Management of Detente, 24-5 
3. Detente, particularly with regard to its European dimension, 
raised for the West the problem of ideological legitimation 
and its relation to foreign policy. The recognition of Soviet 
dominance over Eastern Europe was a crucial political and 
security demand made by the Kremlin as the price for their 
favourable attitude to 'global relaxation'. Moreover, the 
Soviets saw detente in their block first of all as the occasion 
for consolidation, not for retrenchment and diffusion, for 
Communist centralized power and responsibility, and as an 
opportunity for the intensification of ideological orthodoxy - 
which, in practice, meant increased internal repression. 
Critics of the policy - who sometimes did not understand its 
roots in American weaknesses and wanted an early 
(and possibly 
premature) return to the Cold War in the 1970s - pointed out 
the dilemma. (See, for example, Norman Podhoretz, 'Kissinger 
Reconsidered', Commentary, June 1982,23). For the Soviets, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology also acts as an important source 
of legitimacy, and the acceptance of the status quo in the 
Third World would have radically contradicted the basic 
mythology which sustains the Soviet elite's image at home 
and its projection abroad. 
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CHAPTER 6 
POLITICAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 
THE IDEOLOGY OF 'POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT' 
One of the most demanding and complex challenges for 
American foreign policy has to do with the United States' 
relations with the so-called 'Third World'. The major obstacle 
in the way of justifying the claims of the 'liberal' ideology 
of foreign policy has been, and still is, the systematic US 
opposition to change in the under-privileged areas of the globe, 
the recurrent alliances with authoritarian and repressive regimes, 
the hostility towards 'national liberation' movements, the 
support of militarism, the blatant interventionism - particularly 
in the Western hemisphere - and a pattern of economic links 
basically serving the interests of US corporations. 
1 
A crucial dilemma of US policy towards the Third World 
has become clear since the early years of 'containment', when 
American policy-makers faced the problems resulting from the 
decay of European imperial power in Asia and Africa and the rise 
of militant nationalism among the subject peoples. This situation 
placed US decision-makers in a difficult position and, as stated 
for instance in a 19+9 'Top Secret' National Security Council 
document (NSC 48/1), it was for a while considered feasible to 
have 'the best of both worlds' in the US response to the challenge: 
'The United States', wrote the analyst, 
should continue to use its influence looking 
toward resolving the colonial-nationalist 
conflict in such a way as to satisfy the 
fundamental demands of the nationalist move- 
ment , lay the 
basis for political stability 
and resistance to communism, and avoid 
weakening the colonial powers who are our 
TAT in + orn nl14 A-_ - 
But it simply was impossible to reconcile these two mutually 
1. On the dynamics of US economic expansion, see P. M. Sweezy 
and H. Magdoff, The Dynamics of U. S. Capitalism, Monthly 
Review Press, New York, 1972. On the theme of the 'super- 
exploitation'of the Third World, see A. Gunder Frank, 
Reflections on the World Economic Crisis, Hutchinson, London, 
1981, esp 23-b_5 
2. Etzold & Gaddis, 259 
(emphasis mine 
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contradictory objectives, and US policies toward the Third World 
today continue suffering from the tension between the proclaimed 
liberal objectives and the realities of interventionism and 
opposition to social and political change. 
Despite all evidence to the contrary, Packenham has 
argued that the basic assumptions and attitudes of American 
policy-makers toward the Third World reflect liberal commitments 
to individualism and democracy, or the American historical ex- 
perience of rapid growth without revolutionary upheaval. 
1 
Given 
the actual US record in the Third World, however, and the diffi- 
culty of squaring it with liberal-democratic views, authors such 
as John Girling have developed a somewhat different line of 
argument, stating that whatever the personal preferences of 
American policy-makers for liberal or democratic solutions, they 
are 'obliged to act, first, in terms of necessity (national 
security) rather than ethical choice, and thus second, within 
the framework of the given situation in Third World countries 
rather than of "hypothetical" ideals'. 
2 
I think, however, that 
the question is not whether there is a tension between political 
ideals and the presumed 'requirements of realism'. but what is 
the conception of 'national security' that guides US policy 
toward the Third World. 
It is idle, I think, to ask - as Girling does - whether 
US intervention in the Third World is a function of the pri- 
mordial drive for economic exploitation, or whether it stems 
rather from considerations of 'security, 
3 
Even a casual look at 
the figures shows the sizeable dimensions of the American economic 
stake in the Third World, 
4 
the protection of which, in itself, 
constitutes a key component of US security policy in those areas. 
1. R. Packenham, esp Ch 3 
2. J. L. S. Girling, America and the Third World, Revolution and 
Intervention, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980,109 
3. ibid, 132-9 
4. See Appendix, Tables 1-5, Indicators of US-Third World Economic 
Interdependence. On this theme, see also S. D. Krasner, Defending 
the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign 
policy., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978, esp 315-38 
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For my purposes, the important points to be discussed are: What 
are the ideological presuppositions of the US approach to the 
challenge of instability and political change in the Third World ? 
To what extent did the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy reflect a 
traditional pattern of US response to the problem ? And which 
were its innovative elements - if any ? 
During the early Cold War years - before the Cuban 
revolution and the Vietnam war changed US ideologists' assumptions 
on the matter - the predominant 'official' tendency in American 
attitudes toward Third World political instability was based on 
the view that economic development would lead, almost auto- 
matically, to the rise of representative institutions, pluralism 
and political stability. 
1 
The implicit political theory behind 
the US's 'aid' efforts- as Kissinger himself summarized it - was, 
paradoxically, a crude form of Marxism, for it assumed that the 
economic structure inevitably has certain associated political 
forms. According to this theory, 
Competition with the Communists should 
take place above all in the realm of in- 
dustrialization. Our [the US's] task 
should be to prove our ability to raise 
the standard of living more efficiently 
than our Communist opponents without re- 
sorting to their methods of regimentation. 
In the long run the satisfaction of wants 
[would] promote a more liberal system as 
well. 2 
This was, however, only part of the story, for during 
the same period the US government was actively promoting and 
helping military dictatorships throughout the Third World, and 
particularly in Latin America, that could not in any way be 
expected to lead their countries toward 'democracy'. The actual 
US position was directed as a matter of priority to the pre- 
servation of the status quo, with 'development' a matter of 
secondary importance. As stated in a 1947 'Top Secret' document 
by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 
An important fact is that most of the 
1. R. Packenham, 'Political Development Doctrines in the American 
Foreign Aid Program', World Politics, January 1966,213-4+ 
2. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 288 
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Latin American Governments are dependent 
upon the military for stability. In con- 
sequence, contact with Latin American 
military men would in reality mean contact 
with very strong domestic political leaders. 
It is suggested that it is now advisable to 
attempt to bring about the economic and the 
domestic conditions which we desire to see 
in South America through these men... 
But the facts were that, at the time and into the 1950s, a number 
of important civilian political movements were struggling for 
real democracy in several Latin American countries, including 
Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Guatemala. The US government, 
however, chose to support the dictatorships of Perez-Jimenez, 
Batista and Somoza, and also to overthrow in 1954 the democrati- 
cally-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, installing 
in that country a military tyranny that still persists. 
The impact of the Cuban revolution and of the revo- 
lutionary war in Indochina produced a perceptible shift of 
emphasis in the American ideology of Third World 'political 
development'. The comfortable assumptions of the early Cold War 
period were shattered, and an open and explicit commitment to 
'stability' and 'order' as the key marks of 'development' became 
the dominant feature of the most significant studies on the 
subject by US authors. 
2 
In these works - which constitute the 
ideological substratum of practical policies - the conservative 
concern with 'order' and 'stability' comes to occupy a privileged 
place: 'order' is not considered a prerequisite for achieving 
other political goods but itself becomes the highest political 
good. In Huntington's words 'the most important political dis- 
tinction among countries concerns not their form of government 
1. Etzold and Gaddis, 77. Keenan, then at the State Department, 
put the position more clearly in a 19+8 document relating to 
the Far East, 'We [the us] should cease to talk about vague 
and - for the Far East - unreal objectives such as 
human 
rights, the raising of the living standards, and democrati- 
zation. The day is not far off when we are going 
to have to 
deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered 
by idealistic slogans the better. ' (ibid. 227) 
2. For a review of the literature, see Mark Kesselman, 'Order 
or Movement ? The Literature of Political Development as 
Ideology', World Politics, Vol 26, No 1, October 1973,139- 
154 
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but their degree of government'. 
I 
In the Third World, therefore, 
the purpose of 'political development' theories should be to 
devise ways - through a kind of political technology2- to streng- 
then the power and dominance of established authorities. 
But it is not difficult to realize that the concepts of 
political 'order' and 'disorder' ('decay' as Huntington calls it) 
are extremely ambiguous. To quote Kesselman: 
Political order appears to prevail when 
established authorities exercise control 
successfully. The concept thus obscures the 
legitimacy of the means used by governments 
to maintain power. It ignores the danger 
posed by government that is too strong... 
and the disorder that derives from officially 
sanctioned repression... The concept of political 
order is not neutral: it places the burden of 
disorder on subordinates who challenge elites. 
Decay refers only to disruptions of the status 
quo by subordinates. Disorder that results 
because of rulers and ruling institutions who 
exert coercion falls outside the definition. 
Yet authorities... may create (or help per- 
petuate) a status quo that defies elemental 
requisites of the political community. 3 
This same point had been made, for instance, by Barrington Moore, 
who pointed out that in certain cases - and there are many ex- 
amples of this in the Third World - the violence stemming from 
ruling institutions (resulting in political repression and social 
deprivation) may be no less extensive than revolutionary violence 
against the established 'order'. 
4 
1. S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale Uni- 
versity Press, New Haven, 1968,1 (emphasis mine). See also the 
important essays on the subject by L. Binder et al, Crises and 
Sequences in Political Development, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1971 
2. This point, which neatly accords with my argument about the in- 
fluence of the idea of politics as 'technique' on the ideology 
of US foreign policy, is made by Kesselman, 14+2 
3. ibid, 142-3. See also Charles C. Moskos & W. Bell, 'Emerging 
Nations and Ideologies of American Social Scientists', American 
Sociologist, Vol II, May 1967,67-72 
4. B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 104. 
For Huntington, 'The primary problem is not liberty but the 
creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have 
order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without 
order. Authority has to exist before it can be limited... '(7-8) 
This is a standard conservative argument that can be questioned 
both on logical and empirical grounds. From the perspective of 
an idea of politics that goes beyond the purely technical in- 
terest in domination, and takes into account other values, the 
problem for Third World countries should be defined in terms of 
establishing authority and safeguarding freedom simultaneously. 
Even if it granted that 'order' logically precedes liberty, 
this does not entail that 'order' should chronologically pre- 
ce esselman, 146) 
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The shift of emphasis in the US ideology of 'political 
development' from a concern with economic growth and political 
pluralism to a fixation upon 'stability' was a response to the 
increasingly unmangeable challenges of Third World nationalism 
and pressure for change. The key purpose of the American ideo- 
logical approach to the problem now is to improve the 'crisis- 
management capabilities' of the ruling elites. 
1 
In the case of 
Latin America, in the period immediately after the Cuban revo- 
lution, the new emphasis on stability and 'crisis-management' 
involved the formulation of a 'national security doctrine' which 
redefined the military's mission, giving them the ideological and 
institutional rationale for the exercise of long-term rule. 
2 
-In 
the first years of the Cold War, under strong US influence, the 
Latin American military organized themselves around the concept 
of 'hemispheric defence' against a monolithic communist external 
enemy. There was in fact no credible threat scenario involving 
Latin America in this period, except as a subsidiary arena of the 
East-West conflict. 
3 
The impact of the Cuban revolution radically 
changed US decision-makers' strategic assumptions about the role 
of the military in Latin America. US ideologists and the Latin 
American military now downplayed the threat of major foreign war 
and sharply upgraded the threat of subversion, implying greater 
consideration of internal security matters and therefore to the 
entire domestic social and political system. 
4 
1. J. La Palombara, 'Distribution: A Crisis of Resource Management' 
in Binder (ed), 275 
2. The best analysis, from a Latin American perspective, of this 
doctrine, is probably the essay by J. C. Rey, 'Doctrina de Seguri- 
dad Nacional e Ideologia Autoritaria', in A. Romero (ed) Seguri- 
dad, Defensa y Democracia en Venezuela, Equinoccio, Caracas, 
1980,195-231. See also J. Saxe-Fernandez, Pro ecciones Hemi- 
sfericas de la Pax Americana, Amorrortu, Buenos Aires, 43-91; 
J. Comblin, Le Pouvoir Militaire en Ameri ue Latine: L'Ideolo ie 
de la Securite Nationale, Delarge, Paris, 1977,79-156 
3. Lt Col J. Child, The Inter-American System: Historical Develop- 
ment, Current Status and Implications for US Policy, Strategic 
Studies Institute, US Army War College, Pennsylvania, October 
1977,9-10 
4. L. Einaudi & A. Stepan, Latin American Institutional Development 
Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil, The Rand Cor- 
poration, Santa Monica, April 1971,13-22; W. A. Selchen, The 
National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Govern- 
ment, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Penn- 
sylvania., July 1977,6-7 
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It was arguedI that the notions of 'national security' 
and political and socio-economic 'development' were inextricably 
linked, that normal democratic procedures could not withstand the 
pressures of communist-inspired insurgency in conditions of under- 
development, and that the military should be prepared to assume 
power and exercise it in accordance with a long-term project of 
authoritarian domination. In the Third World in general, and in 
Latin America in particular, the tasks of 'nation building' could 
be undertaken by one group: the military elite. Only the security- 
conscious military had the ability to assume the centralized 
control of power that presumably would result in national 'develop- 
ment'. 
2 
The new military, authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes 
that emerged in Latin America in the 1960s (Brazil in 1964, 
Argentina in 1966, and Peru in 1968) were to a significant extent 
the product of the conceptual and organizational reassessments 
originated both among US strategists and the Latin American mili- 
tary by the political impact of Castro's revolutionary changes 
in Cuba. Even before the Cuban revolution had taken place, the 
US had based its Latin American policies on a quest for stability, 
1. The basic tenets of this doctrine were summarized by former 
US Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara in his book The 
Essence of Security, Harper & Row, New York, 1968 
2. As General W. Westmoreland put it in an address to the 8th 
Conference of the Armies of the Americas (25 September 1968) 
'Although the "nation building" process would seem to refer 
to a function of the civilian institutions, our own experience 
(in Indochina, A. R. ) and that of friendly nations has been 
that the armed forces must frequently assume a dominant role, 
and use their abilities and equipment to help the people help 
themselves. ' (NACLA. Newsletter, Vol 11, No 6,1968,10). On 
the concept of 'nation building' and its role in the ideology 
of political development, Edward Shils, Political Development 
in the New States, Mouton, The Hague, 1962. Although Huntington, 
in his already cited and very influential book, ostensibly 
favours party rule, not military government, the whole thrust 
of his analysis and prescriptions points towards authoritarian 
solutions to the problem of 'stability'. 
3. This is the denomination used by Latin American social scientist 
to distinguish these regimes - where the military as an insti- 
tution assumes the role of main 'agent of national development' 
from previous military dictatorships based on the individual 
power of a military 'caud±llo'. See G. A. O'Donnell, Moderni- 
zaci6n y Autoritarismo, Paidos, Buenos Aires, 1972; J. Malloy 
ed Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Uni- 
versity of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1977 
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but their ideological justification insisted on economic growth 
as a path leading towards democracy. After Cuba, however, it 
was argued1 that the military, as the 'technocratic' class, were 
the most institutionally qualified group to promote 'modernization' 
The theme of stability and its conservative implications came 
therefore to occupy an explicitly preeminent role in US dealings 
with the region and, more generally, with the Third World as a 
whole. 
It was not easy to avoid the pitfalls of a pro-mili- 
taristic foreign policy, for US ideologists were caught in a 
dilemma between, on the one hand, their realization that socio- 
economic and political conditions prevailing in most of the 
Third World demanded a policy geared to change, and, on the 
other, their need to satisfy the conservative requirements of 
a status quo power. Kissinger's own handling of the problem 
built upon the premise that the question of 'political organi- 
zation', not that of 'industrialization', confronts the new 
nations at the very beginning of their process of development, 
and that 'to rely on economic development to bring about en- 
lightened political institutions is to reverse the real priorities' 
Communist successes in the Third World were due 'not to the 
excellence of its economic theory by to its political ability to 
mobilize national resources and organize the social effort'. 
3 
If the issue between the US and its Communist adversaries in the 
Third World was simply defined in terms of the relative capacity 
to promote economic growth, the outcome was 'foreordained'. 
4 
1. On this point, see A. Stepan, 'The New Professionalism of 
Internal Warfare and Military Rule', in A. Stepan (ed), Authori- 
tarian Brazil, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973,4775; 
M. Klane, War Without End, Knopf, New York, 1972,270-310 
2. Kigsfinger, The Necessity for Choice, 310 
3. ibid, (emphasis in the original) 
4. ibid, 311. This point had been made more forcefully-by Kennan 
in his February 24 1948 'Review of Current Trends' for the 
State Department. 'The peoples of Asia and of the Pacific area', 
he wrote, 'are going to go ahead, whatever we do, with the 
development of their political forms and mutual interrelation- 
ships in their own way... It is not only possible, but probable, 
that in the course of this process many peoples will fall, for 
varying periods, under the influence of Moscow, whose ideology 
has a greater lure for such peoples, and probably greater 
realit than anything we could oppose to it. ' (Etzold & 
Caddis, 227) emphasis mine 
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Kissinger recognized that the 'new nations' could not 'live by 
bread alone', and that 'to offer nothing but bread [was] to leave 
the arena to those who are sufficiently dynamic to define their 
purpose'. 
1 
And what could the US do ? The vagueness of Kissinger's 
prescriptions ('to make the concepts of freedom and respect for 
human dignity meaningful to the new nations') matched the super- 
ficiality of his analysis, for he argued that 'Democracy has 
less appeal [in the Third World] not because of the West's sins 
but because leaders in the developing countries did not undergo 
the risks of the anticolonial struggle in order to make themselves 
dispensable'. 
2 
The problem of political development in the Third 
World cannot, however, be dissociated from its origins in the 
colonial period and from the pressures and challenges imposed by 
the contemporary international context. Western - and particularly 
US - political, economic and military expansion and conquest have 
been, and still are, major causes of conflict and instability in 
the underprivileged regions of the globe. Kissinger's disregard 
for the impact of external intervention upon Third World political 
evolution is not an isolated phenomenon, but a basic aspect of 
the US ideology of 'political development'. By failing to con- 
sider the destabilizing - and, on occasions, devastating - effects 
of US military and economic power on other nations, this ideology 
totally obscures the real issues in the American relationship 
with Third World nations, which mainly have to do with covert 
political intervention or overt military invasion, the 'stabili- 
zation' purposes of 'military assistance', and the power of US 
based corporations over the economic system of weaker countries. 
3 
It is, I think, crucially mistaken to address the 
question of US-Third World relations from the perspective of the 
'political development' ideology, for the problem is not that 
Western democratic traditions are 'sometimes unworkable' in the 
Third World, or that 'some form of authoritarian rule may be 
inevitable as a last resort', 
4 
but that US security policies 
1. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 321 
2. Kissinger, The White House Years, 69 
3. See S. Bodenheimer, 'The Ideology of Developmentalism: American 
political Science's Paradigm-Surrogate for Latin American 
Studies', Berkeley Journal of Sociology, Vol XV, 1970,95-137; 
Kasselman, 1 9-50 
4. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 320-21 
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with regard to the Third World are founded on a view of stability 
that cannot accommodate changes outside the hegemonial control 
of American political, military and economic interests. The fear 
of changes carried out independently by Third World nations is 
characteristic of US policies in these areas, and help to ex- 
plain - above all in Latin America - why the US has consistently 
supported authoritarian 'solutions' to the problem of order rather 
than coming to terms with national revolutions in the region. In 
my view, it makes little sense to say that 'In principle, the US 
would like to have democratic governments, sharing its values - 
and friendly to its interests - in Latin America', but that 'In 
practice, the most co-operative governments generally have been 
right-wing dictatorships'. 
I 
The reasons for this are not difficult 
to understand, for democratic governments in Latin America - 
such as Goulart's government in Brazil and Allende's in Chile - 
have usually tried harder to become more independent of the US. 
The present crisis in Central America offers an ex- 
tremely illuminating example of the issues under discussion. It 
is of course beyond the scope of this study to deal with this 
matter in detail, but the Central American conflict should not 
be totally cast aside, for it contains all the ingredients that 
have made US policies in the Third World such a hopeless tangle 
of contradictions between principles and reality. The US has 
traditionally supported militarism in Central America by building 
up and co-operating with the region's militaries, aiding them 
with increasingly substantial amounts of military assistance 
and helping them - in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua - maintain their authoritarian political positions. 
2 
This has been done for reasons of 'security', and to preserve 
the isthmus within the US's 'sphere of influence'. Historically, 
the weakest point in the US's long association with Central 
America has been the unwillingness of successive administrations 
to formulate a strategy capable of accommodating and promoting 
real and not merely cosmetic political change in the area. The 
1. G. Connell-Smith, 'The Crisis in Central America: President 
Reagan's Options', The World Today, October 1983,387 
2. For a thorough analysis of the association between the US 
and the Central American military, see D. L. Etchison, The 
United States and Militarism in Central America, Praeger, 
New York, 1975, esp 57-111 
-147- 
absence of a policy geared to the need for change goes a long 
way to explaining the rude shock inflicted on the whole edifice 
of American policy in the region by the Nicaraguan revolution 
of 1979. 
Since then US policies in the area have consisted of, 
on the one hand, total hostility towards Nicaragua coupled with 
systematic attempts to overthrow the 'Sandinista' regime in 
Managua, and, on the other, concerted efforts to sustain in 
power in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, corrupt, inefficient 
and oppressive regimes that face increasingly powerful opposition 
from almost all quarters. The US strategy - as in the case of 
the 'Alliance for Progress' in the 1960s - is a blend of economic 
aid and counter-revolutionary violence that in no way clearly 
addresses the key problem of the distribution of political power 
in these societies. The recommendations of the January 1984 
'Kissinger Report' on Central America, to inject massive amounts 
of US military and financial aid into the region, not only will 
not help to reduce tensions in countries dominated by civilian 
and military oligarchies that look to the US for support, but 
will actually strengthen their rule by increasing the size and 
capabilities of the armed forces, which are the main instruments 
of repression. The paradox is, then, that the 'Kissinger Report' 
restates all the discredited assertions of a theory of 'develop- 
ment' according to which the problems of economic growth can be 
dealt with separately from those of political change; a theory, 
moreover, that Kissinger himself had stigmatized for '[bemusing] 
itself with economic and technical remedies largely irrelevant 
to the underlying political and spiritual problem'. 
1 
The root of the conflict in Central America is not that 
there are no 'democratic alternatives' but that the US - in 
alliance with the Latin American military and civilian oligarchies 
- is committed to a version of stability 
that cannot accept 
fundamental political changes in the region, leading - among 
other things - to a substantial dismantling of the existing 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 69. On the deep-seated 
economic and social ills of the Central American region, 
see V. Bulmer-Thomas, 'Crisis in Central America: economic 
roots and historical dimensions', The World Today, September 
1983. See also, Report of the National Bipartisan Commission 
on Central America, USGPO, Washington DC, January 1984,5- 
2 
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military institutions, radical reforms in the land-tenure systems, 
and new terms of treatment for foreign capital and the con- 
ditions for profit-repatriation. In principle, the US has chosen 
not to oppose all change in the Third World, 
1 but to try to 
maintain the prevailing - favourable to American interests - 
pattern of relations in terms of the distribution of power and 
wealth, productive capacity, status and knowledge. This, as 
Buzan points out, can be done by using a present advantage to 
create conditions for superior adaptation and development in the 
future. The status quo thus becomes'dynamic', inasmuch as it 
'rides the wave of change rather than resisting it, but static 
in its attempt to hold on to the existing pattern of relations'. 
2 
In practice, however, during the 'Kissinger period' the US - in 
its relations with the Third World - did little to 'ride the 
wave of change' by positively relating to, rather than pushing 
away, the forces of change in Asia-, Africa, and Latin America. 
It was precisely during the 'Kissinger years' - to add another 
example to what has already been said - that the reformist- 
centrist alternative in Central America was destroyed by the 
US-supported armed forces in alliance with the oligarchic sections 
of society. In El Salvador, in 1972, the electoral victory of 
J. N. Duarte was shamefully disowned by the military, who then 
proceeded to torture Duarte and send him into exile - without 
the US doing anything to help him. Now, twelve years later, the 
same man is presented as the 'last card' of American policy in 
the isthmus. If, as Voegelin notes, 
3 
the moral value in political 
action is prudence, by which we must understand a reckoning of 
consequences, it is from this perspective quite obvious that 
Kissinger and Nixon paid little or no attention to the possible 
human costs of their actions - or their passivity - in the Third 
World. 
1. As Barnett observes, to set as a national security goal the 
enforcement of a totally rigid conception of 'stability' in 
a world 'in convulsions, a world in which radical change is 
as inevitable as it is necessary, is as practical as King 
Canute's attempt to command the tides'. (R. Barnett, 'The 
Illusion of Security', in Charles R. Beitz & T. Herman (eds), 
Peace and War, Freeman, San Francisco, 1973,285) 
2. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear, The National Security Prob- 
lem in International Relations, Wheatsheaf Books, London, 1983, 
179 
3. E. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Chicago University 
Press, Chicago, 1952,1-26,162-89 
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VIETNAM : 'REALISM' AS SELF-DELUSION 
Politics has to do with power and also with values: 
with people's beliefs, convictions, and aspirations, and with 
what they are prepared to do to build a political order in 
accordance with their views on how it should be organized. The 
gigantic US effort in Indochina was driven by the belief in the 
feasibility of solving political problems essentially related to 
people's values through the massive application of military force. 
All the crucial problems in the US ideological approach to the 
Third World - the lack of concern for local idiosyncracies, the 
absence of a historical perspective, the alliances with dominant 
and unpopular elites, the opposition to fundamental political 
and socio-economic changes - came together in the Vietnam ex- 
perience. The Vietnam war was not an isolated mistake, but the 
product of a certain view of the US's role in the world, of its 
security requirements, and of the malleability of Third World 
societies to the impact of advanced military technology and 
American theories of political development. It was not an isolated 
error, but it was a very costly one. 
The basic difficulty that plagued American policy in 
Vietnam was the refusal to take account of the reality with 
which the US had to deal. To put it differently, US decision- 
makers never succeeded in recognizing the contradiction between 
the American principal aim - to preserve an independent non- 
Communist South Vietnam - and the reality of Vietnam: that the 
National Liberation Front ('Vietcong') was a politically dominant 
force among the southern population, particularly in the country- 
side, and that as long as an organized social life could be 
maintained in South Vietnam the NLF remained as the leading 
political actor among the peasants. Thus, the forced evacuation 
and systematic bombardment of the rural population of Vietnam 
were not accidental by-products of the war, but an unavoidable 
dimension of the US strategy. As Huntington put it in 1968, the 
Vietcong was 'a powerful force that cannot be dislodged from 
its constituency so long as the constituency continues 
to exist. ' 
1. S. Huntington, 'No More Vietnams ? ', Foreign Affairs, Vol 
46, 
1968,212. See also The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), 
Vol 5,12 
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The conclusion was obvious: to crush the people's war it was 
necessary to eliminate the people. 
The fact that genocide could not be explicitly imple- 
mented as a policy - though US forces inflicted devastation on 
an enormous scale upon the peoples of South East Asia - meant 
that the political struggle remained paramount in deciding the 
course of the war. In this context, however, the US was bound to 
fail, for the South Vietnamese government was totally unable to 
achieve the willing identification by the peasants of their 
interests with those of the regime. This failure laid bare a 
dilemma which - according to one of the best studies on 'Counter- 
insurgency' - was never seriously grappled with by US policy- 
makers: 'Effective programs require governmental stability, but 
successful counterinsurgency requires granting the rural popu- 
lation a strong voice in its own affairs. Steps toward the latter 
... threaten the former and are usually pushed aside with disastrous 
effects on counterinsurgency. 'I The South Vietnamese government 
could not reform itself without at the same time putting its 
survival in peril; as a result, it had to rely on a military 
solution, to be necessarily implemented by the US. 
Leslie Gelb, who headed the team that wrote the Pentagon 
Papers, has said that 'no systematic or serious examination of 
Vietnam's importance to the United States was ever undertaken 
within the American government. Endless assertions passed for 
analysis. '2 This has led some authors to argue that the rationales 
offered to justify the US intervention in Indochina 'just do not 
make any sense'. 
3 
But actually they did make sense within the 
context of a notion of US security seen as the worldwide defence 
(in the non-communist world) of the international status quo. 
This required the US to 'behave like the greatest power in the 
world', for no other reason than - in Walt W. Rostow's words - 
1. Douglas S. Balufard, The Counterinsurgency Era. US Doctrine 
-;?, r3 Performance. 1950 to the Present, The Free Press, New 
York, 1977,278 
2. L. Gelb, 'Vietnam: The System Worked', 146. Gelb also main- 
tained that 'Vietnam was not an aberration of the decision- 
making system, but the logical combination of the principles 
that leaders brought with them into it. ' (Gelb and Betts, 
The Irony of Vietnam, 2) 
3. Krasner, 321 
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to convince the world of this 'simple fact'. 
I 
In the last in- 
stance, therefore, American ideologists - Kissinger among them - 
came to see the issue in Vietnam simply as preventing a victory 
by a 'third class... peasant state' over the US. 
2 
Self-delusion - grounded on the belief in the feasi- 
bility of military solutions - became a dominant trait in US 
policy formulation towards Indochina. The reverse of this lack 
of realism on the American side was the conviction that the 
Vietnamese did not understand the 'realities of the situation'. 
For Kissinger, this absence of 'realism' expressed a more 
general deficiency in the approach-to the outside world charac- 
teristic of the leaders of the 'new nations': 'The West', he 
argued, 
is deeply committed to the notion that the 
real world, as we think of it, is external 
to the observer... [whereas] Other cultures 
that escaped the early impact of Newtonian 
thinking have retained and expanded the 
essentially pre-Newtonian view that the 
real world is almost completely internal to 
the observer... Empirical reality has a much 
different significance for the new countries 
... for in an important sense they never went 
through the process of discovering it. 3 
The importance of these statements lies not only in the theoretical 
field, as an instance of Kissinger's astonishingly little under- 
standing of the sociology and history of the so-called 'new nations' 
but also - and most significantly - in the field of policy-imple- 
mentation. Views like these played a part in the US approach to 
Vietnam; it is therefore not surprising that Kissinger could not 
understand 'that a fourth-rate military power like North Vietnam 
doesn't have a breaking point' and that he, like his predecessors, 
1. See The Pentagon Papers (as published by The New York Times), 
Bantam, New York, 1971,256 
2. Kissinger, 'What Should We Do Now ? ', Look, August 9 1966,29 
3. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, 327-8. He repeated these 
claims in a 1966 essay on 'Domestic Structure and Foreign 
policy', where he argued that the attitudes towards 'empirical 
reality' of Third World societies 'which do not share our 
cultural mode' enable them to 'alter reality by influencing 
the perspective of the observer -a process which we are largely 




still longed, in 1969, for 'decisive' military actions to destroy, 
once and for all, the will of the North Vietnamesel The fact 
that the Hanoi leadership and the NLF in the South did not accept 
his assessment of 'empirical reality' made them appear to 
Kissinger as 'obnoxious', 'fanatics', 'maddening', 'almost mani- 
acal', and led him to believe that 'lack of ambiguity was pre- 
cluded by Vietnamese culture', which was, rather, a breeding 
ground for 'opaqueness' and 'inherent suspiciousness', giving its 
opponents 'an infinite capacity for intrigue'. 
2 
In spite of the fact that Kissinger took time to 
study the political and military aspects of the war, and that 
he travelled to South East Asia on several occasions and made 
three research tours of Vietnam before assuming office, he shows 
in his writings only a superficial understanding of the nature 
of the war and of the likely nature of the peace. In his Memoirs 
he still treated the war as purely a case of 'communist aggression' 
perpetuating the discredited claim that North Vietnam had invaded 
the south without provocation. 
3 And yet he at least grasped that, 
in Vietnam, 'military victories' were meaningless without a poli- 
tical corollary; also, he realized that the South Vietnamese 
government had little popular support, and could not compete 
politically with its adversaries. The US had been 'unable... to 
create a political structure that could survive military oppositior 
to Hanoi after we withdraw'; 
4 
but despite these drawbacks 
1. See R. Morris, Uncertain Greatness. Henry Kissinger and Americar 
Foreign Policy, 7: 7- 
2. See Kissinger, The White House Years, 259,1320,1441 
3. ibid, 230-5. Kissinger, who should have been aware of the true 
record of events as revealed in the Pentagan. Papers, neverthelesE 
wrote that 'In my view, our entry into the war had been the pro- 
duct not of a militarist psychosis but of a naive idealism that 
wanted to set right all the world's ills and believed American 
goodwill supplied its own efficacy. ' 
(230) 
4. Kissinger, 'The Viet Nam Negotiations', Foreign Affairs, Vol 47, 
No 2, January 1969,230. In this widely praised but actually 
quite confusing article Kissinger emphasized one of the 'cardi- 
nal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not 
lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win'. (214) 
According to this view, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces 
were winning the war by 1969; however, Kissinger went on to argue 
that the American military position had begun to improve sub- 
stantially, and that, 'As a result, we have achieved our minimur 
objective: Hanoi is unable to gain a military victory'. 
(230) 
He did not explain - as Hersh rightly points out - how denying. 
Hanoi a military victory was a measure of 'success' in view of 
his previously expressed conviction that Hanoi did not need a 
military victory in order to win. 
(See S. M. Hersh, Kissinger: 
The Price of Power, 48) 
__ J 
Kissinger - as Nixon - was determined that the war should somehow 
be ended according to American terms, for what was involved in 
Vietnam was 'confidence in American promises'. 
Nixon, too, had some definite ideas about how the wax 
in Vietnam should be ended, and they excluded a settlement that 
would relinquish the Thieu regime's monopoly of power, for he 
strongly believed in the need to preserve South Vietnam within 
the US sphere of influence. 
2 
Both he and Kissinger came to admit 
that a military solution was not a viable option at acceptable 
costs; on the other hand, they were not prepared to compromise 
on the central issue of sharing power in the Saigon government 
with the NLF. Thus the strategy they devised aimed at a 
'negotiated' settlement that would preserve the existing Saigon 
regime's power and sovereignty intact, by forcing Hanoi to accept 
US terms through the escalation of military violence, and by 
getting the Soviet and Chinese leaderships to put pressure on 
their allies to make concessions that would allow the US to with- 
draw 'in a manner reflecting a national decision and not a rout', 
3 
leaving Thieu at the head of a friendly government in South 
Vietnam. This strategy was formulated in the face of an inter- 
agency study (NSSM-1) commissioned in early 1969, which implicitly 
reached the conclusion that the US could neither gain a military 
victory nor withdraw from Vietnam leaving the South Vietnamese 
in a position to defend themselves. 
4 
In Gelb's words, the needed 
reassessment could only have come from 'the upper echelons of 
the executive branch' (which in this case meant Nixon and Kissinger 
but 'these men were locked into their perspectives'. 
5 
The enormous obstacles blocking the way of such a 
strategy - which again, as in the past, put its 
faith in the 
power of military technology - did not totally escape Kissinger, 
though he was reluctant to tackle the political problems straight 
on. This would have required recognition of the fact that the US 
involvement had been deeply flawed all along - an admission that 
1. Kissinger, 'The Vietnam Negotiations', 219 
2. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 349 
3. Kissinger, The White House Years, 228,298 
4. The full text of NSSM-1 is printed in The Congressional Record, 
May 10 1972,4975-5066 
5. Gelb and Betts, 200 
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was too damaging to Kissinger's case for an 'honorable' withdrawal. 
The most he was prepared to accept was that the Thieu government 
did not object to this or that clause of an agreement but to the 
fact of a compromise: 'They preferred to continue the military 
contest rather than face the political struggle. '1 Yet he believed 
in the need to keep the anti-communist South Vietnamese in power 
with the backing of US threats of military retaliation against 
the North. He was convinced that these assurances of continued 
support, coupled with the 'Vietnamization' program - that had 
massively resupplied the South Vietnamese army before the signing 
of the 'peace agreement' in early 1973 - had given the Thieu 
government enough instruments to withstand the communists' military 
and political challenges. There is enough evidence that suggests 
that Kissinger did not take the view that all he and Nixon had 
done was to buy a 'decent interval' to save face between the US 
pull-out and the inevitable fall of South Vietnam, but that he 
really believed that the South Vietnamese state could be kept 
going more or less indefinitely. 
2 
This conviction shows the 
extent to which Kissinger shared the failings of his predecessors 
in assessing the Vietnamese situation: the willingness to accept 
overoptimistic intelligence estimates, the belief that military 
aid could act as a substitute for politics, and, in sum, the 
propensity towards self-delusion that led him and Nixon to formu- 
late a strategy which events proved to be deeply flawed in at 
least four regards: 
- It failed to take account of the capacity of the North Viet- 
namese to adapt successfully even to an all-out war of de- 
struction. 
- It overestimated the importance of Soviet and Chinese influence 
on the North Vietnamese. 
- Its implementation demanded an unprecedented 
degree of secrecy - 
to protect it from mounting domestic criticism - that could 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 132+ 
2. A relevant source is the book by Frank Snepp, a former senior 
CIA officer in South Vietnam, Decent Interval. The American 
Debacle in Vietnam and the Fall of Saigon, Allen Lane, London, 
1980. Also Kissinger, The White House Years, 1301-1470; 
A. Roberts, 'Kissinger and the Structuring of US Foreign Policy' 
political Studies, Vol 29, No 4,1981,629-30 
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not - in the conditions of American democratic practices - be 
maintained over the long run. 
- Finally, it did not involve any serious consideration of the 
crucial problem of the war: the reluctance of the South Viet- 
namese population to fight on behalf of the ruling regime. 
The Hanoi leadership realized that the Paris agreement 
of January 1973 not only gave legitimacy to the NLF's 'Provisional 
Revolutionary Government', but also required Thieu to compete 
at the political level, thus exposing the narrowness of his base 
of popular support. 
1 
Kissinger himself recognized that 'Hanoi 
was indeed [in 1973] instructing its cadres in the South for a 
long period of political competition'; 
2 
but Nixon's statement of 
January 23 1973, that the US recognized Thieu's regime as 'the 
sole legitimate government' in South Vietnam3 carried the seeds 
of a new war. With their private commitments to Saigon and their 
public misinterpretations of the Paris accords, Nixon and Kissinger 
encouraged Thieu to ignore the terms of the agreement, knowing 
that the US would protect him from the consequences by providing 
the resources to keep his army in operation. As Porter puts it: 
'Merely by complying with the spirit and the letter of the agree- 
ment it had signed, the Nixon administration could have helped 
to foster a political settlement and save hundreds of thousands 
of Vietnamese from death or maiming in a prolonged war. '4 To be 
sure, such a course would have implied a significant shift in 
policy, one that had been made doubly difficult after four 
further years of trying to 'win' the war. 
Nixon and Kissinger acted as if American 'credibility' 
demanded the vindication of the disastrous policies the US had 
1. The text of the Agreement is reproduced in the Weekly Compi- 
lation of Presidential Documents, Washington DC, January 29 
1973,45- 
2. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1470 (emphasis in the original 
Nowhere in his Memoirs does Kissinger discuss adequately the 
question whether the concessions he finally made to the North 
Vietnamese in January 1973 could have been agreed earlier, nor 
does he address the issue whether the precarious 'peace' gained 
in the Paris agreement was worth the extension of the war for 
four more years. 
3. The New York Times, January 24 1973 
4. G. Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and 
the Paris Agreement, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1975,185 
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Pursued from Eisenhower to Johnson, whereas what was in fact 
needed in order to restore the US government's credibility at 
home and abroad was precisely to change course in Vietnam, accept 
the realities of the situation, and shift the American role from 
military patronage of Saigon to promoter of a political settle- 
ment. True, Nixon and Kissinger inherited the Vietnam war, but 
not only did they accept the legacy, they also extended the war 
to Cambodia, turning that nation's countryside into a massive, 
dedicated and effective anti-American rural base. Kissinaer's 
responsibility for this outcome was high, as he personally chose 
the most ambitious strategic option for carrying the US war into 
Cambodia and got it approved by the NSC's senior review group 
in September 1970. But his failure in Indochina transcended 
the collapse of a single policy. It went to the heart of his 
approach to the Third World and of his views on how US interests 
should be conceived and upheld. 
1. W. Shawcross, Sideshow: 
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This may have been just a politician's public relations exercise, 
but it is clear that the 'Nixon Doctrine' implicitly downgraded 
the possibility of successful military threats against US allies 
and interests materializing in the 'Third World'. Two crucial 
points were unclear, however: first, was there any justification 
for believing that the threat to traditional US notions of 
stability in the 'Third World' had been substantially reduced ? 
And, secondly, given that the 'Nixon Doctrine' committed the US 
to preserving its worldwide interests, avoiding as far as possible 
direct American involvement, did this conceal a drift towards 
nuclear defence or an acceptance of greater risks of local (con- 
ventional) defeat ? 
The 'Nixon Doctrine' was fashioned by a number of dubious 
ideas about international reality, including the beliefs that, one, 
challenges posed to US allies in the 'Third World' could be met 
mainly through the mobilization of their own resources (with 
American support in the form of arms transfers and economic assis- 
tance) and, two, that the likelihood of such threats was low. But 
none of these propositions was self-evident, for there was no 
reason to expect that political turbulence and military insurgen- 
cies affecting US 'interests' in Asia and elsewhere would diminish. 
Moreover, the Doctrine's stated confidence in the US allies' ability 
to defend themselves was in a number of cases - as Vietnam and 
Cambodia showed - out of all proportion to their capabilities; yet 
there was no change in Nixon's and Kissinger's high estimation of 
the inherent importance of preserving stability and blocking 
revolutionary upheavals whenever these threats appeared. Thus the 
issues of interests, commitments, alliances, and the level of US 
involvement - all intrinsically political - remained unresolved, 
and Nixon and Kissinger never accepted that, as a result of a 
lower level of conventional involvement, the risks of stalemate 
or defeat for the US and its allies would be greater. 
Nixon and Kissinger argued that 'The challenge is not 
merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burdens, or 
change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into 
question our very objectives. '1 The war in Indochina, however, 
had shown that it was the US's foreign policy objectives that 
needed to be re-assessed in the light of the catastrophic course 
1. R. Nixon, Building for Peace, 16-7 (emphasis mine 
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of American opposition to nationalism and revolution all over 
the underprivileged areas of the globe. The alternative of re- 
placing direct US military intervention with the militarization 
of 'client' regimes - Israel, Iran, Guatemala, Brazil - not only 
implied an abandonment of politics as the guiding source of foreign 
policy, but also placed the US once again squarely in the familiar 
dilemma of having to choose between reneging on an unwise commit- 
ment to the perceived detriment of its global 'credibility', or 
becoming embroiled in new political and military 'quagmires'. 
The US, the Doctrine proclaimed, would help the self-reliant. But 
the self-reliant were unlikely to require help, and the view that 
the US would help where it made a real difference and where it 
was in her interest to do so did not, to quote Vincent, 'make the 
choice between a bad case for assistance and a worse one any 
easier (the good one not requiring assistance). 
' Rather than 
withdrawing because certain commitments were considered unsound, 
Nixon and Kissinger determined that the US should extricate itself 
only after unsound commitments had been made sound2 - usually by 
'stabilizing' client regimes through military aid. Thus the 
analysis of political alternatives to existing commitments and 
the redefinition of security interests were sacrificed in favour 
of military incrementalism. 
It has been argued by Sorley3 that the arms transfer 
policies of the Nixon administration were a 'brilliant rearguard 
action', conducted in the face of a wave of disengagement sentiment, 
that sought to 'retain as much influence for the United States in 
world affairs as was possible and to use that influence to help 
shape new relationships that would be more conducive to peace and 
security'. This, however, can be questioned on several grounds. 
In the first place, the author makes it appear as if the only 
alternative left to US decision-makers to preserve American in- 
fluence in the Third World after the Vietnam debacle was a policy 
of indirect military involvement. But in fact there were other 
1. R. J. Vincent, 'Kissinger's System of Foreign Policy', The Year 
Book of World Affairs, Stevens & Sons, London, 1977,19 
2. J. L. S. Girling, 'Kissingerism: The Enduring Problems', Inter- 
national Affairs, Vol 51, No 3, July 1975,336-7 
3. Lewis Sorley, Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis, 
The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1983,30 
4. ibid, 183 
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options of a political nature - in the Middle East and Latin 
America, for instance - that did not require the obsessive con- 
cern with the militarization of the Third World that characterized 
the administration's military assistance programmes. 
I 
Secondly, 
the argument that these policies contributed to 'peace' and 
'security' has little empirical foundation. What the Nixon- 
Kissinger doctrine of 'self-reliance' did was to strengthen 
regional 'patrons' like Iran, Israel, and Brazil, encouraging them 
to 'defend themselves' against either non-nuclear external threats 
or internal unrest: the latter, on a number of occasions, being 
the usual target. Thus the massive US arms supplies coupled with 
more effective military training not only expanded the coercive 
('defence') capacity of Third World regimes, but also, as Girling 
puts it, 'made them more likely to use force, rather than per- 
suasion, in dealing with the threat to "national security" posed 
by endemic ethnic, religious, regional or class tension and con- 
flict'. 2 In their pursuit of 'stability' Nixon and Kissinger were 
not overly concerned with the fact that internal discontent might 
well be justified and should be conciliated rather than suppressed. 
Their efforts to expand the military capabilities of 'friendly' 
Third World regimes, rather than contribute to 'security', in- 
tensified the trend towards more authoritarian behaviour by 
militarized regimes domestically and also their propensity to 
use force against external adversaries. 
The policy of relying on militarized clients to preserve 
'regional security' led to a series of costly blunders and failures 
In the Middle East, it set the stage for the October 1973 war 
and for the Shah's militaristic and dictatorial excesses, that 
sowed the seeds of revolution. In Latin America, it strengthened 
the forces of authoritarianism and repression throughout the 
hemisphere, and determined the administration's hostility to any 
sign of change. In Africa, the mirage of 'stability' and the 
refusal to consider alternative policies committed the US to 
fostering both the white-minority regimes and the Portuguese 
presence in the region, with the administration moving to 'stifle 
any criticism of Portugal's colonial role in Africa by more liberal 
1. See Appendix (Figures 1-2) of this study 
2. Girling, 'Kissingerism', 342 
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members of NATO, such as Norway and Canada, a strategy which 
[would] in fact enable a more silent and cohesive coordination 
of aid to Portugal'. 
1 
In all these cases, short-term military 
'security' was bought at the price of a long-term increase in 
the underlying political tensions, and an intensification of the 
risks of even more destructive wars. 
Policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict were parti- 
cularly misguided, with tragic results for all peoples in the 
region. They were based on a blind reliance on Israel's military 
supremacy, a systematic underestimation of the Arab states' 
capabilities, and a total lack of concern for the demands of the 
Palestinian national movement. Kissinger's aim was to preserve 
the post-1967 status quo by the threat of Israeli military re- 
taliation, for in his view 'the longer the stalemate continued 
the more obvious would it become that the Soviet Union had failed 
to deliver what the Arabs wanted... Sooner or later, if we kept 
our nerve, this would force a reassessment of even radical Arab 
policy. '2 He argued that 'until some Arab state showed a willing- 
ness to separate from the Soviets', the US had 'no reason to 
modify [its] policy', 
3 but it was totally unnecessary to wait 
until the aftermath of the October 1973 war to accommodate Egypt 
within the US system of alliances in the area, for it should have 
been clear at the time that, after Nasser's death, Sadat had 
moved decisively to implement two policies: peace with Israel and 
the conversion of Egypt to an American client state. 
' Kissinger, 
1. US House of Representatives, US Business Involvement in Southern 
Africa. Part I, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, USGPO, Washing- 
ton DC, 1972,286. The Nixon-Kissinger policies towards Africa 
were based on the premise that 'The whites are here to stay and 
the only way that constructive change can come about is through 
them. ' (The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa, 66). This assess. 
ment included not only the Portuguese, but also the white regimes 
in Rhodesia and South Africa, and it goes a long way toward ex- 
plaining the haphazard and generally hostile nature of the US's 
responses to both the collapse of the Pfotuguese empire, and to 
the black peoples' attempts to transform their conditions of 
life under white minority rule. 
2. Kissinger, The White House Years, 176,1279. Also, Years of 
Upheaval, 19 
3. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1291 
4. On this point, see the excellent analysis by Noam Chomsky in 
his book The Fateful Triangle: The US, Israel and the Palesti- 
nians, Pluto Press, London, 1983,64-70. Also, Towards a New 
Cold War, 184-5 
.f °- -- _ 
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however, completely missed Sadat's 'signals', which included, at 
the very least, the following: (a) the offering, in February 1971, 
of a full peace treaty to Israel on the pre-June 1967 borders, 
with recognized borders and security guarantees; (b) a massive 
purge, in May 1972, of pro-Soviet elements in the Egyptian govern- 
ment; (c) an Egyptian military intervention to crush a pro-Soviet 
communist coup in Sudan in July 1972; (d) the expulsion, the same 
month, of 15,000 Soviet military advisers and experts from Egypt; 
(e) finally, the opening of a 'secret channel' to the White House 
in April 1972. But K±ssinger's reactions to all this were, as he 
puts it, 'largely tactical'; he wanted to 'continue to bring home 
to Sadat the futility of his course... '1 
The truth is, however, that Nixon and Kissinger pushed 
Sadat to the wall by their total misreading of the diplomatic 
situation, as well as their insistence on interpreting the Arab- 
Israeli conflict through the prism of the 'Soviet challenge' 
theory of international conflict. Between 1969 and 1973 Kissinger 
played a crucial role in undermining all efforts to break the 
diplomatic impasse through negotiations with the Arabs, convinced 
as he was that Israel's power was unchallengeable. 
2 
All warnings 
from US Ambassadors in the area, from US oil companies, from 
Sadat himself, and even leading Jewish figures, that if negotia- 
tions were not seriously carried forward there would be a disastrous 
war were disregarded. 
3 
In the end, Egypt and Syria went to war, 
a war during which the US called a strategic nuclear alert, and 
that created - according to Blechman and Hart - 'a serious threat 
of military conflict between the United States and the Soviet 
Union'. 
4 
Another study alleges that Israel also threatened to 
use nuclear weapons in the early stages of the war, in order to 
compel the US to re-supply the Israeli Defence Forces with massive 
transfers of conventional weapons. 
5 
For Kissinger, however, this 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1294 
2. _, 373-7,560-93,1280-1300 
3. See Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, 66. Also US Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Multinational Oil Corporations and US 
Foreign Policy, USGPO, Washington DC, January 2 1975, Part III, 
Section VII 
4. B. M. Blechman and D. M. Hart, 'The Political Utility of Nuclear 
Weapons', International Security, Vol 7, No 1,1982,132-56 
5. See A. Perlmutter, M. Handel, U. Bar-Joseph, Two Minutes over 
Baghdad, Vallentine, Mitchell & Co., London, 1982,19 
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dangerous conflict, which led to the oil embargo and to unpre- 
cedented Arab successes on the battlefield, demonstrated the 
essential correctness of his strategy, which now culminated 'in 
an unexpected showdown'. 
1 But the fact that this war was needed 
to make Nixon and Kissinger understand Sadat's willingness, in- 
deed eagerness, to transform Egypt into an American client-state 
only showed their ignorance of the political context of the 
Middle East, as well as their arrogant reliance on force as a 
substitute for politics in the Third World. 
Iran, another 'showpiece' of the Nixon Doctrine, had 
received $1.8 billion in US military grant-aid between 1950 and 
1970. In the following six years, under Kissinger's stewardship, 
American arms sales totalled $12.1 billion, of which 80% was for 
equipment. 
2 
This massive programme helped to discredit the Shah 
at home, to stir Iranian antagonisms toward the US, and completely 
to distort the economic development of the country: 'There was 
the overconcentration of power and wealth, wild inflation, luxury- 
centered consumption, debilitating corruption, the military's 
priority over civilian needs... and the rising food-import bill. '3 
But for Kissinger, the Shah was a 'pillar of stability' and 'a 
dedicated reformer'; he was indeed 'authoritarian', but 'This was 
in keeping with the traditions, perhaps even the necessities of 
his society'. His overthrow'had little to do with his purchases 
of military equipment's, for it cannot be said that the Shah's 
arms purchases 'diverted resources from economic development'. 
6 
The Shah's problem was that he 'modernized too rapidly', and 'did 
not adapt his political institutions sufficiently to the economic 
and social changes he had brought about' .7 The US 'could have 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 468 
2. B. Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in 
Iran, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980,128 
3. ibid, 145 
4. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1258-9 
5. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 670 
6. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1260 
7. ibid, 1259. In his analysis of the Shah's fall, Kissinger again 
castigates the assumptions of the theory that economic growth 
stimulates political stability, arguing that 'in underdeveloped 
countries economic growth tends to have the opposite effect; it 
compounds political unrest'. 
(1260). As noted earlier, this 
totally contradicts Kissinger's present approach to the challenge 
to US traditional policies in Central America. 
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urged the Shah to do that', but, said Kissinger, 'I am not sure 
that we would have known what to sa 
1 
y'. This is hardly surprising, 
for the facts are that the US had brought him back to power in 
1953 - overthrowing a regime that did not confirm Kissinger's 
theses on the dictatorial 'needs' of Iranian society - trained 
the secret police (SAVAK), and supplied the military and economic 
aid that perpetuated his rule. The factual record - to which 
Kissinger makes few and superficial references - shows conclusively 
that the Shah's 'reformist' policies were disastrous for a large 
part of the Iranian people both in the rural and urban areas, that 
enormous resources were squandered in support of the Shah's martial 
extravaganza, and that he created an economy that perpetuated, 
sometimes intensifying, impoverishment among the underprivileged 
sectors of Iranian society - the vast majority who rebelled 
against his rule in 1978-79. 
If the Nixon-Kissinger policies toward Iran provided 
an example vif the dangers of blindly supporting an autocrat for 
reasons of 'regional security' - ignoring the evidence of wide- 
spread corruption, social dislocation, and repression, their 
policies toward Latin America illustrated the US preference for 
authoritarian solutions to the problem of instability in the 
Third World. In August 1969, a Presidential Mission, headed by 
Nelson Rockefeller presented to Nixon its Report on the Americas, 
which codified the basic principles of the administration's 
approach to the area. Its fundamental premise was that 'a new type 
of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major 
force for constructive social change in the American republics'. 
Motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, 
and a stagnant political order, 'the new military man is prepared 
to adapt his authoritarian tradition to the goals of social and 
economic progress'. In view of this 'reality', the US goal should 
be to 'work with them' in their efforts 'to bring education and 
better standards of living to their people while avoiding anarchy 
and violent revolution'. 
2 
But this was not at All what was 
happening, or could be expected to happen. In the first place, 
the 'new' Latin American military regimes of the 1960s and 70s 
1. See Kissinger, For the Record, 177 
2. The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, Quadrangle Books, 
Chicago, 1969,32-3,61 
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originated as a dictatorial response to processes of democrati- 
zation and popular mobilization that had endangered the privileges 
of traditionally dominant social and economic sectors. Their 
'novelty' did not reside in their methods or policies - which 
continued to be repressive and oriented to satisfy the interests 
of a minority - but in the fact that, this time, the military 
institution itself assumed control of the state, and that they 
developed a legitimating ideology founded on the notion of 
'national security' as equivalent to 'development'. 
I 
In the second 
place, the nature of these regimes made it imperative for the 
military to adopt anti-popular policies in the social and economic 
realms: anti-egalitarian, elitist, and openly favourable to 
capital - particularly foreign capital - rather than labour. 
2 
The Rockefeller Report's conclusions and the policies 
that flowed from it, derived from the highly dubious proposition 
that 
Democracy is a very subtle and difficult 
problem for most of the other countries 
in the hemisphere... Few of these countries 
have achieved the sufficiently advanced 
economic and social systems required to 
support a consistently democratic system. 
For many of these societies, therefore, 
the question is less one of democracy or 
a lack of it than it is simply of orderly 
ways of getting along. 3 
Quite apart from the fact that such an assessment totally over- 
looks the role of the US in repeatedly stifling democracy in the 
hemisphere - in Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Dominican 
Republic in 1965, Chile in 1973 - the idea that many Latin American 
nations are not yet 'ready' to live in freedom is contradicted 
by the realities of our history, the long spells of democratic 
rule in several countries - economically and socially diverse - 
and the arduous struggle for liberty and democratization - against 
both internal and external opposition - that is a common and con- 
stant factor in the contemporary history of all Central and South 
American countries. 
1. See G. Arriagada and M. A. Garreton, 'America Latina a la Hora 
de las Doctrinas de la Seguridad Nacional', in M. A. Perez (ed), 
Las Fuerzas Armadas en la Sociedad Civil, CISEC, Santiago, 1978, 
1273-229 
2. M. E. Carnanza, Fuerzas Armadas Estado de Exce cion en America 
Latina, Siglo XXI, Mexico, 1978,68-89 
3. The Rockefeller Report on the Americas, 58 
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Kissinger has argued that Allende's electoral victory 
represented 'a break with Chile's long democratic history', for 
he 'would become President not through an authentic expression 
of majority will but through a fluke of the Chilean political 
system'. 
1 
It is true that in 1970 Allende obtained 36% of the 
vote, but Kissinger himself recognizes that the programme of the 
Christian Democratic Party - which got almost as many votes as 
Allende's left-wing coalition - 'differed from Allende's largely 
on procedural points... '; 
2 
in other words, it was also radical 
in its political nature, and the support that both Allende and 
Tomic (the Christian Democratic candidate) received showed that 
the Chilean people voted overwhelmingly in favour of profound 
reforms of their political and socio-economic systems. For Kissinger 
however, Allende's electoral triumph was 'by definition... the last 
democratic election' in Chile, 
3 
a pronouncement completely at odds 
not only with the fact that democratic elections continued under 
Allende, but also with the results of these elections, which con- 
firmed on several occasions the massive popular support for a 
policy of reform, with the left-wing coalition's share of the vote 
actually increasing. 
4 
According to Kissinger, the US's attempts, in 1970, 
forcefully to prevent Allende's accession to power amounted to 
no more than a 'haphazard and amateurish exploration of a military 
coup, designed to bring about not military rule but a new electoral 
contest... '5 He also holds that 'There was no American involvement 
in coup plotting afterwards. f6 Both assertions are totally dis- 
proved by the official documentation published in the US, that 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 654 
2. ibid, 665 
3. ibid, 655 
4. In the Municipal elections of April 1971, Allende obtained 
50.2%, the Christian Democrats 27%, and the extreme-right 20%. 
In the Congressional elections of March 1973, Allende's 'Popular 
Unity' alliance gained six seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 
two seats in the Senate, with 43% of the total vote: a remark- 
able and unprecedented achievement in the Chilean context, and 
at a time of deep political and economic crisis to a signifi- 
cant extent induced by US pressures and the openly anti-demo- 
cratic practices of the right-wing conspirators. 
5. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 377 
6.1=, 377,382 
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shows that US security agencies, between September 1970 and 
September 1973, not only instigated a military coup in Chile, 
but also participated in its design and organization, and helped 
to orientate the actions of the new military government. 
I 
The 
'haphazard and amateurish' conspiracy of 1970, on the other hand, 
led to the assassination of the Chilean Army's Commander in Chief, 
General Rene Schneider. A 'new election' could hardly have been 
the conspirators' purpose. 
2 
The hostility towards Allende and the intervention in 
Chilean politics summarized all the prejudices and conservative 
ideological assumptions of the Nixon administration's foreign 
policy in the Third World: the fear of change, the struggle 
against nationalism and social reform, the use of the military 
as an instrument to repress popular demands and to protect foreign 
interests, with devastating consequences for the countries in- 
volved. Considering what has happened in Chile since 1973, 
Kissinger's view that 'the change of government in Chile was on 
balance favourable - even from the point of view of human 
1. See Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 
USGPO, Washington DC, 1975,225-5 ; US Senate, 93rd Congress, 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 
(2 vols), USGPO, 1973; US Senate, 94th Congress, Select Com- 
mittee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to In- 
telligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, 
USGPO, 1975. In his Memoirs, Kissinger argues that 'A sus- 
picious Senate investigating Committee was forced to admit 
that it could find "no evidence" of American complicity' in 
Allende's downfall (Years of Upheaval, 374), but he is re- 
ferring only to the last collections of documents mentioned 
earlier, and his interpretation of the Committee's views is 
distorted, to say the least. 
2. For a detailed analysis of the Nixon Administration's role in 
the overthrow of Allende, see Joan Garces, Allende la Ex- 
periencia Chilena, Ariel, Barcelona, 1976,65-112; A. Uribe, 
Le Livre Noir de l'Intervention Americaine au Chili, Le Seuil, 
Paris, 1974. To be sure, US actions were not the only factor 
that determined Allende's tragic fate; the mistakes of the 
'Popular Unity' coalition, and the total opposition of all 
sectors privileged under the 'established order' in Chile, 
also played a crucial part in his government's downfall. For 
my purposes, however, the important point to be emphasized 
is that the US's anti-Allende intervention began even before 
he took office, because he represented the possibility of 
political and social changes that were seen with displeasure 
in Washington. Allende, it must be added, made efforts to 
ensure that his government's relations with the US were cordial 
and based on mutual respect, but to no avail. 
(See A. Uribe, 
'Chili: etrange defense de la liberte', Le Monde Diplomatique, 
8 decembre 1979,8-9) 
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rights', 
1 demonstrates an almost indecent disregard for the facts. 
The militarization of American foreign policy during 
the Nixon-Kissinger years only accentuated the influence of the 
basic ideological premises that have determined the US approach 
to Latin America, Asia, and Africa after World War II. However, 
the 'Nixon Doctrine', in its strategic implications, revitalized 
the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of policy, and this 
was a relatively new development after the Kennedy-Johnson Third 
World 'counterinsurgency' policies. The objective of reducing the 
US conventional involvement, while preserving intact American 
worldwide commitments, meant an increase in the US reliance on 
the use of nuclear weapons to protect its interests in a crisis. 
To be sure, the 'Nixon Doctrine' did not exhaust alternative 
military responses farther down the scale from nuclear war; my 
point is, rather, that in reducing the possibility of use of US 
troops in a future case of 'resistance to aggression', it impli- 
citly had to rely for its credibility on a suggestion of willing- 
ness to invoke nuclear war. 
2 
To put it differently, the total 
thrust of the Nixon-Kissinger defence policy was to increase 
reliance on nuclear weapons as a substitute for conventional 
military means, a step totally in line with the ideological 
tendency to search for technical solutions to political problems. 
1. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 411. On the political and socio- 
economic effects of military rule in Chile after 1973, see 
p. O'Brien and J. Roddick, Chile: The Pinochet Decade, Latin 
American Bureau, London, 1973 




THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
KISSINGER AND THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
I have argued so far that the Kissinger-Nixon foreign 
policy design was decisively influenced by a conservative-realist 
ideology that derives from two key factors: a conception of 
politics as 'technique' and an inadequate understanding of the 
nature of the social element in political life and of its impact 
upon historic change. Kissinger's conservatism was informed by 
a conviction of the need to conduct an active policy, which allowed 
for flexibility and tactical adjustments, in order to combat the 
twin challenges to US hegemony represented by the growth of Soviet 
power and the rise of Third World nationalism. His - and Nixon's - 
fundamental objective was to preserve the privileged American 
position in the international system on the basis of the co-option 
of adversaries - through the policy of detente - and of the im- 
plementation of a 'new' regional security policy - the Nixon 
Doctrine - that relied on the activities of client states to 
maintain 'stability'. 
I have tried to show the practical relevance of these 
ideological assumptions on the formulation and operationalization 
of the Kissinger-Nixon foreign policy design towards the US main 
adversaries and in the Third World. It is now my intention to 
consider the effects of the conservative-realist ideology on the 
evolution of US nuclear strategy - which is here understood as 
'an activity consciously studied, analyzed and practised'1 ac- 
cording to certain political conceptions of the utility of 
military force, and, specifically, nuclear weapons, to serve the 
ends of state policy. My definition therefore stresses the fact - 
to be discussed later - that the way nuclear strategy has evolved 
is closely related to a view of politics, and that only by under- 
standing the nature of this view of politics is it possible to 
discover the roots of the technological distortion in this area 
1. M. Howard, 'The Relevance of Traditional Strategy', in The 
Causes of War and Other Essays, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 
8 19877787 
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Of US military policy and also to clarify what kind of 'order' 
the 'nuclear order' is. 
My main point will be that there is a crucial paradox 
in the way the epistemological presuppositions of conservative- 
realism affects nuclear strategy: on one side - and despite the 
constructivistic1 foundations of the notion of politics as 
'technique' - the theory of deterrence accepts the basic political 
irrationality of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy; but, 
on the other side, this conception of politics pushes nuclear 
strategy towards a continuous and relentless search for 'technical' 
solutions to the dilemmas of deterrence. To put it differently, 
the 'technological infatuation' characteristic of US nuclear 
strategy is the result of an ideological belief in the possibility 
of solving political problems through technical means. Thus, even 
though deterrence rests on the threat of political annihilation, 
the notion of politics as 'technique' that characterizes conser- 
vative-realism constantly reinforces the tendencies that make the 
materialization of that threat more likely. In what follows, I 
will trace the development of nuclear strategy in the US - and 
Kissinger's role in it - up until the period of the Nixon ad- 
ministration, as a preliminary step to discussing the nature of 
the nuclear order, the perversion of (political) relevance in 
nuclear strategy, and the impact these processes have had, and 
continue to have, upon US foreign policy. 
The political use of nuclear strategy as an instrument 
of US foreign policy must be seen as the expression of a certain 
conception of politics, which determines a permanent unwillingness 
to accept the existence of a nuclear 'stalemate'. Discussions on 
'deterrence', therefore, make little sense unless they are placed 
within the context of: (a) the actual evolution of war plans, and 
(b) the efforts to give political utility to the nuclear arsenals 
as an instrument of power in an age of revolution. 
Even though it is basically correct to say that for the 
1. I use the term 'constructivism' in the sense given to it by 
F. A. Hayek, as a conception according to which man not only 
designs and creates the different institutional 'orders' in 
which his social existence develops, but he can also alter 
them at will. See 'The Errors of Constructivism', in New 
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History 
of Ideas, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1978,3-22 
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greater part of the nuclear age, Western strategic thought at 
the academic level 'has focused on deterrence and other means 
of avoiding strategic nuclear war', and that, at least until ten 
years ago, little thought had been given 'to the conduct of 
nuclear war in the event that deterrence failed', 
1 the fact is 
that, at the operational level, the US has always (since 1945) 
had plans for the practical implementation, if need be, of nuclear 
war. 
2 
True, 'target lists' have usually received more attention 
than war aims, and existing forces have on occasion - or perhaps 
always - been inadequate to the tasks set them, but the question 
of what to do if deterrence fails 'has received a great deal of 
attention (by the military-technical apparatus) for a very long 
time'. 3 The available evidence tends to suggest that at this 
(operational) level - which is not that of 'nuclear theology' - 
premiums have always been placed on the refinement of weapons 
systems, and nuclear war has never been considered 'unthinkable'. 
4 
The US has never adhered to a doctrine of 'mutually 
assured destruction' - in the sense of accepting nuclear stability 
based on 'parity' - and the search has continued throughout the 
nuclear era for ways to preserve or restore some kind of meaningful 
'superiority' over the USSR in the nuclear field and, of course, 
to instrumentalize politically the operational threat of nuclear 
weapons. The evolution of US nuclear strategy has not only been 
related to changes in technology, but also to alterations in the 
political environment and to perceptions of the character of 
1. D. Ball, Can Nuclear War be Controlled ?, Adelphi Paper No 169, 
IISS, London, Autumn 1981,1 
2. These are discussed by A. L. Friedberg, 'A History of the US 
"Strategic Doctrine": 1945 to 1980', The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol 3, No 3,1980,37-71 
3. ibid, 45 
4. As stated in a 1948 'Top Secret' NSC Memorandum on 'United 
States Policy on Atomic Weapons': 'The United States has 
nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of 
raising the question, in either a well defined or an equivocal 
decision that atomic weapons would be used in the event of war. 
An advance decision that atomic weapons will be used, if ne- 
cessary, would presumably be of some use to the military plan- 
ners. Such a decision does not appear essential, however, since 
the military can and will, in its absence, plan to exploit every 
capability in the form of men, materials resources and science 
this country has to offer. (Etzold & Gaddis, 340-41, emphasis 
mine). In other words, the operational establishment would 
continue to prepare for nuclear war even without an explicit 
public political decision on the matter. 
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strategic strength in the international system and the respective 
global positions of the superpowers. 
1 
During the period of 
American atomic monopoly it was officially decided that 'in the 
event of hostilities, the National Military Establishment must 
be ready to utilize promptly and effectively all appropriate 
means available, including atomic weapons, in the interest of 
national security and must therefore plan accordingly'. 
2 
The 
possession of a 'super' bomb was regarded (in 1950) as possibly 
'a decisive factor if properly used', 
3 
and was quickly developed. 
From this point until the end of the decade capabilities were 
deployed to carry out strikes against the full panoply of targets 
within the Soviet bloc. At this stage the 'massive retaliation' 
strategy 'explained how a new war might be fought during the 
remaining period of grace of patent nuclear superiority', and 
the debate that took place in these years on the possibility of 
'limited' nuclear wars was in fact based on the same premise as 
'massive retaliation': 'that a nuclear strategy could work to the 
advantage of the West. '5 
1. Thus, it is simplistic to argue that 'When changes in speed or 
accuracy of weaponry increased the vulnerability of forces, the 
balance of opinion shifted in favour of counterforce targeting; 
when both sides had forces sufficiently invulnerable that either 
would disarm itself more than its victim in a first strike (the 
situation around the time of SALT I), persuasiveness of MAD was 
at its peak. ' (R. K. Betts, 'Elusive Equivalence: The Political 
and Military Meaning of the Nuclear Balance', in S. Huntington 
(ed), The Strategic Im erative, Bellinger Publishing Co., Cam- 
bridge, Mass, 1982,103)- It was precisely at the time of SALT I 
that the US was developing a new array of weapons systems and a 
'new' nuclear doctrine directed towards the restoration of 
American strategic superiority and the political utility of 
nuclear strategy. The technological factor was only one, among 
others, influencing these doctrinal changes. 
2. Etzold & Gaddis, 343 
3. ibid, 370 (from a January 13 1950 'Top Secret' document). See 
also 343,363 
4. Friedberg, 47 
5. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 90,95. According 
to Morgenthau, 'those conceptions of limiting nuclear war... are 
peculiarly American and are the result of a humanitarian impulse 
within the framework of an utterly inhuman enterprise'. 
('The 
Fallacy of Thinking Conventionally About Nuclear Weapons', in 
D. Carlton and C. Shaerf (eds), Arms Control and Technological 
Innovation, Croom Helm, London, 1977,245). This may be so, but 
it is at least arguable that less altruistic motivations also 
play a role in the debate. This can well be taken as another 
example of the propensity for self-delusion of the 'realists'. 
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The move towards 'flexible response' in the early 1960s 
occurred at a moment when the US enjoyed vast strategic superiority 
(in number and quality of weapons) over the USSR. Basically, the 
strategy of 'flexible response' was an attempt to increase the 
credibility of American nuclear threats by relating them to a 
wider number of possible contingencies, rather than simply 
emphasizing indiscriminate retaliation and all-out war. At the 
strategic nuclear level - as initially formulated by McNamara - 
it was a strategy of second-strike counterforce that required a 
significant upgrading of command and control facilities and the 
establishing in advance of detailed operational plans. 
I 
In this 
sense it incorporated the fundamental legacy of the 'limited 
nuclear war' debate of the 1950s: the belief in the feasibility 
of 'controlling' the nuclear order by improving its technological 
basis. True, McNamara and his aides soon realized that a strategy 
of second strike counterforce that did not provide clear indi- 
cators of 'sufficiency' (how much is enough ?) opened the doors 
to massive budgetary demands from the armed services. These 
demands, however, could not be met at a period when the US 
government was both increasing its involvement in Vietnam and 
trying to implement the costly domestic programmes of Johnson's 
'great society'. As budgetary pressures mounted, defence priorities 
shifted away from strategic offensive and defensive forces to 
those conventional forces required to prosecute the war in South 
East Asia. 
2 At McNamara's urging, proposals by the military for 
major new strategic weapons systems (i. e. ABM, a new advanced 
bomber, Poseidon, and Minuteman III were rejected or simply 
deferred. 
3 
This essentially was the background to McNamara's 
1. See W. W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, Harper & Row, New 
York, 1964,53,74 
2. Defence budgets totalling almost $ 50 billion prior to esca- 
lation in Vietnam rose sharply to approximately $66 billion, 
$73 billion, $75 billion, and $82 billion from Fiscal Year 1966 
to FY 1969. At the same time military expenditures on major 
strategic nuclear forces declined significantly during the 
period from 1965 to 1968 relative to what they had been in the 
early 1960s and would be after Nixon took office. 
(See US De- 
partment of Defense: Statement by the Secretary of Defense C. M. 
Clifford on the 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for FY 
1970-74y USGPO, Washington DC, January 15 1969. Also, J. J. Holst 
Parity, Superiority, or Sufficiency ?, Adelphi Paper No 65, IIS. c 
London, February 1970,31) 
3. H. B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parit : The US and the Strate- 
1c Arms Race, 19 1-1971, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1973, 
284-5 
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declaratory shift from counterforce formulas to an emphasis on 
the 'assured destruction' mission of nuclear forces1 - that is, 
to a policy of 'maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict 
an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or 
combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a surprise first 
strike'. 
2 
This change in declaratory US nuclear policy from 
'city-avoidance' to 'assured destruction' was not, however, ac- 
companied by a corresponding alteration of US nuclear war plans, 
for the majority of designated targets were still Soviet military 
installations, and options for city-avoiding attacks (counter- 
force) were maintained in the Single Integrated Operational Plan. 
3 
In other words, US operational plans continued to be guided by 
a strategy of second strike counterforce, stressing such notions 
as 'control', 'options', 'flexibility', and 'sequential attacks', 
and also by the belief that the US would preserve a margin of 
quantitative and qualitative superiority over the USSR in the 
nuclear field well into the future. 
4 
It was this last assumption that was shattered by the 
awesome Soviet effort to reach a position of raw strategic 
'parity' in number of nuclear delivery vehicles with the US in 
the middle and late 1960s. 
5 
It is probably true that McNamara 
1. In Henry Rowen's words: 'The primary purpose of the Assured 
Destruction capabilities doctrine was to provide a metric for 
deciding how much force was enough: it provided a basis for 
denying.... claims for more money for strategic forces... However, 
it was never proposed by McNamara and his staff that nuclear 
weapons actually be used in this way. ' (Quoted in Friedberg, 
53) ; see also Freedman, The Evolution..., 24+5-6 
2. R. S. McNamara, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 
1965, USGPO, Washington DC, 19672 12 
3. D. Ball, 'Dejä Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon 
Administration', in R. O'Neill (ed) The Strategic Nuclear 
Balance, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, Canberra, 1975,171 
4. Friedberg, 52-3 
5. For an excellent analysis of the technological characteristics 
and political impact of the Soviet strategic build-up, see 
W. R. Schilling, 'US Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s: The Search 
for Sufficiently equivalent Countervailing Parity', Inter- 
national Security, Vol VI, No 2,1981,48-79. The key figures 
are these: starting in 196'4 when the USSR had 389 strategic 
delivery vehicles and the US had 1,800, the USSR had surpassed 
the US in the number of ICBMs by 1970, in the number of SLBMs 
by 1975, and in the total number of inter-continental bombers, 
ICBMs and SLBMs by 1973. 
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and his principal aides had become convinced in those years that 
some form of 'parity' in which both sides maintained secure, 
second-strike, 'assured destruction' forces, was not only an in- 
evitable but also a desirable state of affairs to strive for. 
Three things, however, must be remembered: first, McNamara's 
efforts to introduce some measure of moderation into the arms 
race - based on the deterrent value of mutual vulnerability to 
a 'city-busting' first strike - were made from the comfortable 
position of knowing that the US enjoyed a significant lead over 
the USSR in both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of that 
race. Secondly, it is highly likely that the Soviets, particularly 
after the 1962 Cuban crisis, faced with the reality of an in- 
creasingly assertive American military involvement throughout 
the world, found it difficult to reconcile a declaratory policy 
of moderation with the actions of the US government. Finally, as 
pointed out earlier, not only did US nuclear war plans change 
little in the 1960s, but there also remained strong pressures for 
a drive for decisive superiority and/or the determined acquisition 
of damage-limiting capabilities (offensive and defensive). 
I 
It is basically correct to say that there are two broad 
schools of thought in the public debate on US nuclear strategy: 
the 'MAD' school views nuclear weapons as so irrationally de- 
structive that they render traditional strategic notions obsolete, 
emphasizing, rather, the deterrent fear derived from mutual vul- 
nerability. 
2 
The second school - which Betts calls the 'damage 
limitation' school3 - stresses two things: first, that the nuclear 
arsenals are a factor of state policy the political utility of 
which goes beyond their own mutual cancellation through deter- 
rence of all-out war; secondly, that it is essential to be ready 
to achieve sensible objectives in nuclear war should deterrence 
1. Freedman, The Evolution..., 255 
2. A good example of this view is provided by McGeorge Bundy's 
piece, 'A Matter of Survival', The New York Review of Books, 
March 17 1983 
3. Betts, 102-3 
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fail. 1 In practice, however, US nuclear deployment policies and 
war plans have always responded to war-fighting requirements, 
covering a wide range of types of means and targets; and even 
when 'assured destruction' objectives have been most strongly 
stressed in the rhetoric, the actual operational plans - with 
their basic thrust towards achieving technological dominance in 
a nuclear confrontation - remained mostly unchanged until the 
late 1960s. 2 
This tendency received a determined impulse with the 
arrival of the Nixon administration in 1969. Nixon ascended to 
the Presidency with a strong commitment to restoring a decisive 
margin of US strategic 'superiority', and in his campaign speeches 
he repeatedly expressed an anxiety that McNamara's readiness to 
accept the logic of MAD threatened the political will of US 
leaders. Nixon had concluded that the US had derived a political 
leverage from its nuclear superiority in the 50s and 60s which 
it should recover as quickly and effectively as possible. 
3 
Though 
both he and Kissinger had to go through the shock of assimilating 
'parity' they did not accept it as a desirable state of affairs, 
4 
1. 'Should deterrence fail' - writes Gray - 'it is entirely possible 
that an American attempt to employ nuclear weapons flexibly in a 
controlled manner would founder on disrupted and severed C31 
and/or on a totally non-cooperative Soviet style of war waging. 
These strong possibilities do not absolve American policy-makers 
in peace time from the duty of providing for holding a cata- 
strophe to the level of a catastrophe, rather than - through 
their conscious neglect - ensuring, indeed guaranteeing, that a 
nuclear catastrophe would become a holocaust. ' (C. S. Gray, 
'"Dangerous to Your Health": The Debate over Nuclear Strategy 
and War', Orbis, Vol 26, No 2,1982,344). Here everything 
hinges on the not very clear semantic distinction between 
'catastrophe' and 'holocaust'. 
2. As Ball has shown, despite the changes in avowed US strategic 
policies over the past three decades, war plans have always 
covered Soviet military forces, stockpiles, bases and instal- 
lations; economic and industrial centres; political and admini- 
strative centres; and, after 1950, the Soviet nuclear forces. 
(See his Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, Adelphi Paper No 
185, IISS, London, Summer 1983, , 397- 
3. H. J. Brenner, 'The Theorist as Actor. The Actor as Theorist', 
Stanford Journal of International Studies, Vol 7,1972,112 
4. Thus, Jerome Kahan's point that 'by proclaiming a doctrine of 
sufficiency in 1969, President Nixon officially accepted nuclear 
parity between the US and the USSR as a fact of life for the 
1970s... ' is highly misleading, for, as I shall try to show in 
the course of this discussion, the changes in US nuclear doc- 
trine under Nixon and Kissinger were in fact attempts to es- 
cape the consequences of 'parity' and to preserve a politically 
useful American advantage through qualitative superiority. (See 
J. H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, The Brookings Insti- 
5,144) 
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and soon moved to begin the first major change in American war 
Plans since the McNamara initiatives of 1961-62. This process of 
apparent innovation in the sphere of nuclear policy was one of 
the most significant products - for its political implications - 
of the 'Kissinger years' in US foreign policy, and a highly re- 
vealing ideological phenomenon that crucially reinforced the 
dilemmas of 'conservative realism' and its conception of politics 
as technique. 
To recapitulate, the 'flexible response' doctrine co- 
incided with an era of ascendancy which allowed a more sophisti- 
cated analysis of 'threats' and means of response, a time of 
confidence in US superiority, aims, and capabilities. The heyday 
of 'mutually assured destruction' coincided with the prolonged 
political-military test of the war in South East Asia. During those 
bitter years, the realities of social conflict, both external and 
domestic, lessened the influence of the nuclear factor in American 
strategic concerns. But the shock of defeat in Vietnam gave a new 
lease of life to the search for a more assertive nuclear strategy, 
and to the attempts to restore the strength of nuclear power as 
an instrument of politics. The move away from MAD-related notions 
to a declaratory emphasis on 'limited nuclear options' during the 
Kissinger years should therefore be seen as an effort to respond 
to a deteriorating political situation through the manipulation 
of a technical threat. The US 'strategic retrenchment' after 
Vietnam meant above all a reduction in its ability to intervene 
with general purpose forces abroad; the 'defence gap' thus created 
was now to be at least to some extent filled by having recourse 
to a 'new' nuclear employment policy. 
The'Schlesinger doctrine'1 was not only a response to 
a changed political climate, but was also related to a series of 
technological innovations in the fields of precision and control 
of nuclear forces that, in theory, increased the plausibility of 
scenarios for 'selective' nuclear exchanges. 
2 
These technological 
1. For relevant excerpts from Secretary Schlesinger's public ela- 
boration of the 'Limited Nuclear Options' doctrine, see Survival 
IISS, March-April 1974, January-February 1975, and May-June 1975 
2. In particular, the new 'Command Data Buffer System' for rapid 
re-targeting, plus the addition of the MK-12A warhead, the 
NS-20 guidance system to the Minutemen missiles, and, of course, 
MIRV. (See R. K. Betts, 'Nuclear Peace: Mythology and Futurology' 
The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 2, No 1, May 1979,99 
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developments, however, only reinforced the essentially political 
thrust of the retreat from MAD, for in fact the substance of the 
'new' strategy - publicly articulated by Secretary of Defence 
James Schlesinger between 1974 and 1975 - was neither 'novel' 
nor 'revolutionary'1: counterforce targeting and the provision of 
war-fighting flexible 'options' were important features of US 
nuclear war planning since the McNamara days and even before. 
Therefore the basic 'novelty' of the 'Schlesinger doctrine' con- 
sisted of its actual declaration, and the crucial question to 
ask about it is: what were the reasons that led US leaders, at 
that moment, to emphasize again 'flexibility', 'selectivity', and 
war-fighting counterforce 'options' at the level of nuclear 
strategy ? The answer, as I said earlier, is political: the 'new' 
doctrine was the culmination of a reassessment of US foreign 
policy challenges and means of response, 
2 
and the prelude to a 
renewed drive for hegemonic advantage in the nuclear field. 
Schlesinger made it clear that his 'new' strategy both increased 
the chances of nuclear war, and envisaged a new period of US 
'superiority' at least in accurate counterforce weaponry. 
3 
The 
public articulation of the 'new' doctrine presaged a record US 
Defense Department Budget, submitted to the American Congress 
by Nixon on 4 February 1974 and asking for massive expenditures 
for the qualitative upgrading of the nuclear arsenal. 
4 
In operational terms, Schlesinger's innovations led to 
the drawing up of 'small packages' of targets from which the US 
President could choose, including strikes of 'down to a few 
weapons'. 
5 
Betts has argued that, before Schlesinger, contingency 
1. Ball, 'Dejä Vu', 150 
2. During 1969 and 1970 the Nixon Administration undertook a 
series of studies aimed, among other things, at increasing 
the flexibility of existing nuclear war plans. In 1972, the 
Department of Defense began to study possible revisions of 
the SIOP. Between 1972 and 1974 a full-scale inter-agency 
review was undertaken, resulting finally in the Schlesinger 
statements of 1974-5. (Lynn Davis, Limited Nuclear Options, 
Adelphi Paper No 121, IISS, London, 1976,3- 
3. Ball, 'Dejä Vu', 160. See also Secretary Schlesinger's testi- 
mony to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, US-USSR 
Strategic Policies, USGPO, Washington DC 1974,28 
4. J. R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal 
Year 1975, USGPO, Washington DC, March 1974,16-24; Ball, 
'Dejä Vu', 219 
5. US-USSR Strategic Policies, 9 
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plans had never been developed for options less than massive but 
more than puny: 'Theoretically forty or fifty missiles or bombers 
could have been dispatched, but... such action was impractical 
because it would have deranged the SIOP... '1. According to Ball, 
however, though the 'new' strategy required some re-targeting of 
missiles, the SIOP itself was not going to be radically changed. 
2 
What is clear is that, with the 'new' doctrine, the Nixon admini- 
stration hoped to extend the political relevance of nuclear weapons 
to a wider variety of conflicts. As Schlesinger explained, 
Deterrence must operate across the entire 
spectrum of possible contingencies. We 
cannot afford gaps in its coverage that 
might invite probes and tests. In an era 
of nuclear parity, we cannot and should 
not rely primarily on the threat of 
massive replies to deter the great variety 
of contingencies that could arise in a 
nuclear crisis. 3 
His elaboration of the 'limited options doctrine'2 left no doubts 
that the search for more 'selectivity' covered three aspects: 
first, limited nuclear 'options' against Soviet nuclear challenges 
at a level below that of all-out war; secondly, nuclear options 
against non-nuclear challenges and local aggression with the 
potential for escalation; and finally, a more discriminating 
strategy for general nuclear war. Thus, the aim of the 'new' 
doctrine was to restore the credibility of US nuclear threats 
across the board by covering a wide range of qualitatively 
different conflicts with contingency plans for nuclear attacks. 
The concept of 'escalation dominance' - the attainment of 
effective military superiority at a particular point in the 
escalation ladder 
5- 
would play a key role in this attempt to 
1. Betts, 'Nuclear Peace: Mythology... ', 99 
2. Ball, 'Dejä Vu'., 214 
3. Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975,4-5,38 
4. The main sources - apart from the documents already quoted - 
of Schlesinger's articulation of the 'limited options' doctrine 
are the Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1976, 
USGPO, Washington DC, February 1975, and US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Briefin on Counterforce Attacks, USGPO, 
Washington DC, September 197 
5 Freedman, The Evolution..., 382 
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revitalize the political utility of nuclear strategy. 
1 
By con- 
fronting the other side with the choice between acceptance of 
a limited nuclear fait accompli or total escalation to societal 
suicide, the US would impose on the USSR a de facto recognition 
of 'limited nuclear war'. 
To be sure, one of the targets - probably the most 
important - of the 'new' strategy was the USSR; but the 'challenges' 
to which Nixon referred in his public statements supporting the 
changes in nuclear doctrine - as opposed to the 'accidents' that 
worried McNamara - were not specified as being exclusively nuclear, 
and included political ones as well. 
2 
The problem was not limited 
to 'keeping the edge' against the USSR - which McNamara had been 
frittering away - but to restore the political instrumentality 
of nuclear war. Kissinger played a significant role in directing 
US nuclear strategy towards a renewed emphasis on counterforce 
'flexibility', and he chaired several of the study groups that 
laid the groundwork for the 'limited options' doctrine. 
3 
This was 
totally in line with his life-long advocacy of nuclear war- 
fighting strategies, and the formulas of nuclear strategy, at 
their core, express the beliefs, perceptions, and intentions of 
policy-makers. For Kissinger, the crucial challenge of nuclear 
power to US leaders was to make nuclear weapons relevant in the 
pursuit of American foreign policy objectives. Force should never 
1. The Nixon administration also encouraged the design and de- 
velopment of a whole new range of weapons technologies for 
'tactical' purposes, to make a tactical nuclear war-fighting 
posture appear more credible. (See Ball, 'Dejä Vu', 182-4). 
As Kissinger explained, 'If crises no longer produced fear of 
escalation to all-out war, they would also become more likely', 
and US threats to initiate a nuclear strike would 'become 
hollow', and there would be 'an exponential increase in the 
dangers to allies at levels of violence below general exchange'. 
(Years of Upheaval, 259). The new strategic situation therefore 
demanded a restoration of US dominance in the nuclear field. 
As he argued in a 1976 interview, 'the peace of the world will 
be threatened... not primarily by strategic forces but by geo- 
political changes, and to resist those geopolitical changes we 
must be able to resist regionally... By non-nuclear means, or 
perhaps even by nuclear means geared to the local situation. 
Non-nuclear means would always be preferable, but I don't want 
to exclude nuclear means in certain situations. ' 
(US News and 
World Report, 15 March 1976,28) 
2. R. Nixon, A New Strategy for Peace, 91-2; Building for Peace, 
170-74; The Emerging Structure of Peace, 15 -8; Shaping a 
Durable Peace, 61-3 
3. Kissinger, The White House Years, 199-222 
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be separated from diplomacy, and particularly in the nuclear era 
the key problem military strategy must solve is the creation of 
'options' for policy, devising a 'spectrum of capabilities' with 
which to act in different kinds of conflict situations. 
1 
Thus, 
nuclear strategy should strive to 'establish a relationship be- 
tween a policy of deterrence and a strategy for fighting a war 
in case deterrence fails'; 
2 
and he consistently argued that the 
solution to this problem could be found in a nuclear employment 
policy for (a) limited nuclear war, and (b) counterforce targeting 
in general nuclear war. 
3 
In his view, the dilemma never resolved 
by MAD-related concepts was 'psychological': 
It was all very well to threaten mutual 
suicide for purposes of deterrence, parti- 
cularly in case of a direct threat to 
national survival... [But] if deterrence 
failed and the President was finally faced 
with the decision to retaliate, who would 
take the moral responsibility for recom- 
mending a strategy based on the massive 
extermination of civilians...? 4 
What most preoccupied Kissinger about 'assured des- 
truction' was that 'no President could make such a threat credible 
except by conducting a diplomacy that suggested a high irration- 
al±ty"; 
5 
but it is difficult to accept Kissinger's own beliefs 
in the possibility of actually using limited nuclear war as an 
instrument of policy as anything other than irrational. He summed 
up his thoughts on the matter by arguing that 
A war which began as a limited nuclear 
war would have the advantage that its 
limitations could have been established 
- and, what is more important, understood - 
well in advance of hostilities. In such a 
conflict, moreover, the options of the 
aggressor are reduced in range. Whereas in 
1. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 3-22,132-73, 
203-33; The Necessity for Choice, 1-9,57-75,169-80 
2. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons..., 132 
3.1_, 174-202. In his later book, The Necessity for Choice, 
Kissinger somewhat moderated his earlier almost fanatical 
enthusiasm for the potentialities of limited nuclear war, but 
he insisted that 'conventional war can be kept conventional 
only if we maintain, together with our retaliatory force, an 
adequate capability for limited nuclear war'. 
(81-98) 
4. Kissinger, The White House Years, 216 
5. ibid 
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a conventional war the choice is between 
continuing the war with its existing re- 
strictions or risking an expanding limited 
war, in a nuclear war the choice is the 
much more difficult one between the ex- 
isting war and all-out conflict ... 
1 
But why, one may ask, would the adversaries of the US accept to 
limit their own possible response to a form of warfare in which 
they would face certain defeat ? Also, to what kind of conflict 
is Kissinger referring ? What is its political nature ? If the 
situation is one of total hostility, how could it be possible 
for either side to believe that the first use of nuclear weapons 
by its enemy was not the first step on the road to total war ?2 
There is a profound contradiction - not uncommon in theoretical 
writings on nuclear 'options' and limited war - between, on the 
one hand, Kissinger's belief in the power of 'reason', conveyed 
through diplomacy in a manner that can be understood even by 
nuclear combatants, and, on the other hand, his willingness to 
manipulate irrationality - in the form of escalation on the 
nuclear ladder - as a negotiating weapon. He insisted, on one 
side, that 'an energetic diplomacy addressed to the problem of 
war limitation can serve as a substitute for lack of imagination 
on the part of the Soviet General Staff', but on the other side 
he argued that 'the emphasis of traditional diplomacy on "good 
faith" and "willingness to come to an agreement" is a positive 
handicap when it comes to dealing with a power dedicated to over- 
throwing the international system' .3 These two propositions, ex- 
pressed in the same book, cannot, however, be mutually reconciled 
with one another. 
There is, of course, an unavoidable paradox inherent 
in nuclear strategy: deterrent effect is maximized by threatening 
the most catastrophic consequences to follow immediately upon the 
outbreak of hostilities, yet decision-makers would in principle 
like to retain as many 'options' as possible short of holocaust 
in the event of deterrence failing. 
4 
Several questions, however, 
1. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons..., 193-4 
2. On this specific dilemma in Kissinger's contributions as a 
strategist, see D. Landau, Kissinger: The Uses of Power, 
Robson Books, London, 1974,47-8 
3. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons..., 317-8 
4. See Brenner, 'The Theorist as Actor... ', 122 
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should be asked: first, is this flexibility of choice - depending 
on political-technical control - attainable ? Secondly, is a 
declaratory policy of 'options' desirable as a means of streng- 
thening deterrence, and what is its political meaning ? Finally, 
should weapons be specifically procured for an 'options' policy ? 
Most authors agree that 'flexibility' is desirable, that 'military 
policy' should 'provide forces and strategies that permit at 
least the possibility of limiting the war, forces and strategies 
that can buy time, not consume it', 
1 
and that the intention of 
the Schlesinger strategy was to limit casualty and damage levels 
in the event that war does occur - and, by providing a wide 
spectrum of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, 'to ensure that 
the reduced expectation of casualties and damage does not lead 
to an increase in the probability of war (and especially of 
limited nuclear war). 12 This is the crux of the matter, for an 
increase in 'war-fighting capabilities' leads unavoidably to an 
increase in the 'probability of war', and a declaratory policy 
of 'options' coupled with a 'war-fighting' weapons procurement 
policy inevitably encourages the use of nuclear weapons as 
instruments of national policy. And this was in fact the intention 
behind the 'Schlesinger's doctrine'; it rested on the same il- 
lusions of'control' that have characterized all attempts to 
'rationalize' nuclear war, but its political import was clear: 
to 'channel' the power of the nuclear arsenal into the mainstream 
of international confrontation 03 
Thus, if nuclear strategy, at its core, is reducible 
to the perceptions, beliefs, and intentions - that is, the 
1. Schilling, 73 
2. Ball, 'Dejä Vu', 228. See also Friedberg, 55 
3. The SALT agreements, as Kissinger correctly perceived, did 
not preclude or hinder US attempts to devise alternative 
strategies for the conduct of nuclear war. In the words of 
Gerald Smith, chief of the US SALT delegation, Nixon accepted 
SALT because he 'knew it was politically and economically 
impractical for his administration to mount major new strate- 
gic programs'. (Doubletalk, Doubleday, New York, 1980,22); 
but both he and Kissinger saw in SALT 'an opportunity to re- 
dress the strategic balance' (Kissinger, The White House Years, 
550). and this would be achieved first by moderating Soviet 
offensive developments, by accelerating US programmes as soon 
as conditions permitted, and by declaring a policy of 'options' 
which tried to extract advantages from American qualitative 
superiority. 
(See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 260,998; 
For the Record, 206) 
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ideology - of policy-makers, the revival of counterforce and 
'limited options' ideas in the Kissinger-Nixon years was an 
expression of their belief that there is potential utility in 
the qualified use of nuclear weapons as an instrument of policy. 
I shall now turn to a more in-depth analysis of the ideological 
background to this belief, which is rooted both in a certain 
view of the nature of the nuclear 'order' and in the 'perversion 
of relevance' in nuclear strategy that results from the notion 
of politics as 'technique'. 
-185- 
IDEOLOGY AND THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR ORDER 
A key component of the 'realist' view of politics that 
I have tried to characterize in this study, is the presumption 
that political processes can be subjected to the control of tech- 
nical means used with sufficient determination and efficiency. 
Thus, even though political 'realists' like Kissinger usually 
accept that there is a clear distinction between nature, which 
is the domain of necessity, and history, where presumably man 
demonstrates his freedom, 1 and therefore that there is an in- 
trinsic element of unpredictability in all historic change, the 
direction this change takes is seen as decisively influenced by 
the tempo of technological innovation. The enormous impact of 
nuclear technology upon contemporary international relations has 
even led some authors - who oppose this version of 'realism' - 
to argue that we have arrived at a situation where men have 
become the servants of the very instruments fashioned for their 
own mastery of nature and history. 
2 
These views about the 'inertial 
thrust'3 and 'gathering determinism 14 of the nuclear competition 
tend, however, to misconceive the essentially political nature 
of the motivating force that drives the nuclear arms race forward. 
The political impulse behind the relentless search for a way out 
of the dilemmas of deterrence is grounded on a conception of 
politics developed solely from the strategic point of view as 
technical mastery over men and nature, and the influence of this 
notion of politics helps to explain the recurrent belief in the 
possibility of using nuclear war as a rational instrument of 
state policy. 
As noted earlier, 
5 
Hobbes's rationalism, his view of 
politics as a rigorous science directed toward the expert mastery 
of objectified tasks, his attempts to apply the newly discovered 
1. Kissinger, The Meaning of History, 22-3 
2. W. Leiss, The Domination of Nature, Braziller, New York, 1972, 
158 
3. E. P. Thompson, 'Deterrence and Addiction', in F. Barnaby and 
G. Thomas (eds), The Nuclear Arms Race: Control or Catastrophe ? 
F. Pinter, London, 1982,55 
4. E. P. Thompson, 'Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civili- 
zation', in Thompson et al, Exterminism and Cold War, Verso, 
London, 1982,27 
5. See Chapter 2, Section II, of this study 
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aptitudes of making to the realm of human affairs, as well as his 
idea that only what I am going to make will be real, 
1 
broke de- 
cisively with the classic, Aristotelian notion of politics as the 
doctrine of the good and just life. The practical problem of the 
virtuous life of the citizens of the polis was transformed into 
the technical problem of regulating social intercourse so as to 
ensure order in the state. 
2 
This was a crucial step in the trans- 
formation of the idea of politics as an instrument toward the 
realization of practical goals - dependent on the open discussion 
of principles and values - into a conception of politics as the 
solution of technical problems through the scientifically ratio- 
nalized control of objectified processes. 
3 
This 'constructivistic' 
view of knowledge can be expressed by the formula that, since 
man has himself created the institutions of society and civili- 
zation, he must also be able to control them and alter them at 
will so as to satisfy his purposes and wishes. But this 'technical 
rationality' is not, as some have argued, 
4 
the inevitable product 
of scientific and technological progress; 'it is not' - in Hayek's 
words - '... the progress of science which threatens our civili- 
zation, but scientific error, based usually on the presumption 
1. For an outstanding discussion of Hobbes's rationalism, and its 
impact on political theory, see the important book by Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 
1958 (7th impression, 1971), Part VI, esp 294-30L1 
2. Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas, 
Hutchinson, London, 1978, 
3. On the difference between these two views of politics see 
Jurgen. Haberrmas, Toward a Rational Society, Heinemann, London, 
19712 82-5,102-42 11 -7; also Arendt, Part V, 175-247. As 
Habermas points out, Machiavelli's 'realpolitical' demystifi- 
cation of the idea of politics was also an attempt to reduce 
the practical knowledge of politics to a technical skill - 
lacking, however, Hobbes's epistemological sophistication: 
'For the Ancients, too, the politicians entrusted with the 
direction of the state were to combine their prudence with 
certain capabilities, say the mastery of economics or of 
military strategy. With Machiavelli, however, only the 
'mechanical' workmanlike skill of the strategist remains for 
politics. ' (See Theory and Practice, 50-51,54-7) 
(emphasis 
mine) 
4. For example, Herbert Marcuse, who argues that 'the very con- 
cept of technical reason is perhaps ideological... Technology 
is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what 
a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and 
things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and 
to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason. ' 
(in Ne ations: E; says in Critical Theory, Beacon Press, Boston, 
1968,223 
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Of knowledge which in fact we do not possess. '1 Thus, when 
Jonathan Schell, for instance, argues that 'It is fundamental 
to the shape and character of the nuclear predicament that its 
origins lie in scientific knowledge rather than in social circum- 
stances' 
2 
he makes two mistakes: . in the first place, he does not 
clarify the specific influence of 'constructivism' upon the 
peculiar nature of scientific-technological progress in our 
societies; secondly, he does not take into account the extent to 
which those 'social circumstances' are in themselves a product 
of the organization of the body politic according to the demands 
of 'technical reason'. 
This epistemological and philosophico-political 
dimension has been almost completely left out of the debate on 
the dilemmas of nuclear strategy; 
3 
as a result, profound mis- 
understandings have developed with respect to the following: 
(a) the ideological basis (in the sense of 'fundamental ideology') 
that lies behind the constant search for a technological solution 
to the apparently unchallengeable riddles of nuclear strategy; 
(b) the nature of the nuclear 'order' and the possibilities of 
'control' and 'limitation' of nuclear war; (c) finally, the pro- 
spects of technical means for reducing the risks of war and 
strengthening 'deterrence'. 
In reference to the first point, it is frequently 
argued that the arms race has its origins in the 'mutual sus- 
picion of each other's political purposes', in 'inter-service 
rivalry', and the fact that in today's rapidly changing techno- 
logical world 'there are always ways of making things "better". ' 
No doubt this is partly true, as it is basically correct to say 
1. Hayek, 'The Errors of Constructivism', 20 
2. J. Schell, The Fate of the Earth, Knopf, New York, 1982,100 
3. In my readings of the literature on this subject, I have only 
come across one passage dealing explicitly with these matters, 
by Kolkowitz, who locates the tendency to search for technical 
solutions to the problem of 'control' of nuclear war 'in the 
scientific spirit of the Enlightenment and in the optimistic 
tradition of the more recent period which envisaged man's 
ability to control, manage and order conflict by rational 
scientific and technological means. ' 
(Quoted by Ian Clark, 
Limited Nuclear War, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1982,160) 
4. See, for instance, Solly Zuckerman, 'Nuclear Storm Warnings' 
The Spectator, 9 April 1983,14 
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that, given that deterrence is not a strategy for waging war but 
rather a 'non-strategy' or an 'anti-strategy', it embodies a 
paradox that 'is almost too much for the military mind, and its 
civilian counterparts, to bear'. 
I 
But it is necessary to go beyond 
this to discover the roots of the technological imperative in 
a view of human knowledge, according to which 'objective truth 
is not given to man but... he can know only what he makes himself'. 
The political implications of this view of knowledge have already 
been discussed; they must, however, be complemented with the 
observation that, in the field of nuclear strategy, the thrust 
towards war can also be interpreted as a temptation to know. 
3 
The clarification of the view of knowledge underlying 
the growth of the notion of politics as technique, and of tech- 
nology as domination of natural and social processes, 
4 
is a pre- 
liminary condition for understanding both what kind of order the 
nuclear 'order' is, and the persistence of the constructivistic 
fallacy in the attempts to 'control' it. The traditional di- 
chotomy - deriving from the ancient Greeks - between phenomena 
which are 'natural' in the sense that they are wholly independent 
of human action, and those which are 'artificial' or 'conventional' 
in the sense that they are the product of human design, has been 
enormously influential in Western thought, and its impact can be 
detected in the discussions on nuclear strategy. This division, 
however, is misleading, for it does not take into account a 
distinct category of phenomena which are the result of human 
1. T. Draper, 'Nuclear Temptations', 
Books, January 19 1984,43 
The New York Review of 
2. Arendt, 293 
3. Arendt describes this view of knowledge as 'Perhaps the most 
momentous of the spiritual consequences of the discoveries 
of the modern age'; this was the conviction that 'In order 
to be certain one had to make sure, and in order to know one 
had to do. Certainty of knoiledg-e could be reached only under 
a twofold condition: first, that knowledge concerned only 
what one had done himself.. . and second, 
that knowledge was 
of such a nature that it could be tested only through more 
doing. ' (289-90) 
Leiss, 101-65 
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action but not of human design. 
1 
Social phenomena, as Nagel 
explains, are not generally the intended results of individual 
actions; nevertheless 'the central task of social science is the 
explanation of phenomena as the unintended outcome of springs of 
action'. 
2 
Indeed it can be argued that social theory begins with 
the discovery that there exist orderly structures - such as 
language, morals, and the market - which are the product of the 
actions of many men but are not the result of human design. 
3 
The belief that this is not so, that orderly human structures 
must inevitably be the product of some thinking mind derives 
from our anthropomorphic habits of thought, from our difficulty 
in conceiving of an order which is not deliberately made and 
which aims at concrete purposes. 'Spontaneous' or 'grown' orders, 
however, differ from 'made' orders on three accounts: (1) Their 
degree of complexity is not limited to what a human mind can 
master; (2) Their existence need not manifest itself to our senses 
but may be based on purely abstract relations which we can only 
mentally reconstruct; and (3) Not having been 'made' they cannot 
legitimately be said to have a particular purpose, although our 
awareness of their existence may be - and usually is - crucial 
for our pursuit of a great variety of different, and sometimes 
contrasting, purposes. 
4 
Spontaneous orders are not necessarily complex, but 
unlike deliberate human arrangements they may achieve any degree 
of complexity. These very complex orders, comprising more parti- 
cular facts than any brain could ascertain or manipulate, can be 
brought about 'only through forces inducing the formation of 
1. F. A. Hayek, 'The Results of Human Action but not of Human 
Design'. in Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, 
96-105. It is interesting to note the similarity between this 
insight and Hegel's notion of 'the cunning of reason', by 
which he tried to call attention to the paradoxical aspect 
of human history, wherein 'reason sets the passions to work 
for itself, while that which develops its existence through 
such impulsion pays the penalty, and suffers loss. ' G. W. F. 
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, George Bell & 
Sons, London, 18942 317- 
2. E. Nagel, 'Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the 
Social Sciences', in Science, Language and Human Rights, 
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Vol I, 
Philadelphia, 1952,54 
3. F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Vol I ('Rules and 
Order', Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973,37 




The nuclear 'order', I think, is of this 
kind; in other words, it is a 'grown' order that has attained a 
degree of complexity which far exceeds any which could have been 
achieved by deliberate organization. This has been convincingly 
demnnstrated by Paul Bracken in his brilliant study on the problems 
of command and control of nuclear forces. 
2 
Its importance lies 
not so much in the author's conclusion - pointed out many times 
before - that there are seemingly insurmountable obstacles to 
maintaining political control in a thermonuclear war, but in his 
analysis of the security organizations built by both the US and 
the USSR, 'the most complex technological apparatus ever con- 
ceived', which have 'institutionalized a major nuclear showdown'. 
3 
Bracken, however, argues that the problem with this enormously 
complex nuclear system is that it has been built 'without thinking 
through its purpose or how to control ±t', 
4 
thus implying that it 
is not only desirable but also feasible to attain these aims; 
but the whole thrust of his analysis tends to show, rather, that 
the gap between increasingly more complicated, 'abstract', nuclear 
strategies, and the progressively more deficient - not sophisti- 
cated enough - command structures designed to carry them out 
simply cannot be filled. This would imply subjecting the nuclear 
'order' -a 'grown' order - to the constraints characteristic of 
'made' orders and the dictates of a 'controlling mind': an im- 
possible task, 
5 
for what in fact happens - adapting Adam 
Ferguson's phrases - is that '[nuclear] nations stumble upon 
establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but 
not the execution of any human design'. 
6 
1. Hayek, Law, Legislation..., 38. See also Hayek's essay, 'Dr 
Bernard Mandeville' in New Studies in Philosophy, 249-66 
2. P. Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1983 
3. ibid, 239. As he puts it, these 'fantastically complex nuclear 
command organizations' parallel the conflict institutions 
built in the decade before 1914, 'but on a far more specta- 
cular and quick-reacting scale'. 
(3). See also Desmond Ball, 
Can Nuclear War be Controlled ?, Adelphi Paper No 169, IISS, 
London, Autunn 1981 , 36-7 
24. Bracken, 239 
5. See Bracken, 4,8,30-1,52-3,58,220-21,232-5,240-42 
6. Quoted by Hayek, Dr Bernard Mandeville', 264 
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Once the nuclear order is seen as a 'grown' order in 
the sense here explained, it is easier to understand the mistake 
of both those who - like Thompson - believe that the nuclear 
systems evolve through some kind of doomsday inertia, and also 
of those - like Kissinger - who attribute to them the character 
of 'made' orders - losing sight of the importance of the unforeseen 
consequences of human action. 
1 
The nuclear order is not a 'process 
without a subject', but its enormous complexity has freed it from 
the whims of any of its multiple creators. All attempts to make 
it serve the 'purpose' of a centralized 'command authority' are 
expressions of the constructivistic fallacy which attributes to 
civilian and military leaders, at a given moment, a comprehensive 
knowledge that they do not, and cannot, possess. 
2 
Clausewitz had argued that strategy can have a negative 
object, and emphasized that, historically, this has often been 
the case, the aim of strategy being to make clear to the other 
side 'the improbability of victory... [and] its unacceptable cost'3 
that is, deterrence. The threat of annihilation and the difficulties 
in the way of giving any clear meaning to the notion of 'victory' 
1. See, for example, F. Halliday, 'The Sources of the New Cold 
War', in Exterminism and Cold War, 298 
2. I know of only one (western) nuclear strategist who has ade- 
quately described the real nature of the nuclear 'order'. I 
refer to Michael Mandelbaum, who has written that the nuclear 
'regime' is a 'complicated, intricate, and delicate entity; it 
does not spring from a grand design... is an expression of the 
wisdom of history... is like a living organism. ' (See his essay, 
'International Stability and Nuclear Order: The First Nuclear 
Regime', in D. C. Gompert et al, Nuclear Weapons and World 
Politics: Alternatives for the Future, McGraw Hill, New York, 
1977,78). There has also been a process of 'militarization' 
of the idea of politics in Marxist - and, particularly, Soviet - 
thought, that in some respects parallels the fate of 'realist' 
conceptions in the West. A detailed discussion of the Soviet 
approach to nuclear strategy is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, it should be pointed out that the strongly sociological 
bent of the Marxist tradition, its fundamental concern with the 
social basis of political life, has contributed to reducing the 
impact of the technological obsession in Soviet strategic theory 
- as it is publicly formulated. On this point, see J. Erickson, 
'The Soviet View of Deterrence: A General Survey', Survival, 
November --December 1982,24+2-51; R. L. Arnett, 'Soviet Attitudes 
Towards Nuclear War: Do They Really Think They Can Win ? ', The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 2, No 2,1979,172-91 
3. Clausewitz, 91 
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in thermonuclear war have up to now preserved some sort of 
'peace' between the superpowers and their main alliance systems, 
but this 'stability' - to quote Freedman - 'depends on something 
that is more the antithesis of strategy than its apotheosis - on 
threats that things will get out of hand, that we might act ir- 
rationally, that possibly through inadvertence we could set in 
motion a process that in its development and conclusion would be 
beyond human control and comprehension'. 
1 
The search for a nuclear strategy with a positive 
object poses excessive conceptual demands upon technology; para- 
doxically, however, this technological apparatus itself is of 
such complexity that it cannot, or, rather, should not, be relied 
upon to implement a politically controlled and 'rational' war. 
But the political impulse behind technology continues its relent- 
less pressure, systematically refining the instruments of de- 
struction that will make knowledge and domination possible. It 
is this political impulse, and its ideological roots, that lie 
at the roots of the recurrent US attempts to overcome the dilemmas 
of deterrence - the barrier of the irrationality of nuclear war - 
through technological means. This is why it is misleading to argue 
- as Litwak does - that there is a 'fundamental difference' be- 
tween the 'flexible response' counterforce doctrine promulgated 
in 1962 and the 1974-1975 'Schlesinger doctrine', because, as 
Litwak puts it, the former 'sought to translate American numerical 
superiority into a rational, credible, war-winning strategy' as 
a means of imposing a 'pattern of stability' on the Soviet Union, 
whereas the latter was 'not regarded as a war-winning strategy'; 
rather, its purpose was to 'influence Soviet intentions and there- 
by reinforce deterrence at a time in which there was 'a narrowing 
range of credibility'. 
2 
Quite apart from the fact that both 
'doctrines' were formulated to a larger or lesser extent with 
the aim of 'influencing Soviet intentions', the point that, in 
my view, should be emphasized is that both of them respond to 
the same purpose of giving nuclear war a 'rational' status as an 
instrument of policy, and both reveal a very similar degree of 
1. Freedman, The Evolution.... 400 
2. R. S. Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign 
policy and the Pursuit of Stability 1969-1976, Ph D Thesis, 
LSE, 1981y 287-8 
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confidence in the value of technology as a 'solution' to at 
least some of the crucial challenges of the nuclear age. 
American decision-makers, to be sure, have not been 
unaware of the credibility problems involved in the attempts to 
establish a 'linkage' between the nuclear arena and political 
crises in 'gray areas', but they nevertheless have persistently 
tried to create this connection, and will, I think, continue to 
do so, unless and until a substantial change in the ideological 
presuppositions of US foreign policy takes place. On this change, 
also, depends the possibility of stopping, and perhaps reversing, 
the pace of the arms race on the US side - the only superpower 
which is an 'open' society, but which has also more consistently 
sought to take the lead in the competition to perfect the in- 
struments of nuclear warfare. 
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THE PERVERSION OF RELEVANCE IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
In what is probably one of the most important political 
treatises of our times, Eric Voegelin presented a powerful case 
to the effect that there has been a continuous process of 'per- 
version of relevance' in the field of political philosophy, 
through the 'shift from theory to method', or, to put it dif- 
ferently, from substantive problems to purely methodological 
disputes. 
1 
Here I have argued that a similar process of 'per- 
version of relevance' has taken place in the field of nuclear 
strategy, through a substitution of technology for politics. 
True, not all nuclear strategists have been unaware 
of this shift, and, particularly in recent years, increasing 
worries have been expressed about the dangers of forgetting that 
nuclear strategy is an instrument of foreign policy and not a 
substitute for it, and also that the so-called 'arms control' 
process is not an end in itself but a means to advance certain 
objectives within the context of a well-defined foreign policy. 
Nowadays it is being insistently said that 'strategic studies 
must reintegrate politics into itsanalytical framework', and 
that 'if the analysis is serious then politics is unavoidable'. 
2 
This realization of the perils involved in the 'technological 
obsession' that has dominated Western, and especially American, 
nuclear strategy is indeed a step forward in the right direction, 
but it will not generate a really substantial change of course 
unless the roots of the problem are definitely seen as deriving 
from the idea of politics at the centre of conservative-realism. 
It is all very well to advocate the 'reintegration of politics' 
within the framework of nuclear strategy, but the question remains, 
what politics ?, and for what purposes ? 
More specifically, it is crucial to determine what 
exactly the 'perversion of relevance' in nuclear strategy con- 
sists of. In my view, there are two key factors 
to be taken into 
account. In the first place, the one-dimensional view of politics - 
in particular of international politics - characteristic of 
'realism', as the domain of force, not of reason, and as an 
1. Voegelin, 10 
2. L. Freedman, 'Indignation, Influence, and Strategic Studies', 
International Affairs, Vol 6, No 2,1984,219 
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instrument of 'order', not of justice. And in the second place, 
the overestimation of the utility of force - evident, for in- 
stance, in such books of contemporary nuclear strategy as 
Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy - which is closely 
connected to the belief in the human ability. to control nature 
and the course of social events through technological means. 
These two traits of the process of 'perversion of relevance' are - 
to use Karl Deutsch's terminology -a manifestation of the 'sin 
of pride' in politics; they involve overestimation or overvalu- 
ation of the organization (in this case the US as a superpower) 
compared with its environment, of its past methods and commitments 
over new ones, and of its current will and inner structure over 
all possibilities of fundamental change: 'The injunction to 
humility' - writes Deutsch - 
common to several of the great religions, 
seems to be aimed directly at many of 
these sources of failure. In its essence, 
humility is perhaps an attitude toward 
facts and messages outside oneself; and 
openness to experience as well as to 
criticism; and a sensitivity and respon- 
siveness to the need and desires of others. 
Its opposite has traditionally been... the 
"sin of pride", the sin... "of seeing one- 
self out of proportion to the universe". 
1 
The 'idolatry of technology' that has so negatively affected the 
development of nuclear strategy in the West is, I think, an 
obvious manifestation of Deutsch's 'sin of pride'. 
It may seem ironic to accuse a conservative theorist 
and decision-maker such as Kissinger of committing this 'sin', 
which can be basically defined as involving a lack of awareness 
of the limits of power and superficial concern for the possi- 
bilities of human failure. After all - as the British conservative 
philosopher Michael Oakeshott has pointed out - 
to be a political 
conservative is presumably 'to prefer the familiar 
to the unknown, 
to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, 
the actual 
to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the 
distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to 
the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss'. 
2 
In other words, 
1. K. W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, The Free Press, New 
York, 1966,229-30 
2. M. Oakeshott, 'On Being Conservative', in Rationalism in 
politics, Basic Books, New York, 1962,169 
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conservatism is, in theory, a philosophy of moderation; in 
practice, however, because of its situational nature as an 
ideology committed to the defence of the established order, con- 
servatism can easily assume a very immoderate character in 
accordance with the intensity of the challenge imposed upon it 
by the forces of change. In times of tranquillity, the conservative 
doubts the ability of man to reorganize society according to 
various ideal visions of what ought to be. 
1 
In times of upheaval, 
however, the conservative's concern for 'limits' usually gives 
way to the implacable use of power, and even - as I have tried 
to show in the preceding pages of this work - to the 'idolatry 
of technology' as the last recourse to maintain domination. 
'Moderation' can sometimes be no more than complicity with in- 
tolerable conditions of existence for countries and peoples, 
2 
and - contrary to Oakeshott - 'reality' can sometimes be intoler- 
able evil, not imperfect good. 
To recapitulate what I have said in this section, 
possibly the most remarkable, yet paradoxical aspect of the works 
and statements of most contemporary nuclear strategists - and 
Kissinger is no exception - is that, though these works respond 
to a 'political' purpose, they lack any substantial analysis of 
the notion of 'politics' underlying their proposals, 
3 
or - almost 
as frequently - any significant discussion of the political con- 
text in which their theories will be applied. 
4 
This perversion 
of relevance in contemporary Western nuclear strategy has its 
roots in the 'classical' tradition of strategic thought, as 
1. W. R. Harbour, The Foundations of Conservative Thought, Uni- 
versity of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1982,5 
2. M. Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political 
Radicalism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980,243 
3. See, for instance, Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign 
Policy, 423-31. These are supposed to be the explicitly 
'political' passages of the book, and yet the analysis re- 
mains at the level of arguments about the American 'reluctance 
to think in terms of power', and the 'Calvinist heritage' that 
'has required success to display the attribute of justice'. 
Kissinga' agrees that 'An imaginative diplomacy and bold pro- 
grams' are required 'in order to overcome the contemporary 
revolution', but he has nothing to say about their contents. 
Examples like this could easily be multiplied. 
Li. This has led Michael Howard to ask about the postulates of 
'nuclear theologians': 'this war they are describing, what 
is it about ?' ('On Fighting a Nuclear War', 9) 
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epitomized by Clausewitz's On War, which not only assumed that 
the concept of 'politics' is relatively unproblematical but also 
made armed power the last word in the theory of strategy 'by 
agreeing' - as Atkinson has put it - 'to sweep problems of social 
order under the rug'. 
1 
Though it is not easy, due to the 'closed' 
nature of the Soviet system, to ascertain precisely how they 
actually see the problem, Soviet strategists have usually been 
cautious in their declaratory approach to the nuclear question. 
Their Marxist ideological training - which emphasizes the notion 
that political objectives and not the performance of weapons 
systems determine the nature and scope of wars i has stopped 
them from endorsing theories of 'limited nuclear war' and 'options' 
for 'escalation dominance'. 2 But it is difficult to reconcile 
their apparent awareness of the perils of the 'idolatry of tech- 
nology' with the enormous importance they attach to armed power 
as the technical dimension of the State's policy, and the general 
militarization of Soviet foreign policy. This process probably 
parallels the Western strategists' constantly intensifying ob- 
session with technological prowess. 
In the early Cold War years, the US National Security 
Council established that America should seek to 'maintain over- 
whelming superiority in atomic weapons' over its adversaries. 
3 
In most Cold War crises US leaders did not have confidence that 
they could engage in a nuclear war with the USSR and limit the 
damage done to their country to an 'acceptable' level. Most of 
them, however, still thought that the disparity in prospective 
damage to the Soviet Union, derived from the American quantitative 
1. Alexander Atkinson, Social Order and the General Theory of 
Strategy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981,9. In this 
interesting study, the author convincingly shows that the 
Chinese strategic theory of prolonged people's war, based on 
land revolution and guerrilla warfare, represented a decisive 
break with the 'classical', Clausewitzian, tradition. His 
discussion of contemporary Communist views on the status of 
nuclear strategy is, however, rather perfunctory; in parti- 
cular, he does not deal with the implications of Mao's cele- 
brated 'paper tigers' theory of nuclear weapons. On this 
point, see Andre Glucksmann, Le Discours de la Guerre, Editions 
de 1'Herne, Paris, 1967,285-352 
2. 'The Soviets' - writes Gerald Smith - 'seldom take up their 
strategic pens to try to rationalize the irrational. ' 
(Double- 
talk, 25) 
3. See Etzold & Gaddis, 167 
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and qualitative advantages in nuclear forces, gave them the 
political leverage to prevail in any critical confrontation. 
1 
Circumstances have changed, but basic notions on the 'political' 
utility of the nuclear arsenals have not. It would be too easy 
to dismiss the view that 'superiority' in nuclear weapons and 
delivery systems conveys to the possessor meaningful political 
and military leverage as a 'persistent myth'; 
2 
but in nuclear 
strategy it is the decision-makers' beliefs that matter, not an 
abstract conception of what is 'rational'. To be sure, the ex- 
perience of the last thirty years shows that it is unlikely that 
a persuasive answer can be found to the challenge of designing 
a 'positive' nuclear strategy 'sufficiently plausible to appear 
as a tolerably rational course of action which has a realistic 
chance of leading to a satisfactory outcome'. 
3 
But this extra- 
ordinarily dangerous search will continue, at least on the 
American side, unless a new vision of politics controls the 
prevailing urge to dominate through the technologies of total 
destruction. As Kissinger's case showed, even though on the one 
hand he tried to impose some measure of control on the arms race, 
on the other he pushed for the development of more sophisticated 
war-winning strategies in the name of 'deterrence'. The precarious 
results of several years of efforts in the field of arms control 
under Kissinger's direction are an eloquent testimony both of 
the relentless drive of the technological arms race and of the 
ultimate futility of a foreign policy obsessed with 'stability'. 
There remains a question that must be dealt with 
before turning to the concluding section of this study. If, as 
argued earlier, the nuclear order is a 'grown' order in the 
sense already explained, what could be the consequences of inter- 
fering with it, of trying to alter it in a direction opposite to 
the one it has been following during almost four decades, that 
is, the direction of real arms control and disarmament rather 
than of a continuous increase in the nuclear arsenals and all 
the paraphernalia of nuclear destruction ? Would this be likely 
to produce a loss of control and a drift towards nuclear 'anarchy' 
as dangerous, or perhaps even more so, than the risks deriving 
1. See Betts, 'Elusive Equivalence', 109 
2. Moulton, 310 
3 Freedman, The Evolution---., 395 
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from any attempt to implement a 'limited' nuclear war ? 
It would, I think, be mistaken to try to answer these 
questions by pointing out that there is an obvious difference 
between the nuclear order 'at rest', as it were, and an activated 
nuclear order in conditions of war. In the first case, it might 
be said, the possibilities of political control are much greater 
as shown by the viability of the deterrence process; but this 
argument again leaves aside the fact that the deterrence process 
'lives' through a systematic and permanent increase in the 
nuclear arsenals and the elaboration of ever more sophisticated 
'war-winning' strategies, thus necessarily multiplying the risks 
of a cataclysmic war. We simply do not know what would happen 
if leaders in both the US and the USSR tried decisively to curb 
the momentum of the arms race, and even progressively dismantle 
the nuclear arsenals. The US - and, to a lesser extent, the 
USSR - is a society geared to constant technological innovation; 
its economy thrives on military expenditure and weapons production, 
and there are powerful domestic interests in both countries 
committed to maintaining the highest possible pitch of international 
confrontation as an 'insurance' against a foreign policy based 
on principles other than 'peace through strength'. 
It is therefore quite clear that creative leadership 
in the field of foreign policy in the US would also require making 
the foundations of the American social and economic orders the 
object of critical reflection, which might perhaps come finally 
to the conclusion that technology may increase the weakness as 
well as the power of man, that at present we are probably more 
powerless over our own creations than we have ever been before, 




When Henry Kissinger assumed the office of Presidential 
Adviser for National Security Affairs, US foreign policy was 
undergoing a profound ideological crisis - both at the level of 
its legitimating 'liberal' claims and with respect to the 
'fundamental' conservative-realist principles which had deter- 
mined its formulation for decades. The myth of a 'liberal' foreign 
policy geared to the defence of democracy and human rights had 
been shattered, together with the 'realist' premises that had 
done so much to take the US into Vietnam; but at the same time 
a combination of international turmoil and domestic upheaval 
created propitious circumstances for a substantial change of 
direction. Innovation was possible and also necessary in order 
to avoid a repetition of costly mistakes, to relate the US to 
emerging forces in world politics, and to restore an equilibrium 
between the ethical values that give cohesion to a democratic 
society and its actions abroad. 
There were basically two alternatives for the new 
a Administration: in the first place, to implement a 'holding 
operation' that would preserve the basic features of the con- 
servative-realist definition of the American national interest, 
but would also include diplomatic and tactical adjustments in 
response to a changed environment that demanded, at least tempo- 
rarily, a more differentiated policy of global 'containment'. 
In theory, the second option open to the Kissinger-Nixon team 
was to set in motion a process of redefinition of the prevailing 
notions of national interest and security, and of the objectives 
of US foreign policy, questioning the 'fundamental' ideological 
presuppositions that had guided this policy until the Vietnam 
debacle, and also the role played by the 'liberal' ideological 
discourse as a legitimating device disconnected from US actions - 
particularly in the Third World. 
What makes the 'Kissinger period' so relevant from the 
point of view of its impact on policy, and so illuminating as a 
case-study on the relationship between political ideas and foreign 
policy, is that Kissinger - and, to a lesser extent, Nixon - was 
aware of the need for change and had the intellectual prowess and 
effective power to face the challenge of innovation. He was, 
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however, crucially handicapped by an ideological framework 
rooted in the tenets of the 'realist' tradition and decisively 
permeated by a narrow view of politics that left almost no room 
for creativity. Kissinger, on one hand, had a sense of history, 
a concern for the limits of power, an awareness of the reality 
of human fallibility, and an abstract predilection for 'peace' - 
to be enjoyed by those powerful enough to participate in, and 
reap the benefits from, the 'balance of power'; but all these 
principles were subordinated to his conservative commitment to 
the defence of the international status quo and of the US privi- 
leged position in it. This ideological commitment prescribed a 
mission which not only justified, but also demanded, a militarized 
foreign policy that in the circumstances of the time also included 
the attempt to co-opt the USSR and China as interested guardians 
of 'stability'. In the Third World this policy led to a conscious 
and determined strengthening of the links between the US and the 
forces of popular repression and exploitation in Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America; it was a policy that militantly opposed Third 
World nationalism and that consequently turned its back on one 
of the most powerful forces shaping contemporary international 
relations. 
1 
1. As an example, among many others, of Kissinger's profound 
antipathy towards expressions of Third World nationalism, 
consider his view of the Suez crisis and of Nasser's signi- 
ficance as an Arab leader - as expounded in a May 1982 lecture 
delivered at Chatham House: 'Britain and France' - said 
Kissinger - 'were acting on a strategic analysis that may have 
been traditional and even self-serving but was far from 
frivolous... Eden's perception was that a dangerous precedent 
was being set: can there be any dispute of this today ? Had 
Nasser's course been shown a failure, a quite different pattern 
of international relations would have developed... As it turned 
out, Nasser's policy was vindicated; revolutions spread in the 
Middle East in the following years, and he has countless imi- 
tators today around the world... ' ('Reflections on a Partner- 
ship: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy', 
International Affairs, Vol 58, No 4,1982,583). Thus, ac- 
cording to Kissinger, the US should have sided with the Franco- 
British neo-colonialist adventure even though it was widely 
condemned by the overwhelming majority of Third World nations 
and by many other countries as no more than a militarily in- 
competent and politically misguided expedition. In this passage 
Kissinger shows no understanding at all of Nasser's symbolic 
importance as an Arab nationalist, nor any sympathy towards 
Nasser's attempts to recover an independent voice for the Arab 
world, and he also begs the question why Nasser asked the 
Soviets for help as a result of Western hostility toward his 
nationalist aims. 
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From the point of view of its ideological foundations, 
what Kissinger introduced into the formulation of American foreign 
policy was a deeper sense of the historic and philosophical roots 
of conservatism, a willingness not to be blinded by the dogmas 
of official propaganda of the 'liberal' kind, and to try to act 
in accordance with a sober assessment of the balance of forces 
and the limitations it imposed on the exercise of US power. Thus, 
it is misleading to argue, as Caldwell has done, that Kissinger's 
'grand design and grand strategy reflected continental European 
values rather than the idealistic approach to foreign policy of 
the United States'. 
1 
In fact, what Kissinger attempted to do was 
to take into account the reality of the breakdown of the domestic 
ideological consensus on foreign policy, and the effects of the 
deterioration of the 'liberal' myth, by making a more thoughtful 
estimate of what was possible in the new conditions. He in no 
way betrayed a supposedly 'idealistic' stand in US foreign policy, 
but simply de-emphasized a legitimating 'liberal' line of dis- 
course which in any case had lost much of its previous mobilizing 
pull as a result of Vietnam. The view that the Nixon Administration 
'robbed the Soviet-American conflict of the moral and political 
dimensions for the sake of which sacrifices could be intelligibly 
demanded by the government and willingly made by the people', 
2 
totally misses the point as to which were the real strengths and 
weaknesses of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. At the time 
they took office, the 'moral' element in US foreign policy had 
suffered an almost irretrievable blow; what they did was to go 
through a difficult transition period while avoiding as far as 
possible - and according to the traditional 'realist' 
interpre- 
tation of American foreign policy objectives - the sacrifice of 
interests that should, in their view, be preserved, and the com- 
promise of positions that should be maintained intact. It has 
taken the Carter 'human rights' campaign, and the policies of 
a 'resurgent America' as - in President Reag-an'. s words - 'the 
last, best hope of man'3 to restore to some extent, especially in 
1. D. Caldwell, 'The Policies of Henry Kissinger', in Caldwell 
(ed), Henry Kissinger. His Personality and Policies, Duke 
University Press, Durham NC, 1983,127 
2. podhoretz, 25 
3. Quoted in R. G. Kaiser, 'Your Host of Hosts', The New York 
Review of Books, June 28 1984,41 
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the US domestic scene, the conformist acquiescence in the 'liberal' 
mythology. 
The Nixon-Kissinger policy reformulation called 
rhetorically for a new awareness of the inherent limits of US 
power, yet it was not prepared to accept a substantial change 
in role or to redefine American interests. Kissinger's powerful 
defence of the Administration's foreign policy record in his 
Memoirs makes a lot out of the effects of the Watergate crisis, 
which, in his view, 'prevented the full fruition of the prospects 
then before us - not only in nurturing US-Soviet relations but 
more generally in developing a new structure of international 
relations'. 
1 
I hope to have shown in this study why I think 
Kissinger's assertion distorts the nature and impact both of the 
Administration's policy - which sought to preserve the status 
quo and not to 'restructure' the international system - and also 
of the Watergate crisis - which was intimately connected to the 
Administration's generalized attempts to hide its policy-making 
process from democratic public scrutiny. On the other hand, a 
strong case can be made that Kissinger and Nixon should be given 
the credit for steering US foreign policy through a complex and 
demanding period, while reducing the scope of any devolution from 
the previously held American positions to the benefit of either 
major allies or adversaries. 
2 
But even Kissinger admits that his 
tactical 'successes' - in East-West relations, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia and Latin America for example - left 'a residue 
reflecting the unprecedented challenge of our period'; a con- 
viction that 'the moral imperative of leadership in our time was 
to keep open the prospect, however slim, of a fundamental change..? 
This raises the issue of the criteria for judging a 
statesman's achievements. In his analysis of Metternich's diplo- 
macy Kissinger provided a clue to the problem, when he argued 
that the Austrian Foreign Minister's 'identification of stability 
with the status quo in the middle of a revolutionary period... 
obscured the real nature of his achievements, that he was merely 
1. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1254 
2. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 235-46,300-01; G. Liska, 
Beyond Kissinger, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 
1975,64 
3. Kissinger, The White House Years, 1255 
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hiding the increasing anachronism of Austria in a century of 
nationalism and liberalism: that he was but delaying the inevi- 
table day of reckoning. '1 My basic point in this study has been 
that Kissinger's tactical dexterity was deeply flawed by his 
lack of a political vision transcending the dogma of stability 
as an end in itself, and by his inability to go to the ideo- 
logical roots of American foreign policy, subject them to criti- 
cism, and rescue them from the sterility of the conservative 
commitment to the defence of the international status quo. 
All historical analogies must be treated with caution, 
for of course historical events are essentially unique. There is 
apparently nothing in common between the situation of Austria in 
the 19th century and the contemporary United States; and to many 
it would seem, to say the least, paradoxical to apply the term 
'anachronistic' to what is surely the most dynamic and innovative 
society - in science, technology, social mores, and probably a 
score of other fields of human activity - of our troubled times. 
And yet, in the field of foreign policy, the US is governed by 
an ideology that clashes with the aspirations of many millions 
of people around the world, an ideology which seeks to accomplish 
the impossible task of maintaining 'order' - conceived as stabi- 
lity - in a world which 'will not allow three billion people to 
live as Americans live or to grow as the American economy grows', 
2 
and that is committed to blocking any significant restructuring 
of international relations to the benefit of the weaker countries 
in the system. 
A foreign policy becomes ideologically anachronistic 
when, rather than creatively channelling the unsettling effects 
of a revolutionary period, it attempts systematically to destroy 
the possibilities for change; and this is precisely what US 
leaders have been trying to do in order to preserve their 
country's privileged position in the international system. This 
is what Kissinger tried to do, and though he scored a number of 
short-term tactical successes, he left the basic features of a 
policy geared to the struggle against social and political trans- 
formation in the Third World and to the use of force as the key 
1. Kissinger, A World Restored, 321 
2. D. H. Rosenberg, 'Arms and the American Way', in B. M. Russett 
and A. Stepan 
(eds), Military Force and American Society, 
Harper & Row, New York, 1973,193 
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instrument of international politics essentially unchanged. His 
conception of international relations was narrowly confined to 
interaction among principal governments, and was insensitive to 
the historical forces that are 'enlivening human awareness of 
inequities' 1 in the international system. The problem was not 
that he 'ignored'2 the Third World, but that he acted towards 
it as a source of threats and not as a challenge for creativity, 
and while it is true that - to quote Carr - 'The business of the 
politician is to consider not merely what is morally or theore- 
tically desirable, but also the forces which exist in the world, 
and how they can be directed or manipulated to probably partial 
realizations of the ends in view', 
3 
it is also true that the 
statesman's creativity depends on his ability to go beyond pure 
manipulation, and to pursue a mission dignified by values other 
than power, stability, and the defence of privilege. The state 
is indeed 'at best a mediator between the objective and the ulti- 
mate, between the norm and the value', in any given present4, but 
it is difficult to discern this attempt at 'mediation' in the 
conduct of US foreign policy under Kissinger and Nixon. 
Though one must not underestimate the fallibility of 
the critical enterprise and the power of resistances, the US is 
an open society and it is still possible to hope that its foreign 
npolicy can be gradually directed away from the premises of con- 
servative-realism and reconciled in practice with a vision of 
politics based on the values of democracy, freedom, justice, and 
human rights. In a world of sovereign states, of course, where 
the US has to deal with other, very powerful and antagonistic 
states, there will always be a tension between ethics and power; 
but this reality should not be taken as an excuse to deprive the 
conduct of foreign policy of a moral framework, nor should it 
be considered a justification of conservatism. An alternative 
US foreign policy would not require the 'abolition of the sove- 
reign state', nor the establishment of 'world government', 
but 
1. Falk, What is Wrong with Henry Kissing er's Foreign Policy ?, 
35 
2. M. Howard, 'Kissinger', in The Causes of War, 270 
3. E. H. Carr, What is History ?, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1964, 
128 




a reorientation of politics and a redefinition of the US national 
interest on the basis of the critique - rather than the accep- 
tance - of the international status quo. The constant struggle 
for a gradual reconciliation between political values and the 
actual practice of politics is essential for the preservation 
of the institutions of an open, liberal-democratic society, for 
if the choice between freedom and the defence of human rights, 
on the one hand, and coercion on the other, is treated as purely 
a matter of expediency, freedom is bound to be sacrificed in 
almost every instance. There probably are few restrictions on 
freedom which could not be justified on the grounds that we do 
not know the particular loss they will cause. 
1 
This is also true 
in the field of foreign policy, where the 'realist' perspective, 
that systematically sacrifices principles for the sake of ex- 
pediency, has hardly produced the results that its defenders 
advocate: 'Instead of having achieved greater mastery over our 
fate we find ourselves in fact more frequently committed to a 
path which we have not deliberately chosen, and faced with "in- 
evitable necessities" of further action which, though never in- 
tended, are the result of what we have done. '2 This comment, though 
not specifically related to this discussion, in my view aptly 
encapsulates the evolution of US foreign policy toward the Third 
World, and also, I think of US nuclear strategy as an instrument 
of policy. 
A reorientation of politics along the lines here sug- 
gested would of course demand a move away from the traditional 
Machiavellian 'realist' ethics of statecraft toward a cosmopolitan- 
Kantian conception of international morality, 
3 
an ethical-political 
posture that would not use the issue of human rights and the 
defence of freedom primarily as a tool of warfare against the 
USSR, but as a pillar of a policy clearly aimed at narrowing the 
gap between the values of a liberal society and its foreign policy 
practice. 
4 
Whether this 'reorientation' will ever take place is 
1. Hayek, Law, Legislation..., Vol I, 57 
2. ibid, 59 
3. See C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979,181-3 
4. S. Hoffman, 'Reaching for the Most Difficult: Human Rights as 
a Foreign Policy Goal', Daedalus, Vol 112, No 
4, Fall 1983, 
37-8 
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at this stage an open question, and even though there are ample 
grounds for pessimism, it must also be recognized that human 
beings are capable of bringing to consciousness the interpretations 
they tacitly accept, and can subject them to rational criticism. 
While I admit that ideological criticism is not in itself suf- 
ficient to bring about meaningful change, I also think that - as 
Bernstein writes - one must 'beware of thinking that history is 
working behind the backs of human beings, that critique can never 
be efficacious, never become a "material force"'. 
I 
This is why I 
believe that fundamental innovation - if and when it occurs - in 
US foreign policy can only be the result of criticism of the 
ideological premises that have guided its formulation for most 
of its history as a great power in the western hemisphere and 
the world at large. 
Earlier in this study, 
2 
I argued that the challenge 
for the conservative statesman consists in transcending the 
present, thinking towards the future and trying to foresee the 
transformations that may occur, with the ultimate purpose of 
creatively channelling change and avoiding the high costs of 
revolution. I now conclude that - in spite of his brilliant 
tactical successes - Kissinger did not overcome this basic 
challenge; and while I agree that it is not easy to discern how 
far the failure of political ideology in the West thus far has 
been 'a failure of sobriety' and how far it has been 'a failure 
of imagination', 
3 
as far as Kissinger is concerned I submit, 
finally, that his failure to go beyond the narrow boundaries of 
'realism' was definitely not a setback attributable to moral 
'sobriety' but a failure of political imagination. 
1. R. J. Bernstein, The Restructur 
Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 197 
2. See Chapter 4+ of this thesis 
3. Dunn, 114 
n of Social and Political 
23 
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NOTE ON SOURCES 
In view of the widely divergent opinions expressed by 
a multitude of reviewers about the accuracy and significance of 
Kissinger's two massive volumes of Memoirs, a few final words 
on their value as a research tool for this study may be in order. 
The key point that has to be made is that a decision- 
maker's reconstruction of his activities in office is in most 
cases a potentially important source of data about his beliefs, 
values, attitudes, and, in short, his ideological framework. As 
an additional source of data, a policy-maker's Memoirs provide 
one further means of access to his view of the world and of him- 
self as an actor intervening in the shaping of historical events. 
A clear distinction should be made, however, between the 
actual utility of Memoirs as a source that can contribute to the 
understanding of a decision-maker's political convictions and 
attitudes, and their value and accuracy as a historical source. 
In other words, a review of Kissinger's sDmetimes highly distorted 
version of history should not be confused with an assessment of 
the Memoirs as reflecting the author's own ideological perspective. 
In this study I have tried to show that, for example, 
Kissinger's account of the origins and development of the US 
intervention in South East Asia and Chile, and also of the purposes 
of American foreign policy in general, leaves much to be desired 
so far as historical truthfulness is concerned. On the other hand, 
I think that the contents of both The White House Years and Years 
of Upheaval confirm the point that Kissinger had a well-defined 
belief system, and that he acted on it; also, as Starr has em- 
phasized, these volumes of Memoirs indicate that Kissinger 
'framed his retrospective in terms of that belief system'. 
2 In sum, 
Kissinger both reconstructed and described his actions in office 
in a manner consistent with his ideological belief system. 
1. H. Starr, 'The Kissinger Years. Studying Individuals and 
Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly, Vol 24+, No 4, 
1980,469. This is an excellent analysis of the continuity 
between Kissinger's scholarly works and his Memoirs. 
2. ibid, 493 
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Thus, I disagree with Tuchman's view that 'The book 
(White House Years) is all record, no assessment', 
I 
and share 
Michael Howard's point that Kissinger's Memoirs are 'an apologia 
... in the literal meaning of the word: a presentation of his 
beliefs'. 2 This is why I have used them confidently as a source 
in several sections of this work. Much the same can be said 
about Nixon's own volume of recollections. It would of course 
be absurd to take him at his word when he tries to disentangle 
the various threads of, for instance, the Watergate affair, but 
the book is invaluable as a guide to Nixon's views on politics 
in general, and international politics in particular. Not all 
Memoirists reveal so much about themselves, their beliefs and 
attitudes, as Kissinger and Nixon have done. In this sense I 
think it is fair to say that they have made a significant con- 
tribution to the study of their period in office. 
1. Barbara W. Tuchman, 'Kissinger: Self-Portrait', in Practising 
HistorY, Macmillan, London, 1983,219 
2. M. Howard, The Causes of War, 267 
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Table 1 
Twenty Largest US Trading Partners, 1981 
($ billions and percentages) 
The twenty largest US trading partners, 
merchandise transactions, include eleven 
which together account for more than 26% 
and almost 22% of all US exports. Mexico 
trading partner of the United States. 
Total 
T7^anýari-i nnc 
in terms of total 
developing countries, 
of all such transactions 
is the third largest 
Exports Imports 
Canada $ 86.0 $ 39.6 $ 46.4 
Japan 59.4 21.8 37.6 
Mexico 31.6 17.8 13.8 
United Kingdom 25.2 12.4 12.8 
Saudi Arabia 21.7 7.3 14.4 
Germany, Fed Rep 21.7 10.3 11.4 
France 13.2 7.3 5.9 
Taiwan 12.3 4.3 8.0 
Venezuela 11.0 5.4 5.6 
Netherlands 11.0 8.6 2.4 
Nigeria 10.7 1.5 9.2 
Italy 10.6 5.4 5.2 
Korea, Rep 10.2 5.1 5.1 
Brazil 8.3 3.8 4.5 
Belgium-Luxembourg 8.1 5.8 2.3 
Hong Kong 8.0 2.6 5.4 
Australia 7.7 5.2 2.5 
Indonesia 7.3 1.3 6.0 
Libya 6.1 0.8 5.3 
Algeria 5.7 0.7 5.0 
Total, 20 Countries $375.8 $167.0 $208.8 
Total, 
11 Developing 132.9 50.6 82.3 
' Countries 
Total US Trade $495.0 $233.7 $261.3 
11 Developing Countries 26.8% 21.7% 31.5% 
as % of Total US Trade 
Source of Tables 1-5 : J. P. Lewis and V. Kallah (eds), US Foreign 
Policy and the Third World: Agenda 1983, 
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Table 5 
Sources of US Crude Petroleum Imports, 1969-1981 






Percentage Shares of US Imports 
1970 1975 
OPEC Countries 46% 78% 
Non-OPEC Developing Countries 3% 7% 
Developed Countries 51% 15% 
Average Annual Growth Rates of US Imports 
1969-7q 1979-78 
OPEC Countries 29.4% 19.9% 
Non-OPEC Developing Countries 9.9% 34.4% 
Developed Countries 15.9% -12.2% 
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